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Abstract
In this thesis I propose an improved theory of ontological commitment, one which is neutral
on epistemology. Although Quine’s quantificational criterion of ontological commitment
has many advantages over its competitors, like its univocal treatment of being and exis-
tence, its clear account of ontological reduction and its capacity to accommodate implicit
commitments, I argue that it has a fatal flaw: the inability to account for ontological com-
mitment to individuals. Quine’s choice of a first-order language of regimentation without
constants is so entwined with his holist epistemology that imputations of existence cannot
be made except to objects-qua-F, qua some wholly third-personal description. Commit-
ments of those who believe that minds reach out directly to objects by means of acquain-
tance or introspection, encoded in language by constants, are ungrammatical in Quine’s
language. This breakdown of grammaticality, on my view, is an avoidable result of Quine’s
behaviourism and holist epistemology filtering into his choice of canonical language. I opt
for a broader conception of ontological commitments as incurred by formalised theories
with one or more semantic categories of categorematic objectual expressions, whose func-
tion is to stand for objects. I expand the language of regimentation at least to first-order
logic with constants and identity. This preserves the attractive features of Quine’s position.
It retains its elegant treatment of reduction and implicit ontological commitments, and its
capacity to explain away Meinongian confusions, without being beholden to global holism.
My canonical language makes room for acquaintance and first-personal methods as sources
of ontological commitment. It has the advantage of allowing theories like Quine’s, which
confine themselves to objects-qua-F, to be regimented as well as non-holist theories whose
criteria of ontological commitment are ‘to be is to be the referent of a name’ or ‘to be is
to be the value of a constant or variable’.
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Introduction
Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment states that a theory’s ontology is determined by
appealing to the existentially quantified consequences of its translation into a first-order for-
mal language, closed under consequence. It has recently come under fire as neo-Carnapian,
Meinongian, and natural-language based approaches, among others, have gained support. I
take as a point of departure a mostly-neglected challenge of a different kind: the problem of
ontological commitment to individuals. It is a curious consequence of Quine’s view that it
prohibits the use of constants, names, or any directly referential expressions in the language
of regimentation, ruling out commitment to an individual qua individual. I intend to make
a case for a more liberal conception of ontological commitment—more wide-ranging than
Quine’s—which allows for commitment to individuals, with an improved logical language of
regimentation. The reason for Quine’s prohibition on commitment to individuals, I argue,
is that his choice of canonical language is heavily informed by his holist epistemology, in
which objects are just posits, always potentially dispensable. But non-holists can coher-
ently attempt to commit to individuals using directly referential expressions, modelled in
a formal language as constants. While holding on to the insight that a logical language is a
helpful medium for ontology, I will propose instead a more permissive language of regimen-
tation, one expanded to permit (at least) the use of constants to record attempts to commit
to individuals. It allows us to regiment non-holist theories with alternative name-based or
name-and-variable-based criteria of commitment as well as Quinean theories.
Ontological commitment, in the wider sense in which I use the term, is borne by those
theories that contain a certain semantic category, or categories, whose function it is to
denote objects: the objectual expressions. An objectual expression should be taken as
committing to the object it stands for. The first chapter will be mostly expository, laying
out the details of Quinean commitment and showing where and how it is indebted to
holism and behaviourism. The only kind of committing expression Quine countenances is
the pronoun—that is, in formalised theories, the objectual first-order variable. Pronouns,
according to him, serve to introduce reification into a theory by marking the presence
of a posit on the intersection of significant observations. Pronominal expressions turn
non-logical observations into complex sentences with a logical part, the variable, and an
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ideological part, the non-logical predicate. In this way, logical grammar separates being
(existence, being an object) from nature (what is true of the objects). Quine also takes
this to imply that theories can only be committed to objects-qua-F, objects insofar as they
satisfy some open formula. His idea of what an object is is imbued with global holism, which
equates objecthood with positing an entity where observations overlap, any object being
always potentially dispensable. He explains how by semantic ascent, taking note of what
kinds of expressions a rival theory uses to refer to things, we can make sense of ascribing an
ontology to someone else without endorsing it. Ascending to the metalanguage means we
are in a position to disquote and identify the objectual expressions, those whose semantic
role is object-involving, without having to use them ourselves to refer. Semantic ascent
allows us to avoid talking past each other. Formal languages have two major advantages
over natural languages: they show on the surface which expressions are the objectual
ones, and, having well-defined consequence relations, they can yield a determinate set of
existential consequences, including those that would have remained implicit in natural-
language theories.
Critics of Quine typically argue that an alternative meta-ontology, a wholly different strat-
egy for asking and answering ontological questions, is called for: one that gives pride of
place to ordinary language, or is framed in a non-classical canonical notation. The chal-
lenge I am interested in, commitment to individuals, does not demand a radical overhaul
of that kind. I want to amend the language of regimentation to allow for criteria of com-
mitment compatible with foundationalist or intermediate epistemologies, for which ‘to be
is to be the value of a variable’ is not sufficient in all cases. My emendations preserve
the idea that the committing expressions of a regimented language reveal the theory’s on-
tology. In chapter 2, I explain how ontological commitment with regimentation (in the
broad sense I have introduced above) is able to withstand some classic attempts to un-
dermine it that some say augur for an alternative meta-ontology. In particular, we can
answer those advocating ordinary language or Meinongian languages as a means of set-
tling ontological questions. Unlike natural languages, formal canonical languages have the
advantage of determinate consequence relations, are free from ambiguity, and provide an
elegant treatment of ontological reduction and elimination. First-order logical grammar
neatly separates being, connoted by the logical variables, from nature, ascribed by the
non-logical predicates. Advocates of commitment would aim to translate any purported
ontological vocabulary into the vocabulary of being, or objecthood, that quantifier-variable
notation brings to the language, and all other vocabulary as ascribing different natures.
Logic is the most inclusive and impartial theory, whose subject matter comprises being,
or objecthood. The objects’ natures are filled in by the special sciences. Instead of giving
in to so-called ‘ways of being’, we should translate all differences as differences in nature
between objects that are alike in being. Unless the notion of a being or object is itself
deficient, what could be wrong with taking all and only words whose function is just to
single out objects as ontologically committing?
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Yet the question remains why genuine proper names, or words like ‘I’, or ‘this’, or ‘that’,
should not under some circumstances count as committing expressions. This is the subject
of chapter 3. Intuitively, we commit to an object when we mention it by name, explicitly
assert it exists, or quietly rely upon it for our explanations. The latter two are covered by
Quine’s criterion. Existence claims, implicit or explicit, all come out as existentially quanti-
fied consequences of a regimented theory. But direct reference seems to invite commitment
in a different way: it can be used to capture in language acts of ostension, acquaintance or
other forms of direct contact with objects. Although these expressions appear to us to be
clearly objectual, Quine’s language of regimentation lacks individual constants to model
direct reference. His claim that this is for reasons of grammatical economy conceals a more
likely explanation: Quinean commitment only countenances objects-qua-F because holism
demands that contact with an object is always mediated by a complete theory. It seems
counter to the aims of meta-ontology, though, to declare commitment to an individual sim-
ply ungrammatical. Ontological questions arise for philosophers all across the epistemic
spectrum, for foundationalists as well as for holists.
Quine managed to avoid reducing non-existence claims to nonsense by ascending to the
semantic plane, distinguishing between disquoting a coherent statement and endorsing
it, between meaningful expressions and referential ones. That irenic strategy avoids the
disputants talking past one another, each taking the opposition to speak nonsense. If di-
rect reference has no equivalent in the language of regimentation, though, this will still
be the fate of attempts to commit by direct reference, such as Descartes’ cogito. There
are theoretical contexts where commitment can only be direct, not indirect. The cog-
ito is essentially first-personal and resists translation into Quine’s strictly third-personal,
behaviourist idiom. Millian names, which denote without connoting, cannot, as Quine
recommends, be translated away as descriptions, since there may be strong evidence to
suggest that although a satisfies all the same open formulae as b, a is nonetheless distinct
from b. But this possibility is blocked off on Quine’s holist treatment of individuals, so
another uncomfortable consequence of his view is that it leads him to treat identity as
indiscernibility-within-a-language, satisfaction of all the same open formulae.
Adding constants to the language of regimentation will ensure that more imputations of
existence can be translated as such, without giving up the precision and clarity of quantified
logic. Such a language would have two categories of committing expressions: variables and
constants. But one of the advantages of using logical grammar as a medium for settling
ontological questions was that it forces a split between the logical/ontological and the
non-logical/ideological vocabulary. Chapter 4 addresses the objection that all committing
expressions must be logical expressions if we are to maintain the kind of logical realism
which supports the view that logic helps us separate being from nature. In the second
chapter I defended a Quinean-inspired view of existence as the most expansive category
(everything there is exists) on the grounds that logic treats all objects equally, leaving
the sorting and ordering of them to the special sciences. Still, that does not imply that
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objectual expressions are all logical expressions, only that some expressions denote without
connoting, leaving all connotation to the ideological vocabulary. Constants can fill that
role as well as variables. Quine’s account demands that committing expressions must be
logical expressions, because variables represent objecthood by their role of introducing a
posit. But the idea that objecthood equals positing is indebted to holist epistemology.
It might be argued that science demands of us that we view objecthood as equivalent to
positing, because science is only concerned with objects insofar as they play a particular
role in a system, not as individuals. That, though, has the uncomfortable consequence
that we must think of identity as indiscernibility after all, and proscribes the use of any
first-personal, introspective, or ostensive methods in the sciences under any circumstances,
even where such methods promote the aims of science, notably in psychology.
The main attraction of Quine’s account becomes apparent when it is considered inde-
pendently of the holism he espouses: logic is a useful vehicle for asking and answering
ontological questions, because logic, the most general theory of all, incorporates the notion
of a being or object, and ontology aims to provide an inventory of the beings. Chapter 5
considers what the argument is to keep objecthood as a logical notion, if we let go of the
idea that all object-involving words are logical words. First of all, logic’s having a sub-
ject matter, even when the subject matter includes being, is despite appearances perfectly
compatible with logic’s being topic-neutral. Topic-neutrality, for modern logic, is not the
Kantian claim that logic is not about being at all, concerned only with the form of thought
or language. That claim presents logic as being a fundamentally different kind of theory
from all others, a merely linguistic discipline whose truth is independent of any fact. In my
view logic is not different in kind from other theories, but continuous with them. It differs
from them in being more general, not in being any less concerned with reality. Logic is
about objects, but it treats all objects equally, not discriminating according to the nature
of things: it is an impartial enquiry. The truths of logic, like all other truths, are true
because they represent their subject matter correctly. The subject matter of logic includes
objecthood : objects in the most general sense, independently of their natures.
Quine, as we noted before, has his own independent reasons for having a logical notion of
objecthood, though a rather thin one: no more than being the value of a variable sitting
where observations stubbornly overlap. Its characteristic expressions, the variables, are
logical expressions. But the idea that a posit is no more than the locus of some confluence
of natures carries in its wake Quine’s view of identity as indiscernibility-within-the-theory.
His thin objects are hard to accept for non-holists, for whom contact with an object is
sometimes direct rather than mediated by a complete theory. Chapter 6 is concerned to
show how our language of regimentation can accommodate thinner as well as richer con-
ceptions of objecthood compatible with a wide spectrum of epistemological positions. To
this effect I combine Frege’s contention that logic incorporates the notion of different rep-
resentations centring on a common object with Barcan Marcus’ degrees of extensionality.
Instead of mandatory criteria of identity, this allows us the option to introduce principles
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of extensionality for particular ontological categories, stipulating that their members can
be declared identical for the purposes of a theory in particular theoretically salient cir-
cumstances. Sets, for instance, are explicitly extensionalised: they are considered identical
whenever they have all and only the same members. This tallies well with our mode of ac-
cess to these kinds of things: for ontological categories whose members we can only access
by description or abstraction, some kind of identification of indiscernibles holds; objects
taken by a certain theory as being accessed directly may be discerned directly, ostensively,
or introspectively, even where they are indiscernible descriptively. Identity, on this view,
can be primitive for some theories we translate into canonical notation: foundationalist
theories which countenance only direct access to objects. Holist systems are rendered as
having extensionalising principles for all kinds of entities. Intermediate systems can have
primitive identity for some metaphysical categories, extensionalised equivalence for others.
The translation process should take into account whether the theory being translated into
canonical notation allows for direct or indirect access to objects, or both. So we will be
in a position to conclude in favour of a conception of ontological commitment with reg-
imentation as translation into a properly logical language and identifying the objectual
expressions, without having to accept behaviourism or holism. Direct, indirect and hybrid
criteria of commitment are all made possible using a canonical language with the expres-
sive strength of at least first-order logic with constants and identity. Besides upholding
the positive features of Quinean commitment—a univocal treatment of being, clear ex-
planations of ontological reduction and implicit commitment, a realist theory of logic and
quantification—it also makes room for alternative epistemologies and first-personal com-
mitment.
I intend to advocate for a broader kind of ontological commitment with a more inclusive
formal language of regimentation, showing that ontological commitment in my sense—
determining the values of the committing expressions of a theory translated into a logical
language—is compatible with many otherwise un-Quinean positions on metaphysics, phi-
losophy of logic and epistemology. Part of my goal is irenic: to show that adopting what
I think of as the good parts of Quine—clear and rigorous methods, keeping philosophical
ontology continuous with the scientific practice of introducing objects where there is an in-
dispensable need for them—is an option for more philosophers than previously supposed.
Not only does the possibility of direct commitment by acquaintance or ostension make
a commitment-based approach to ontology available to the votaries of such methods in
epistemology, but they are also potentially of interest to the philosophy of psychology and
psychiatry. Scientists working in those disciplines have now mostly renounced behaviourism
and are open to non-behaviourist methodology. It seems likely that first-personal posits
will play some role in the regimented versions of their theories.
The philosophical ramifications of epistemology-neutral commitment may well extend to
many even more expansive potential languages of regimentation, to go with alternative
criteria of commitment space does not permit me to discuss. I do not want to delimit the
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range of languages of regimentation except to rule out Meinongian and neo-Meinongian
ones: those that are incompatible with a univocal treatment of being and existence and
its attendant vocabulary. I propose a modest expansion, the addition of constants, because
it lets me keep a strict separation between ontology and ideology, which, as evinced by
chapter 2, I see as a safe way to maintain a completely univocal treatment of existence. But
more permissive languages of regimentation may well be made consistent with doctrines
in the philosophy of logic which lack my requirement of strong impartiality. It can be
argued that they have been proposed already: for instance, Boolos [Boo84] can be read
as proposing a plural language of regimentation with the expressive power of monadic
second-order logic. Shapiro appears to indicate a wish to regiment in a second-order
language standardly interpreted [Sha00], while Williamson feels drawn to higher-order
posits, but takes properties to be the values of their variables. As he also takes modal
vocabulary to be indispensable to the ideology, he appears to be a proponent of a higher-
order modal language of regimentation [Wil13]. I have avoided discussing higher-order and
modal questions, partly for reasons of space, partly because of the difficulties of viewing all
their values as forming a single all-encompassing domain, which I think is needed to be able
to think of being as forming one maximally inclusive subject matter. But I certainly do
think of them as potential issues of commitment, with potential languages of regimentation
to go with them.
Since it is not particularly my ambition to present a Quinean account of commitment, or
to defend the historical Quine, there will be no exhaustive list of challenges to Quine and
responses on his behalf. There are also some stalwarts of Quinean systematic philosophy
which will occasionally be discussed, but on which I will not take a firm position, such
as semantic holism, the analytic-synthetic distinction, and modality. I have no wish to
support him on all counts. Another kind of challenge to Quine that will not make an
appearance here at all is that which takes one metaphysical category to function as the
touchstone of commitment, like truth-making or grounding. My interest here is in the
intersection of ontology with language, logic and epistemology. There are deep questions
related to commitment about how our minds reach out to objects (directly? indirectly
via a complete theory?) and how our language and our background theory allows us to
talk about them, about which these approaches seem to have nothing to say. I appreciate
Quine’s attempts to adhere to scientific methodology and his insistence that philosophy
should not contradict science, but be continuous with it. One of the points I take from him
and want to expand on is that logical grammar should not normally limit the theoretical
identifications that can be made. But the problem is that Quine himself limits developments
in this way, by barring first-personal methods and blocking investigation of mental states,
the observer, selves, etcetera. This is a consequence of his holism and behaviourism, not




1.1 Talking about Objects
Ontological questions are questions about what there is. Some are about what there is in
the very general sense of asking for an inventory of the world, a complete catalogue of all
the beings—‘What is there?’—others in the more specific sense of asking whether there are
things that answer to some particular description, or go into a circumscribed category—
‘Are there persons?’, ‘Are there numbers?’, ‘Is there a God?’. Besides ontology tout court,
we sometimes speak of a particular ontology: what there is according to someone. To find
out about someone’s ontology, we listen to what she says: what she makes reference to,
what she explicitly says exists, and what we can assume she must believe in in order for her
claims to make sense. On the surface, it is a simple matter to confirm or falsify someone’s
ontology: we check whether there is a being in the world for each item on her list, and she
will be caught out if she assumes there are things of a certain kind when the world contains
no such things.
A person’s ontology may prove much more elusive than appearances suggest. A speaker
intending to speak truly about the world can be assumed to have made an imputation
of existence to entities she invokes in the course of theorising: the things she mentions,
explicitly asserts there are, or tacitly relies upon. But there is no clear method to determine
whether some statement of English definitively does or does not invoke an entity. Whether
a sentence in isolation means that there is an object is often difficult to work out, even for
a true, unambiguous sentence which appears to be about some object or other. Does it
follow from the truth of ‘Rome was built on seven hills’ that there are such things as hills,
or Rome? Perhaps not; apparently referential terms like ‘Rome’ might be explained away
as convenient fictions, or as referring, not to a single thing, but to many things arranged in
a certain way. We cannot be sure, on the basis of an isolated claim, whether the speaker
13
means such words to function as genuine names, or deny them referential status. Does
‘Rome was built on seven hills’ entail that there is a number, namely seven? It does
if ‘Rome was built on seven hills’ is to be explained as ‘The number of hills on which
Rome was built is equal to seven’. Assuming a Russellian theory of descriptions, the latter
sentence does logically entail the claim ‘there is a number’. How can we tell if this is the
correct analysis of ‘Rome was built on seven hills’, though?
Not even sentences that explicitly contain the phrase ‘there is’ are an infallible guide to the
speaker’s ontology. A sociologist may truly say ‘There is a net migration from Mexico to
the USA.’ She does not mean that migrations are really objects out there in the world, but
would explain that this is an optional façon de parler. She would explain that ‘there is a net
migration from < x, y, z > to < u, v, w >’ means that more people move from < x, y, z >
to < u, v, w > than from < u, v, w > to < x, y, z >, so ‘There is a net migration from
Mexico to the USA’ is only a convenient shorthand for ‘More people move from Mexico to
the USA than from the USA to Mexico.’
Sometimes people attempt to get out of apparent existence claims. Perhaps they say they
didn’t mean to utter something true, but were making a joke or using poetic licence. Or
they protest that they expressed themselves inexactly. They didn’t mean that there is
such a person as ‘the average mother’; they meant to make general pronouncements about
mothers. New-found evidence may supplant old existence claims in some cases. Carefully
analysing the presuppositions of someone’s utterance can force them into accepting an
existence claim, or relieve them from one. This usually proves onerous because it is unclear
exactly which sentences they believe, or are rationally compelled to accept.
1.2 Criteria of Ontological Commitment
The above suggests that we need a general strategy to work out what there is according to
someone. If we are to use what someone says as a guide to her ontology, we must identify
the expressions that betray her existential assumptions. Such a set of expressions is hard to
pin down. Certainly not every use of a noun or predicate comes with an object, since nouns
or predicates may be used in negative existentials, like ‘Unicorns do not exist’ or ‘There
is no such thing as Pegasus’. If ‘Pegasus’ or ‘unicorns’ carried an implicit imputation of
existence, such statements would be self-contradictory. Not every meaningful word stands
for a thing; some are used in some contexts to indicate that they do not refer, or that they
do not apply to anything. But there must be some words that (at least in some contexts)
we cannot deny must stand for things. If there were no stopping point to the denial of
ontological presuppositions, we could never ascribe an ontology to anyone.
I define a criterion of ontological commitment broadly as a principle that identifies cer-
tain parts of a language, which we may call the committing expressions, as those that
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presume the existence of an object. Questions about what the correct criterion of onto-
logical commitment should be, and whether it is possible to give one, are not about being
but about imputations of being. They are a subset of what are now frequently called
meta-ontological questions [vI98, Man09]: those concerned with the strategy we employ to
formulate, interpret and answer ontological questions. Criteria of ontological commitment
are also meta-criteria in the sense that they are in the metalanguage: they mark out certain
words as the words whose role it is to indicate the presence of a thing.1
1.2.1 Desiderata
Judging from the above, there are at least four desiderata for ontological commitment.
1. First of all, there must be some ontologically committing expressions, and some
expressions that are not committing. A language without committing expressions
cannot have any pretensions to an ontology. But a language in which every word
is presumed to come with an entity attached cannot express coherent statements of
non-being.
2. Secondly, there should be true and coherent negative existentials, or statements
of non-being. A true statement of the form pThere is no x such that Fxq, or pThere
is no x such that a = xq, is true because ‘F ’, or ‘a’, does not apply to anything.
3. Thirdly, it must count as commitments not only those entities someone explicitly
asserts there are or refers to, but also those that she implicitly relies on.
4. Fourthly, interdependence between metaphysical categories should be explained.
Social scientists should not be committed to trends, migrations and average moth-
ers if they can explain statements apparently featuring such things in terms of less
controversial entities. Some account must be given of what it means for someone’s
ontology if they explain certain kinds in terms of others: if they say that migrations
are people moving from one place to another, that mental states are brain states, or
that propositions are sets of possible worlds.
I will refer to philosophers who favour a commitment-based view of meta-ontology as
‘commitmentphiles’, not as ‘Quineans’, reserving the label ‘Quineans’ for those who adhere
to Quine’s specific quantificational criterion of ontological commitment, or (occasionally)
1Whether being, existence and being an object are all equivalent is itself a meta-ontological question.
For the time being I will use ‘being’ and ‘existence’ interchangeably, as well as other ontological vocabulary
such as ‘being real’, ‘being part of the world’ and the like. I will do the same for ‘thing’, ‘object’, ‘entity’,
and ‘being’ (the noun), for some suitably liberal reading of these words, putting no constraints on what
they are like (e.g. concrete). The argument for doing this will emerge in 1.4 and 2.2.
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those who hold some other explicitly Quinean doctrine. Quineans about commitment are
members of a subset of the set of commitmentphiles.
1.3 Quine’s Quantificational Criterion of Ontological Com-
mitment
The archetypal criterion of ontological commitment, which has until recently dominated the
scene in meta-ontology, is Quine’s quantificational criterion. According to Quine, saying
that there is something, mentioning something, and implicitly presupposing an entity all
come down to making some first-order existentially quantified claim. He abstracts away
from the superficial difficulties of ascribing an ontology to a person whose utterances are
vague or incomplete by concentrating, instead, on what a theory says there is. A theory
should always be stated in a form that makes it unambiguous what it says there is. Quine’s
solution is translation into a formal language closed under consequence.
Quine’s idiom of choice, his canonical language of regimentation, is bivalent first-order
logic without individual constants. He regards this as the only properly logical language.
In 1.4 and 1.5 I will make my case that his choice of logic and committing expressions is
rooted in his holist epistemology. According to Quine, there is only one way to introduce
objects into a theory: when pronouns or their formal analogue, variables, begin to be used
to mark significant intersections in its observations, indicating the presence of a posit.
Quinean commitment results in a flat ontology: there is only one kind of quantifier, one
domain of all the objects. Variables are logical vocabulary, and thus, perhaps surprisingly,
objecthood itself is a logical primitive. Predicates, being derived from observations, are by
virtue of their semantic role non-logical; they talk about what is true of the objects. So
logical grammar separates talk of being from talk of nature, assigning the former to logic,
the latter to ideology.
1.3.1 Motivations
Quine’s criterion of commitment is explicitly metalinguistic. One of his motivations is to
avoid becoming entangled in what he calls ‘Plato’s Beard’ [Qui48, p. 21]: the idea that
non-existents must have some kind of being to be coherently spoken of. If Anne denies,
and her opponent Bea affirms, that there are things that are F , Anne would not want to
describe the situation as ‘there are some entities, namely F s, that I do not believe in’,
because such a statement would be paradoxical.2 Quine wants to resist the inference that
because Anne acknowledges that Bea has said something coherent in affirming the existence
2Cf. Moore’s paradox: ‘p but I do not believe that p’.
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of F s, Anne herself must refer to F s to say that there are no F s. She would then be pushed
towards the uncomfortable position that to coherently deny there are F s she must assign
them to some umbrageous realm of subsistents or possibilia, because in some sense she
must have referred to something. Instead, Anne can discuss Bea’s ontology speaking only
of entities that are common to the dialects of both warring factions: linguistic expressions
[Qui48, p. 31]. As long as it is clear which of Bea’s words are unequivocally supposed to
be referential, Anne can conclude, whenever Bea uses such a word concatenated with ‘F ’,
that F s exist according to Bea. Anne then denies that there are any such by stating that
‘F ’ applies to nothing, and by refusing to affirm any sentence that concatenates ‘F ’ with
referential expressions.
Being meaningful (or significant, as Quine prefers to say) is not the same as being ref-
erential. It is perfectly coherent to maintain that some expressions, like punctuation,
truth-functions, and arguably predicates,3 are syncategorematic: meaningful in context,
designating nothing. Syncategoremata, in other words, are never committing expressions.
If words like ‘existent’ or ‘real’ are to be more than ‘empty honorifics’ [Qui39, p. 704],
though, there must be some expressions of which it cannot be denied that their role is to
designate. To use such an expression in a true sentence is to be committed to a corre-
sponding entity. For Quine, there is only one such expression: the variable. Variables are
the kinds of words that take entities as values. Instead of the mediaeval ‘categoremata’
I will call such words ‘objectual’ words: those whose function is to stand for an object.
Objectual words are always committing.
Even some uses of variables, Quine says, can be eliminable from a theory if contextual
definitions are supplied that show them to be no more than ‘an eliminable shorthand’
[Qui39, p. 708]. Apparent commitment to propositions or migrations can be paraphrased
away by providing a template to translate them out in favour of a longer, more cumbrously
expressed, but more parsimonious theory. Sentences which apparently presuppose propo-
sitions or migrations can be transformed without loss of information into sentences not
mentioning them, which is proof of the absence of commitment.
Another motivation is to safeguard philosophy from positivistic attacks by showing it to
be continuous with natural science. Analytic philosophers’ interest in ontology wavered
with the positivists, who thought of ontological questions as meaningless or misguided.
Metaphysics, according to Quine, is made respectable once again by showing it to be
no different in kind from the natural sciences. Scientific enquiry is of the same sort as
ordinary knowledge-seeking, but more sophisticated and efficient. ‘I see metaphysics, good
and bad, as a continuation of science, good and bad’ [Qui88, p. 117]. The entities there
3Quine avails himself in [Qui39, Qui43b, Qui47a] of the venerable mediaeval argument that predicates
are syncategorematic to argue for nominalism. I do not take belief in the referentiality of predicates to be
incompatible with belief in ontological commitment in my sense, although it appears hard to square with
classic Quinean commitment. See 1.5 and 5.3 below.
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are according to metaphysics are justified in the same way that talk of entities is justified
in the sciences: by appeal to their indispensable explanatory role in our best theory of the
world. Metaphysical theories are thus subject to the same methodological constraints as
scientific ones. Ontological questions are answerable questions subject to the constraints of
theory choice [Qui48, p. 36]. This must always be a holist and pragmatist pursuit: there
is no vantage point outside our best theory, and if recalcitrant data occur, the weakest link
in the system as a whole must give way. There will always be interdependence between
the different categories of explanatory posits, and any of them will be subject to revision
if they prove inadequate [Qui81d, Qui81a].
1.3.2 Things as Posits
The reason that pronouns inescapably stand for things is to do with the way theories grow
out of observations. Quine believes that acquiring a theory, whether in infancy, or via
translation, or in a scientific setting, is no more and no less than acquiring a language.
Theory-building starts with observation sentences: ‘Tree’; ‘Green’; ‘Rose’; ‘Red’; ‘Rabbit’;
‘Furry’, etcetera. The very early stages of theorising are composed of nothing except these
observation sentences, used by the budding theorist to label features in her experience.4
From mere individual observations nothing follows. All we can do is venture them and
see what reactions we encounter. The first additions to the emerging theory are ‘yes’ and
‘no’, based on the reactions of assent and dissent. The use of truth-functional operators
such as negation, conjunction, disjunction, and the conditional can now be learned by the
nascent theorist. Thus far all of the theory is empirically conditioned, directly based on
experience. It is possible for theories never to develop beyond this point. Such theories
remain, structurally speaking, on the level of sentential logic, and have no ontology. There
are only atomic sentences and truth-functional connectives to link them [Qui79].
Nevertheless, further developments have great explanatory benefits. We are able to distin-
guish much more fine-grained kinds of evidence if we are able to discuss and explain which
observations are frequently co-located and why. Our vehicle for locating patterns within the
observations is the pronoun, the introduction of which turns observations into predicates,
and leads the language to be enriched with further logical vocabulary: quantifiers binding
the variables. The language learner will begin to use pronominal expressions when she
notices significant intersections in her observations. The difference between intersections
and mere conjunctions is marked by inserting a pronoun where observations coincide in an
interesting way. ‘Green. And Tree’ is true in the presence of a green field and a copper
beech. ‘This is green and it is a tree’, though, says something more: that greenness and
4Quine often speaks of them as though the philosophical story he is telling here exactly mirrors infant
development [Qui60b, p. 47, p. 92], [Qui92, p. 23]. Of course I don’t mean to defend this particular aspect
of Quine’s philosophy.
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treehood persistently overlap here. The ontological vocabulary is the vocabulary used to
pinpoint these intersections. The notion of objecthood enters the theory when, in response
to recurrent evidence of such overlap, we posit an object as a likely explanation of the
pattern of overlap. Pronouns signal an increase in explanatory capacity of a burgeoning
theory. ‘This is where I see bodies materializing, ontologically speaking: as ideal nodes at
the foci of intersecting observation sentences’ [Qui92, p. 24]. The introduction of pronouns
into the observation sentences imposes a structure on the sentences that was not previously
there: instead of an undivided whole, they now have a pronominal part and a predicative
part. The predicative part is what is left over from the observation sentence. Observation
sentences are feature-placing, cf. [Str59, p. 212], not attributive. They do not contain
a word for an object and a word that attributes something to the object. The addition
of variables divides the language into expressions that purport to say what there is and
those that purport to say what is true of those beings. The former are the ontological
expressions, and the latter the ideological expressions [Qui51b]. The ideology comprises
all the characteristics ascribed to the beings: what is said about their natures and their
relations to each other. But for such ascriptions of natures and reference and relatedness to
make sense, we first need to presume that something is there to have such characteristics
ascribed to it. Pronouns are used to herald the presence of an object.
As the theory progresses, more sophisticated posits and methods will ensue. Scientific
standards of rigour may be formulated within it, so the theory itself will be judged by
standards of simplicity and familiarity, and how well it matches the data [Qui60b, pp. 20-
21]. Eventually, the only posits left could be numbers and particles, which are not directly
obervable at all. Questions will arise about which intersections are the significant ones;
these questions are not answerable on purely empirical grounds. But according to Quine all
posits, näıve or sophisticated, stem from the introduction of an entity on the intersection
of continuous observations by linking their corresponding observation sentences together
with a pronoun. Pronouns get the process of reification off the ground. As a result, our
best theory, couched in the clearest, least ambiguous language we can muster, will tell us
exactly what it says there is: the values of its pronominal expressions.
Quine is not done yet. He has expounded a just-so story purporting to show how the
pronominal expressions will furnish us with information about what is said to be by someone
creating a new theory, but as we saw above, any theory worth its salt will also serve to
make clear what existence claims are entailed by it globally. Otherwise, our evidence is once
again reduced to the habits of individual persons. What follows from a set of statements




The idea behind ontological commitment is that the entities that there are according to a
theory are those it talks about. A theory is a set of sentences, and it ‘talks about’ something
when it either explicitly says it exists, mentions it, or entails its existence. On Quine’s
fully developed criterion of commitment5, all three reduce to first-order quantification in
a regimented theory, a theory translated in its entirety into a logical language [Qui60b,
ch. 5]. As the formal theory is closed under consequence, it will always be determinate
whether some existentially quantified claim is, or is not, entailed by it. Existence claims,
implicit commitment, and reference, despite their different surface structures, all share
the deep logical structure ‘∃xFx ’. There is no more to existence than what is captured by
existential quantification; to be is to be the value of a bound variable in our best formalised
theory.
Quine’s logical language is bivalent first-order logic without constants [Qui60b, ch. 5];
[Qui70]. Some of the reasons for this choice emerge in section 1.5 below. Regimentation
simplifies the theory and eliminates the vagueness and ambiguity that beset ordinary lan-
guage. In addition, it reduces those posits whose existence is explicitly asserted and those
that are merely presupposed to the same level: existentially quantified sentences entailed by
the regimented theory. If in the natural language version of the theory no explicit mention
of F s is made, the regimented version can show that there is some appeal to F s once all of
the statements of the theory are spelled out in full, because among the sentences entailed
by them is an existentially quantified statement about F s. The committing expressions
are the formal analogues of pronouns: variables. He adopts the objectual interpretation of
quantifier-variable notation, according to which variables denote elements in the domain
of discourse, as explicating natural-language ‘there is’.
Variables as Committing Expressions: From Pronouns to Variables
Quine advocates regimenting the unwieldy structure of natural languages on the grounds
that it reworks statements we already understand into a more uniform and perspicuous
form [Qui40, pp. 65-71]; [Qui69a]. As part of the theory of arithmetic, we can say in
English, of a number:
1. Either this number is less than 0, or this number is equal to 0, or this number is greater
than 0.
5Quine doesn’t mention regimented or logical languages in “On What There Is” [Qui48], except perhaps
obliquely in his references to Russell’s theory of descriptions. He does deploy formal machinery in the earlier
papers [Qui39], [Qui40], [Qui43a], [Qui43b], [Qui45], [Qui47b], [Qui47a] including appeals to paraphrase by
contextual definitions. As he is a holist, it makes sense to suppose that commitments belong to the
regimented theory as a whole, but this is not stated clearly until [Qui60b, ch. 5].
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Sentence 1. is true, but cannot be turned into a general truth by substituting ‘every
number’ for ‘this number’. When we try that, we end up with:
2. Either every number is less than 0, or every number is equal to 0, or every number is
greater than 0.
Sentence 2. is obviously not true. How can we rephrase this sentence so it expresses its
intended meaning? We must turn to pronouns:
3. Every number is such that either it is less than 0, or it is equal to 0, or it is greater than
0.
Pronouns are capable of talking about the things within their range generally, prepared
to stand for any one of them. A predicate plus the appropriate number of pronouns is a
‘sentence matrix’ or open formula [Qui40, p. 71], which yields clear and determinate truth
conditions for a sentence in which it is bound by a quantifier such as ‘all’ or ‘some’: true,
for the first one, if the formula is satisfied by everything in the pronoun’s range; for the
second, if it is satisfied by at least one of the objects. But there is still some ambiguity
left. Think about the following sentence:
4. Whatever two numbers you may select, they are such that either it is less than it, or it
is equal to it, or it is greater than it.
The pronouns of 4. retain the property of standing for things generally, but fulfil a special
additional role. Any pair can be singled out by ‘whatever two numbers’, even one with two
identical co-ordinates. In this context, though, one pronoun stands for the first co-ordinate
of such a pair, the other for the second co-ordinate. Here formal pronouns have a clear
advantage over English, which has to make do with locutions like ‘the former’, or ‘the
first-mentioned’. That can be cumbersome in longer clauses. We would prefer something
unambiguous and brief, and resort to:
5. Whatever two numbers it1 and it2 you may select, they are such that either it1 is less
than it2, or it1 is equal to it2, or it1 is greater than it2.
Sentence 5. provides a hint of Frege’s variable-binding strategy.6 [Fre67]. Quine proposes to
tidy up our grammar by rendering all theories in first-order logic, revealing the underlying
form of 5. to be:
6. ∀x∀y(N x ∧ N y → (x < y ∨ x = y ∨ x > y))
6This should not be taken to mean that Frege’s interpretation of quantification coincides with Quine’s.
Quine’s objectual interpretation is originally Tarski’s [Tar56a]. Frege did not conceive of variables as ranging
over a domain; instead he construed quantifiers as second-level properties. According to his interpretation,
‘∃xFx ’ means that the concept corresponding to ‘F ’ has at least one instance.
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Quantification, Satisfaction and Truth
Quine favours standard first-order predicate logic (but without individual constants) as
the canonical notation for all theories. Once a complete statement of the theory—a set of
sentences closed under consequence—is achieved, we uncover its ontological commitments
by solving for the domain of quantification that its variables must range over. We isolate
all its existentially quantified sentences and posit a value of each variable, using a Tarskian
objectual reading of the quantifiers. A non-empty set is given as the domain of discourse,
over which the variables of the language are said to range. An existentially quantified
statement ‘∃xFx ’ is true if and only if there is some element of the domain of which ‘F ’ is
true. ‘∀xFx ’ is true if and only if ‘F ’ is true of every element of the domain. ‘Being true of’
is explained in terms of satisfaction. Informally, an element of the domain a satisfies the
open formula ‘Fx’ iff Fa. A fuller, more formal treatment is given when we say that open
formulae are satisfied by sequences. A sequence < a, b, c, ... > satisfies a formula ‘Fx’ iff
Fa, as ‘x’ is the alphabetically first variable of ‘Fx’, a is the first coordinate of < a, b, c,
... >, and the open formula applies to it. Similarly, < a, b, c, ... > satisfies ‘Rxy’ iff Rab:
alphabetically first and second variables, first and second coordinates, and it truly applies.
And so on for formulae and sequences of any length. (Following a suggestion from Boolos,
we may stipulate, with Quine, that we can append repetitions of the final coordinate if the
formula exceeds the sequence in length [Qui70, p. 38].) The advantage of this definition is
that truth of closed sentences comes out as a limiting case of satisfaction: satisfaction by all
sequences. An existentially quantified sentence whose quantifier binds the alphabetically
ith variable is true of a sequence iff its open formulae is true of some sequence that is
just like it, except perhaps with respect to its ith coordinate; and a universally quantified
sentence whose quantifier binds the alphabetically ith variable is true of a sequence iff its
open formulae is true of all sequences that are just like it, except perhaps with respect to
their ith coordinate.
This interpretation of quantification is rightly called the ‘objectual interpretation’: the
interpretation assigns the variables directly to objects. This fact tallies well with the idea
that they are committing expressions: they do nothing but to stand for elements of the
domain. The whole syntactic category of variables is one which the interpretation always
explicitly assigns to objects, so they are inalienably objectual expressions. Whenever a
speaker utters something equivalent to ‘∃xFx ’, she says that there is something such that
‘Fx ’ is true of it. This is an imputation of existence, the existence of F s, because her
statement will only be true if the domain contains F things. ‘The variables of quantification,
‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’, range over our whole ontology, whatever it may be;
and we are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged
presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in
order to render one of our affirmations true.’ [Qui48, p. 13]. This is the most that can
usefully be said about the meaning of ‘exists’. All there is to the existence of F s is that
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something satisfies ‘Fx ’. ‘Existence is what the existential quantifier expresses’ [Qui69b,
p. 166] and ‘to be is to be the value of a variable’ [Qui39, p. 708], [Qui48, p. 32]; that is,
a bound variable in our best theory. The only ontologically committing expressions are
the only objectual expressions: the variables.
1.3.4 Quinean Interdependence
Although making definitive claims about what exists is the business of theories, not pri-
marily of individual agents, there is a rational constraint on people to accept the existence
of the things that there are according to a theory they endorse. Of course, they are not
committed to each claim they make in passing. Individual agents can escape a commit-
ment by realigning the boundaries of their theories. One way of doing so is to deny that
the sentence they uttered was intended to form part of a theory. Some sentences are not
thought of as true, or even truth-evaluable, at all. As far as ontology is concerned, they
can be left out of consideration entirely. Quine mentions fictional sentences as an example
where ‘an attitude of frivolity’ [Qui53d, p. 103] is apposite. Other potential candidates
include jokes and formulaic or merely phatic statements. When the speaker’s objective is
to amuse, flatter, or pacify an audience, rather than to say something true, their utterances
do not directly contribute to the furthering of our collective knowledge and methodology.
This does not mean that such statements are of no theoretical interest in any way. In par-
ticular, theories about fiction, pragmatics, or social customs may (or may not, if they are
reductive) add commitments to our best theory, and this in no way contradicts frivolity.7
Elimination, Reduction and Paraphrase
Escaping commitments is possible even where the statement in question is a declarative
sentence intended to be part of a theory. A theorist avoids having an existence claim
attributed to her if she improves her theory by providing a permissible paraphrase. Her
overall theory allows her the option to work out whether a posit is really necessary for
explanatory purposes, or in fact turns out to be dispensable. A permissible paraphrase
is a translation of old, natural language, parts of theories, into new, regimented ones,
‘expand[ing the apparent existential assertion] into an idiom sterile of such assertions’
[Qui53d, p. 103] to demonstrate that the ostensible commitment can be explained away.
I distinguish between eliminativism and ontological reduction. An eliminativist about F s
believes that all talk of F s is so far from being true or useful that there is no point in trans-
lating sentences about F s into a regimented theory. Instead, all sentences involving F s are
7E.g. see [vI77] for a Quinean defence of the claim that meta-fictional sentences carry commitment.
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simply dropped. Eliminativism is different from frivolity because the eliminativist thinks
discourse involving F s is intended as part of a theory, but is not worth preserving because
it is a part wholly without merit.8 A philosopher who is a reductionist about F s, on the
other hand, does not want to dismiss talk of F s as altogether useless, even though she
does not countenance F s as posits and wants her language of regimentation not to speak
of F s. To reduce F s to Gs is to provide rules of translation that allow talk of F s to be
explained in terms that only contain mention of Gs. Such translation can be direct, trans-
lating one predicate as another predicate (e.g. using ‘significant’ instead of ‘meaningful’)
or indirect, translating a simple attribution of a predicate as a complex sentence involving
multiple predicates (e.g. translating ‘Susan has schizophrenia’ as ‘Susan’s brain is affected
by synaptic disregulation which causes overactive D2 receptors’, which, in its regimented
form, quantifies over synapses and receptors and expounds their relations to each other).
It is possible for a reductionist and an eliminativist to arrive, by different routes, at the
exact same regimented theory. They could, for instance, each end up quantifying only over
parts of brains and other physical things and agree completely on what things there are
and how they are. The difference is that the reductionist formulated her theory in the
belief that it is the best possible translation of various scientific disciplines conjoined with
folk psychology. By contrast, the eliminativist arrived at her regimented theory without
giving any thought to folk psychology, believing it to be deficient, and used as her source
only physically-based theories of the brain.
Parsimony: No Cardinality Limit on Ontology
One of the aims of ontological reduction is parsimony: not multiplying entities beyond
necessity. The multiplication of entities, which Ockham frowned upon, pertains to kinds,
not individuals. Other things being equal, we should prefer theories with smaller ontologies,
but the aim is not for fewer values of variables, but fewer kinds—for Quine, fewer predicates.
There is no legitimate cardinality limit on ontology. Ontological commitments are incurred
to items that fall under some indispensable kind F . Without it, we would be unable
to explain all we want to explain, which is no small matter. So it would be unwise to
dismiss indispensable posits because our intuitions tell us their extensions are too large.
And who could tell where the cut-off point for ‘too large’ should be? Accepting a kind
means accepting it with all its concomitant instances. It is not paradoxical for ontological
reduction by paraphrase to result in an increase in the cardinality of a theory. The reduction
is legitimate if the translated sentence posits fewer kinds than the original sentence. Take
8Some philosophers draw the distinction in the same way I do; e.g. Churchland: ‘Eliminative materialism
is the thesis that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false
theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will
eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience.’ [Chu81, p. 67]. Others
use ‘eliminativism’ in a looser sense: ‘In principle, anyone denying the existence of some type of thing is an
eliminativist with regard to that type of thing.’ [Ram07, sec. 1].
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the sentence ‘There is a net migration from Mexico to the USA because there is a large
disparity in GDP between the two countries.’ On the surface this statement leads us to
posit only six objects, belonging to five kinds: two countries, a migration, a product and
a disparity. Imagine an economist who painstakingly supplies contextual definitions that
transform this simple sentence into one in which the quantifiers range solely over people.
As a result of her labours, she ends up positing 424 million individuals on the basis of this
statement, rather than six. But the only kind posited is that of Homo sapiens, and one
kind is more parsimonious than five.
1.3.5 Translation
Quine’s aim to keep philosophy continuous with natural science leads him to justify the
posits of metaphysics in the same way that posits are justified in science: in terms of their
explanatory value to an overall theory. Ontological commitments belong to the theory as
a whole, and ostensible surface commitments may be dispensable, so all claims entailed
by a theory must be taken into account for its commitments to come to light. Formalised
languages, with their well-defined consequence relations [Hod01, Bla01], are ideally suited
to this end, and give the theory the additional virtue of simplicity [Qui81c, Qui53a]. An-
other great advantage of regimentation is that it equalises the status of implicit and explicit
commitments. All posits are equal from the standpoint of the formalised theory, which is
just a set of sentences closed under consequence. No existentially quantified sentence takes
precedence over another.
Not only does Quine’s holism cause him to have very little interest in isolated existence
questions, he is also pessimistic about the possibility of extracting an unambiguous set of
entailments from a collection of natural language claims, with their attendant vagueness
and ambiguity [Qui60b, ch. 4]. At times he doubts that the idea of a common-sense or
folk ontology can be spelled out in enough detail to be coherent. ‘[A] fenced ontology is
just not implicit in ordinary language . . . Ontological concern is not a correction of a lay
thought and practice; it is foreign to the lay culture, though an outgrowth of it’ [Qui81c,
p. 9]. Although objectual quantification elucidates natural-language ‘there is’/‘exists’ and
the like, the natural-language expressions it improves upon are not themselves, strictly
speaking, ontological vocabulary. To count as such, all purported existence claims must
first be translated into canonical notation.
Ordinary language, of course, does contain locutions like ‘there is’, ‘exists’, etcetera, as
well as pronouns, but various complications arise to cast doubt on the idea that these
are themselves committing expressions. Natural-language pronouns are not always purely
objectual, but convey ideological information. In English, ‘it’ may be thought of as the
sort of word that indicates only that an object is present. But the range of ‘it’ is restricted
to inanimate objects, non-animal life forms and, in some contexts, animals. Persons and
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often other sentient creatures are referred to by a separate category of pronouns, which
are also differentiated by gender. Instead of merely indicating that there is an object
present, as the variables of formal logic do, these also convey information about what kind
of object this is. This is at odds with Quine’s presentation of the role of the pronoun,
namely to locate a node on the intersection of observations: a peg to hang the ideological
information on, which does not contain information of its own. Informative pronouns, like
those connoting the gender or species of their values, are not purely objectual, nor strictly
speaking ontological. We must separate the objectual function of the pronoun from the
built-in information. This is achieved by the kind of translational strategy we saw Quine
undertake in [Qui40, pp. 65-71] (see section 1.3.2). Regimentation can come in stages,
and languages can be formalised to greater or lesser degrees. We see examples of this in
jargon of what we would ordinarily be happy to call natural language; think of the kind of
disambiguations inherent in a mathematician’s use of ‘there is something x such that’, or
a lawyer’s use of ‘the party of the fifth part’. They delineate the scope of the quantifier or,
in the second case, disambiguate which member of the sequence is to satisfy the expression
following it.
Meaning Equivalence?
The question now arises, though, to what extent this process of formalisation is like trans-
lation at all. Some critics of Quine, like Alston, profess to be puzzled at the claim that
ostensible commitments can be paraphrased away. Alston contends that if paraphrase is
indeed a form of translation, then various ordinary strictures on the translation of sentences
of one language into another must apply: at the very least, a sentence and its translation
must share a meaning. ‘For if the translation of (1) [‘There is a possibility that James will
come’] into (2) [‘The statement that James will come is not certainly false’], for example,
is adequate, then they are normally used to make the same assertion’ [Als58, pp. 9-10].
But the ordinary strictures do not apply to translation into canonical notation, which is
guided by pragmatic concerns distinct from those of natural-language translation. The aim
is not to preserve as much as possible of the source language’s content, structure, subtlety,
connotations or poetic quality. The aim of regimentation is to bring to light what is entailed
by a theory, and to reveal its primitive predicates and its posits. To translate a theory into
canonical notation is to move from one theory to another, couched in a new formalised
idiom—since a theory is just a set of sentences closed under consequence, a language no
more than the corresponding set of well-formed formulae. Proposing a new theory to
supplant the old is justified by the constraints of theory choice: the new theory is preferred
because of some explanatory benefit. There is no God’s eye perspective from which we
can judge rival theories. The only way to make progress is to move from an old theory to
a new one, always working within the best available theory. This goes for its posits, too:
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we accept a new theory with all its posits, and if we wish to reject some of them, we must
propose a new coherent theory according to which no such objects exist. ‘Everything to
which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory-
building process, and simultaneously real from the standpoint of the theory that is being
built . . . we can never do better than occupy the standpoint of some theory or other, the
best we can muster at the time’ [Qui60b, p. 22]. Translation into canonical notation is a
process whereby the recognition of some defect in the old theory leads to a new one rising
from its ashes. Meaning-equivalence is not required, nor even full material equivalence.
Since the old theory was deficient, some of its sentences were false. Nevertheless, most of it
was worth preserving, leading to new, true, improved sentences taking the place of the old,
false ones while preserving overall coherence. It is true that the natural-language version
of a theory has its own advantages which the regimented version lacks. For instance,
it is better suited to human communication; it respects conventional connotations and
linguistic subtleties. The regimented theory, on the other hand, scores much more highly
on scientific precision, well-defined consequence and clarity. It also separates ontological
from ideological expressions, making it an ideal vehicle for asking and answering ontological
questions without muddying the waters.
Although Alston’s puzzlement, expressed in the late 1950s, is understandable with respect
to Quine’s earlier papers, from Word and Object onwards it is clear that his notion of
translation is specifically radical translation [Qui60b, ch. 2, ch. 5]. When the field linguist
maps sentences to sentences, engaged in the project of radical translation, the order of
acquisition is just the one sketched in 1.3.2. First the linguist identifies the native’s obser-
vation sentences, mapping them onto her own observation sentences. Next she attempts
to identify the native equivalents of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’, betokening assent and dissent. With
the help of these expressions, she begins to link observations and translate truth-functional
constructions. So far everything is radically translatable, because it is empirically condi-
tioned. The evidence for it is, with some refinements, just based upon third-personally
accessible stimulus meanings, including assent and dissent [Qui60b, pp. 32-33, pp. 57-60].
The trouble comes when the linguist tries to reify. She wants to move from observation sen-
tences like ‘Rabbit’ to terms like ‘rabbit’, and refer to objects whenever the native speakers
do. But the transition from feature-placing sentences to variable-predicate sentences intro-
duces indeterminacy. Theories allow for reification when feature-placing sentences receive
a newfound structure by locating a pronoun on the intersection of significantly overlap-
ping observations; the combination of variables, quantifiers, truth-functions and identity
amounts to predicate logic. But this development is not an empirically conditioned one.
Observations plus assent and dissent cannot be enough to fix the boundaries of objects,
neither to decide which overlapping observations are the significant ones nor to determine
numerical identity. If objects are the sorts of things that are hypostatised on the inter-
sections of significant observations, they are not themselves directly observable. Which
intersections are assigned a posit and which are not is not an empirically based matter.
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There are several equally explanatory arrays of posits for any given quantified theory.
The linguist can never be sure that her patterns of reification match those of the native
speakers. The third-personally accessible evidence is consistent with ‘rabbit’ as a transla-
tion of ‘gavagai’, but equally consistent with such translations as ‘rabbit stage’, ‘part of the
rabbit fusion’, or ‘manifestation of rabbithood’ [Qui60b, p. 54]. To try to rule out any of
these alternatives by asking questions would be to impose her own apparatus of reification
on the source language. When she thinks she’s asking ‘Is this the same rabbit as before?’,
she cannot empirically verify that her question cannot be translated ‘Is this a rabbit stage
of the same series?’9 [Qui68a, p. 189].
Indeterminacy of translation has another, metaphysical, consequence which would turn
Alston’s complaint on its head. It provides grist to Quine’s mill in his complaint against
the ‘myth of a museum’ full of meanings for words [Qui68a, p. 186]. The metaphysical
consequence is that there are no such things as meanings. A very minimal criterion of
identity for meanings must include as a component that they remain stable under transla-
tion. But indeterminacy of translation reveals that even this modest part of a criterion of
identity is too much to ask; no such stability is forthcoming for first-order languages. So
we cannot help but conclude that meanings are just not out there in the world. Alston’s
quest to preserve meaning in translation was too ambitious to begin with.
I want to endorse the pragmatic line on formalisation, according to which formalised the-
ories are not expected to preserve all features of their ordinary language precursors, but
need only provide a good medium for ontological enquiry. I do not want to commit myself
to the idea that all translation is radical translation, or that formalisation only ever occurs
by translating radically. The modern commitmentphile does not need to adopt this part of
Quine’s view, as she is under no obligation to accept his behaviouristic model of language-
slash-theory acquisition. Liking the idea of asking and answering ontological questions in
a language with a well-defined consequence relation in no way entails that all languages
are the result of moving from observation sentences via behaviouristic truth functions to
selecting idealised nodes where features intersect. Contemporary commitmentphiles do
not have to follow Quine in taking only first-order logic as the quintessential language of
regimentation.
9Chomsky [Cho69] reads indeterminacy as a species of underdetermination of theory by data. Com-
mentators tend to concur with the Chomskian line [Wri97, Bal06], but I think this is a misinterpretation.
When indeterminacy results, the reason is not that our evidence is insufficient. Observation of linguistic
behaviour is all the evidence we could ever hope to have, because linguistic behaviour (in Quine’s opinion)
is all there is to language. There may be genuine facts of the matter about, say, physics which our theory
cannot settle, but any question about language that cannot be settled by the collection of all available
facts about behaviour is one about which there is genuinely no fact of the matter. So the indeterminacy
argument really does entail the metaphysical conclusion that meanings do not exist. Also see [Gau06] for
a thorough overview and refutation of underdetermination/indeterminacy confusions in the literature.
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Relativity
A second famous objection to Quinean commitment originates with Cartwright, and was
likewise published in the 1950s. His complaint is that the quantificational criterion cannot
be stated without leaving the realm of the scientifically sound theory of reference and
sliding into the theory of meaning Quine disavows [Qui53c] as replete with suspicious
notions like meaning and analyticity. A theory which is not already in quantificational
form, Cartwright asserts, cannot be translated into canonical notation without the help of
the theory of meaning [Car54, p. 3]. An early temporal slice of Quine agrees [Qui53c, p.
131], but any post-1960 Quine-stage need only admit that imposing quantificational form
on such a theory leads to inscrutability. Quine’s considered position at this later stage is
that there may be different candidate domains that could make the theory come out true.
A theory that quantifies over cats, but leaves it open what colour they are, can make do
with a domain of black cats or white cats, or a domain of cat-stages, or undetached cat
parts. All that matters in specifying the domain is what is true of its members, or how
we, in empirically unconditioned ways, delineate them. Indeterminacy leads to ontological
relativity [Qui68a].
There are two distinct potential ways to determine the domain of discourse of a regimented
theory. The first way gives us the ontology in the sense of an inventory of all the objects,
an enumeration of them. Having excerpted all the existentially quantified claims, we are
left with a list of sentences: ‘∃x (Fx∧Gx∧Hx )’, ‘∃y(Iy∧Jy∧Ky)’, ‘∃z (Lz∧Mz )’, ... The
objects can be enumerated in these terms: there is something in the domain which is F,
G and H ; something which is I, J and K ; something which is L and M, all of them are
distinct. From this list we can derive the domain’s cardinality.
A second way of specifying the ontology is to give an exhaustive catalogue of natures and
their relations to each other. Suppose there is a predicate or open formula ϕ satisfaction
of which is entailed by all of the other characteristics ascribed by the theory, e.g. if
p∀x(Fx → ϕx)q, p∀x(Gx → ϕx)q, and so forth for all the predicates of the ideology. An
example of such a predicate would be ‘is material’ in a physicalist theory. If there is
such a ϕ, the domain can be concisely specified as {x : ϕx}. (Standard Tarskian model
theory requires that the domain be set-sized.) But the inscrutability of reference which
carries ontological relativity in its wake led the historical Quine to lose interest in this
second option. He noted that if all predicates allow for interchangeable but non-equivalent
translations, the only stable factor is the cardinality of the theory.10
Cartwright also argues that a quantificational criterion of commitment cannot be stated
without using modal language. He thinks that Quine must specify the domain of the
regimented theory by appeal to objects that would make the theory true, that would form
10From time to time Quine goes so far as to suggest that the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem implies an
ontology consisting only of the natural numbers [Qui68a, p. 207]; [Qui92, p. 33].
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the domain, or that would be F if the theory were true: ‘information concerning the
nature of those conceivable or possible universes in which the axioms of the theory would
be satisfied’ [Car54, p. 8]. If true, this would be bad not only because (that temporal
part of) Quine rejects modal ontology11 but also because, contra Cartwright [Car54, p. 7],
impossible ontologies ought to be describable. Cf. Scheffler and Chomsky’s case of a theory
T which contains the sentence ‘¬∃x(x is a unicorn)’ as well as the sentence ‘∃x(x is a table)’,
but whose predicate ‘is a table’ is best translated as our ‘is a unicorn’. Their complaint is
that this is a different theory from the surface-inconsistent T ′ which contains both ‘¬∃x(x
is a unicorn)’ and ‘∃x(x is a unicorn)’ [SC58, p. 81]. For proponents of regimentation,
by contrast, the regimented translations of the two theories coincide, which is a virtue of
regimentation as it shows T to be just as hollow at heart as T ′.12 But it seems to me that
my description of the enumerative inventory of the beings constitutes a way in which Quine
can sidestep the demand for a possible universe which satisfies the axioms of the theory.
He simply radically translates the theory, excerpts all the existentially quantified claims,
and disquotes them. He is then in a position to say, non-modally, that if these sentences
are true then there are those things. He need not appeal to sets of entities that satisfy, or
would satisfy, the descriptions, but only to the existential claims entailed by the regimented
theory. That was part of the irenic project of ascending to the meta-language: one party
can talk about what the other believes in without referring to any non-linguistic entity. All
the first party needs is the second’s objectual variables and the implications of her theory.
In general, the commitmentphile’s modus operandi is to translate the theory into a logical
language of their choice, close it under consequence, select the sentences which contain
committing expressions and disquote those sentences. Since not all commitmentphiles will
opt for radical translation, the issue of ontological relativity is one I want to remain neutral
about. I will also set aside all modally based objections from this point onwards. Modal
philosophy is in and of itself compatible with being a commitmentphile13 but it is not my
11In the 1940s and 50s, he considers the very idea of a possibile incoherent owing to the lack of a
clear criterion of identity [Qui48, p. 23]. He does not object to all uses of modal logic—he praises the
syntactic treatment of [Bar46b, Bar46a, Bar47] in [Qui47c]—but during that period he categorically rejects
interpreted modal logics. He regards them as inextricably mired in analyticity: ‘The result of prefixing “”
to any statement is true if and only if the statement is analytic’ [Qui47b, p. 45]. Consequently he reads
‘x is essentially F ’ as “‘Fx” is analytic’, which he decries as at best relative to a description, at worst an
outright category error: ‘rationality is involved in the meaning of the word “man” while two-leggedness
is not; but two-leggedness may at the same time be viewed as involved in the meaning of “biped” while
rationality is not . . . it makes no sense to say of the actual individual, who is at once a man and a biped, that
his rationality is essential’ [Qui51c, p. 22]. In the late 60s he softens his position with respect to possible
worlds, perhaps under the influence of [Lew68], if ‘worlds’ are conceived as describable distributions of
matter over space-time points [Qui68b, p. 12]. See also section 1.4.4 below.
12For these translations to be accurate, T must have had two predicates ‘is a table’ and ‘is a unicorn’
with identical satisfaction conditions. So to affirm, in the language in question, the existence of tables
while denying the existence of unicorns is incoherent, though not surface-inconsistent. The regimented
theory closed under consequence reveals the inconsistency which is hidden by the natural-language surface
structure.
13Certainly Lewis is a Quinean about commitment, see especially his [Lew68, Lew86, Lew90]. Williamson
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focus here, and space does not permit any further discussion of modality.
1.3.6 Quinean Commitment and the Desiderata
In 1.2, I laid out some desiderata for ontological commitment: 1. that there must be some
ontologically committing expressions, and some non-committing expressions; 2. true and
coherent negative existentials; 3. an account of implicit commitment; 4. an account of
interdependence between categories. Quinean commitment performs quite well on these
counts.
His committing expressions are pronominal: specifically, the variables of a theory translated
into a properly logical language. All other vocabulary will either be logical operators or
predicates; these are not committing. It is therefore perfectly coherent to assert a statement
of the form pThere is no x such that Fxq. The ‘F ’ is not itself committing; it is not
referential at all, but syncategorematic. So ‘¬∃xFx’ will be true iff nothing satisfies ‘F ’. A
speaker can escape commitment even when she utters a declarative sentence intended to be
part of a theory, by providing a permissible paraphrase: a clear and formalised rewording
of the earlier, ostensibly existential, sentence which does not make the existence claim she
wants to avoid. To show that F s just are Gs, all she needs to do is show that talk of F s can
always, without loss of information, be translated into talk of Gs. Imputing existence F s
and Gs usually only forms a small part of theorising, though; theories often simply mention
the things they assume there are in passing, or rely in their explanations on objects that
are never invoked explicitly. We surmise what a theory implicitly assumes there is by
thinking about what existence claims logically follow from the claims it makes. Natural
languages such as English can be obscure about their entailments because of their inherent
vagueness and ambiguity. So we should always concentrate on formalised theories, which
make it unambiguously clear on the surface what they say there is. Quine accounts for
implicit commitments by treating all commitments as existentially quantified consequences
of a regimented theory closed under consequence.
1.4 Metaphysical Embroidery upon Quinean Themes
According to Quine, objects are introduced into a theory when pronouns begin to be used
to mark significant intersections in its observations. The role of the pronoun is to indicate
the presence of a posit: an object is posited to account for the persistent intersection
of observations. The historical Quine, wary as he was of succumbing to the traditional
metaphysician’s temptation to talk nonsense, would be reluctant to engage in discourse
is also plausibly described as proposing a modal language of regimentation, though not apparently one with
Lewis’s flat ontology [Wil00a, Wil02, Wil13].
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about notions of objecthood, existence, or being. But, proceeding with caution and bearing
in mind that by ‘notion of objecthood’ I mean mostly what vocabulary is used in talking
about objects, and how it is used, I will trace a path towards the separation of sense from
nonsense in this area.
1.4.1 Objecthood as a Logical Notion
Languages which contain no reifying vocabulary cannot be said to express anything about
objecthood. As Strawson says, ‘feature-placing sentences do not introduce particulars into
our discourse’ [Str59, p. 244]. Strawson’s remark applies to Quine’s observation sentences,
since they are feature-placing. Objecthood is introduced only when it becomes possible to
express that an object is present. The objectual expressions of a language are those whose
semantic role is just to signal the presence of a thing. They cannot be used except to stand
for a presumed object, and are therefore committing expressions: expressions that indicate
that the speaker is making a presumption of existence or being. If the speaker is wrong in
making that presumption, her sentence will be false. Formal languages may have syntactic
categories which the interpretation explicitly assigns to objects: in the case of Quine’s
language of regimentation, that category comprises the first-order variables.
Quine is most naturally read as identifying objecthood with playing the role of a posit.
Variables indicate no more and no less than that a thing is needed here for explanatory
purposes. The leap from ‘Green. And Tree’ to ‘x is green and x is a tree’ is a leap from
a feature-placing language, labelling observations, to a richer logical form with objectual
vocabulary in addition to the observational vocabulary. The objectual vocabulary denotes
an object, but connotes nothing; it only brings in objecthood. This is contrasted with
the ideological vocabulary, the leftover part formed from the observation sentence. The
predicates specifically do not denote. The objectual vocabulary was introduced expressly
to discharge the denotative role. The ideology is a vestige from the kind of language,
a feature-placing language, that lacked reifying vocabulary and only noted phenomena
without having any such role as denotation within it.14
The contrast between objectual language and ideology can be put, borrowing a phrase
from van Inwagen [vI09], as the contrast between talk of being and talk of nature. A
logical language cleanly separates being from nature: variables are concerned with being,
predicates ascribe natures. When we talk about natures, characteristics, or kinds in this
context, it is not to be read as reifying natures, etc. A kind or nature in this sense only
14This could perhaps form the basis of argument for Quine’s rejection of realism about universals and
of second-order logic: predicative vocabulary is designed not to stand for anything, because it is what is
left over from a feature-placing language once all the expressions designed to stand for things have been
assigned to things. I don’t think that line of thought is unassailable, but I will not pursue it here in any
detail; it comes up briefly in 5.3 below.
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means something that is said of an object, within the context of a theory. According to
Quine’s view of commitment, reification of properties and relations should proceed via
first-order quantification.
The idea that logical languages force a useful separation between being and nature dovetails
with the proposal that a purely objectual expression is committing because it communicates
nothing except that its denotation is a thing, leaving everything else that can be said about
it to the ideology. Variables, designed to herald the presence of an object, belong to the
logical vocabulary. So perhaps surprisingly, it appears that the notion of objecthood itself
must be reckoned to logic, too. Predicates, on the other hand, are paradigmatically non-
logical. Predicates are what is left of observations when objectual vocabulary gets a grip;
they constitute the ideology, the part of the language that serves to express ideas and
ascribe characteristics [Qui51b]. In this way the syntax of the language of regimentation
helps us make it clear why we only need one kind of quantification and one realm of
being, not ever-widening concentric circles of subsistence and beyond: the use of a variable
indicates only that an object is present, and that is enough for logical purposes. All
other differences between things are resigned to the ideology. No matter how different in
nature two things are, that will never suffice for showing that they are not both things
when considered from the point of view of logical grammar. The differences in nature are
expressed by means of predicates, and differences in being are incoherent because they are
not expressible by logical grammar at all: being is simply being, appearing as a value of a
variable in the domain.
Quine’s committing expressions, the first-order variables, are a clear case of expressions
that cannot be used except to stand for an object. Whenever they are used, a correspond-
ing object’s failing to exist invalidates the claim that is made by means of them. But does
their being objectual in that sense, that whatever else is the case they at least denote in
any true context, also mean that they should be purely objectual, i.e. do nothing except
to denote? It is unclear whether van Inwagen means his point to be stretched quite this
far, though he is certainly opposed to wider and narrower notions of being. Quine appears
to rely on the idea that committing expressions must be purely objectual, and restricts
the available committing expressions accordingly. By contrast to formal-logic variables,
ordinary-language pronouns are not always purely objectual. Some of them convey infor-
mation about gender, case, or kind in addition to denoting an object. But their sanitised
formal cousins, the variables, are purely objectual vocabulary. Nothing is communicated
by them except that an object is present. A slightly more controversial category of po-
tential committing expressions are the individual constants of first-order logic, assigned
elements in the domain as their values. These are denied admission to Quine’s language
of regimentation, possibly because he regards them as impurely objectual. We will return
to his reasons for this strict admissions policy in section 1.5 and chapter 3 below. More
contentiously, second-order variables may also be thought of as committing expressions
[Sha00]. On the standard interpretation, they are assigned objects of a particular kind,
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namely subsets of the first-order domain. The fact that their values must be sets arguably
weakens their case to be called committing expressions, since we can infer from the use
of a second-order variable in a standard second-order logic that its value is a set. Even
though nothing can be deduced about what its members are, it must be a set, so the case
could potentially be made that second-order expressions are not purely objectual expres-
sions.15 A commitment-based meta-ontology that admits committing expressions that are
objectual—whose semantic function is to denote—without being purely objectual—their
function is at least to denote, but may also include information—is possible. Examples
of such expressions might include higher-order variables, typed variables, propositional
variables, type-indexed names or sortal-indexed names. Such a theory, though, would have
to face questions about the role of logic in commitment—particularly, whether it could
maintain a view of logic as treating all objects completely impartially, without ordering
them according to their natures. My interest here is in purely objectual expressions, and
subsequent discussion will mostly focus on them.
1.4.2 Thin Objects
Using metaphysical language that might make the historical Quine uneasy, I would call his
notion of objecthood a relatively thin one. To be an object is no more than to be posited
on the intersection of observations. At least on the Quinean picture we have so far been
considering, there is only one kind of objectual expression, and it is purely objectual. van
Inwagen makes the plausible suggestion that all questions people attempt to raise about
different kinds of being are in reality questions about differences in nature. Since there
is only one kind of objectual language, and it reveals no information about the thing it
denotes, questions about different kinds of existence must always be framed in ideological
terms or appear senseless. To be a thing is just to be a good explanation of some pattern
in our observations: a pragmatic imposition which we keep because it works. Quine ends
up identifying being, existence and being an object, but not for no good reason. They are
all the result of reification, or the introduction of objectual vocabulary. It is because there
is a single semantic category whose function it is to signal that reification has taken place,
namely the variables. Here there is the germ of a reply to obfuscatory questions such as
‘What is it to be an object?’ or ‘Are there really objects?’ (e.g. Heideggerian distinctions
between ontic and ontological questions [Hei62], or the ‘pure ontology’ of [Jac02]). To be
an object is nothing more than to be posited as a good explanation of overlap. There
is only one such notion, simply because there is only one kind of role for the pronoun,
which is to flag the presence of significantly overlapping observations. If there were no
such intersections, the question would not be raised because the language would not be
15Quine never makes this case, and I want to remain neutral on the issue, but it might be considered a
natural motivation for his rejection of second-order logic [Qui70, pp. 66-68]. We will come back to this in
section 5.3.
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first-order, but retain the structure of sentential logic.
1.4.3 Commitment to Entities-qua-F
In a regimented language, the variable connotes no more, and no less, than existence; being
an object. All the interesting information about what is true of the thing is confined to the
ideology of the theory: its predicates. We choose our logical language such that it confines
talk of natures to its non-logical vocabulary, and reflects logical truths in the particles of
its grammar. A logical language thus cleanly separates being from nature: quantificational
vocabulary conveys no information about the things, only that they are things; only the
predicates speak of natures. Commitment only applies to things insofar as they fall under
some kinds describable in the theory: a theory is committed to whatever satisfies some
predicate or concatenation of predicates belonging to it: objects-qua-F. Although concate-
nations of predicates can be highly specific, even to the point of singling out only one single
being, the individuals themselves are only relevant insofar as they satisfy some open sen-
tence couched in terms of the predicates of the theory. They are there not qua individuals
but qua locus of persistently intersecting observations. A theory cannot be committed to
an individual qua individual under any circumstances, an issue to which we shall return in
chapter 3. It can be committed at most to the existence of something-qua-F, for some ‘F ’
which only that individual satisfies.
1.4.4 Flat Ontology
Ontological commitment à la Quine yields a flat ontology. The term ‘flat ontology’ is not
Quine’s, and as far as I can tell is first found in Castañeda [ned90, p. 47].16 The ontology
of the theory is arrived at by determining the domain of the regimented version of the
theory. A domain of discourse is a set: an unordered collection of existents that provide
values for the variables. All values of variables show up as items on a list the order of
which is irrelevant. Sets, being equally order-insensitive, are a fitting model for domains in
this sense. However the members of two sets may be presented or arranged, if all of them
coincide, the sets are pronounced identical. Since variables are the semantic category that
represent the introduction of reification, or positing beings, the beings are all on a par.
There is no ordering or hierarchy imposed on them. The beings themselves feature only
as objects-qua-F, only insofar as the open sentence governed by an existential quantifier is
true of them. The flat ontology models the underlying philosophy of existence quite well:
16Castañeda [ibid.] uses the term to contrast this kind of ontology with what he views as a hierarchical
ontology found in Aristotle, classifying supervenience as premised on a flat ontology. Interestingly, there is a
continental use of the the term ‘flat ontology’ as well. It seems to be much in vogue with human geographers,
who tend to credit the term to Deleuze [Del94] and use it in the sense of ‘an ontology composed of complex,
emergent spatial relations’, where its antonym is ‘transcendent ontology’; e.g. see [MIW05].
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there are no different kinds of being or existence that would have to be represented by a
hierarchy or ordering of posits qua beings. There are only differences in nature, which are
expressed by the predicates that are true of the posits. Logical grammar represents this
difference between being and nature. The presence of a variable signals only that its value
is a thing; nothing is revealed about what sort of thing it is, and only one notion of thing
is in play—the most general one.
Another way to explicate the flat ontology is that there is only one domain of discourse, a
single category of all the objects. In the case of Quinean commitment this entails specifically
that there is only one kind of quantifier and variable. A being is anything that is in
the range of the quantifiers. Any theory formulated in a way that appears to indicate
more than one type of quantifier must be translated into a language with only one kind
of quantification to be considered intelligible. By way of illustration, consider Lewis’s
explanation of how possible worlds can be made to fit into a flat ontology [Lew68].
Previously, Quine had criticised possibilia as lacking clear criteria of identity (see footnote
12 above). This problem is only exacerbated by the introduction of Kripke semantics
[Kri63], with their proliferation of domains of discourse, intended to model possible worlds.
His interpretation appears to entail that there are really two kinds of quantifier, the pair
‘’ and ‘♦’ and the pair ‘∃’ and ‘∀’, where the latter perform their normal function, while
the former range over possible worlds. The ordinary quantifiers, presumably, range over
objects contained within the worlds. This makes a mystery of how to translate world-
quantifiers into ordinary quantifiers, and how to interpret trans-world identity statements.
If there is no single unified domain of quantification, but multiple ones existing side by side,
there is no obvious answer to the question whether an object in some world is identical
to an object in another. Lewis translates away the appearance of a hierarchical ontology
of worlds whose contents are only locally quantified over, by letting ordinary first-order
quantifiers range over worlds as well as their contents (that is, their parts). The scope of
our quantifiers is much broader than we normally assume, encompassing all of modal space,
but it is ordinary first-order quantification all the same. On his reading, it follows that
two things located in distinct possible scenarios are never identical, since they are parts of
distinct worlds and occupy different points in the pluriverse, just like two different time-
slices of the same thing are never identical with each other. There has been a large domain
expansion, but nothing ontologically untoward is going on; worlds and possibilia may have
some unusual characteristics, but they are simply beings tout court. Although Quine is
still an extensionalist after 1968, he has ceased to complain about the unintelligibility of
possible worlds. In [Qui68b, Qui70] he accepts that some senses of ‘possible world’, such
as ‘cosmic distribution of particles’ are scientifically kosher, although he still complains
that ‘this idea affords us no general way of equating sentences in real life’ [Qui70, p. 4].17
17See also [Qui81e, Qui81b].
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1.5 Ontology and Quine’s Philosophy of Logic
Formalisation is useful for explaining interdependence and for levelling implicit with ex-
plicit commitments. Any existential consequences of a formalised theory are commitments,
whether they were explicitly stated pre-formalisation or only implied. Objectual quanti-
fiers, as defined by the formal languages we have encountered, unlike purportedly ontologi-
cal expressions in natural language, have the force of full generality. Formalising a theory
also confers upon it the theoretical virtue of simplicity. But now the question arises which
formal language is the one best suited for ontological enquiry. Is there only one suitable
candidate, or many? Quine’s ontological idiom of choice is bivalent first-order logic without
individual constants, which he claims is the only truly logical language. His reasons for
this choice turn out to be more informed by his overall epistemology than they seem.
1.5.1 Chasing Truth up the Tree of Grammar: Quine’s Conception of
Logic
One compelling reason for determining commitments only after translation into a formal
language of regimentation, we have already seen, has to do with the originally Tarskian
objectual interpretation of quantification. Variables are interpreted as ranging over a do-
main, with ‘∃xFx ’ being true if and only if at least one of its elements satisfies the open
formula ‘Fx’. Formally, truth is defined in terms of satisfaction by sequences, as described
in section 1.3.3, and truth for closed sentences is a limiting case: satisfaction by all se-
quences, because closed sentences have open formulae as constituents. The truth values of
compound sentences are determined by the truth values of their components, and this is
specifiable recursively. Quine is also interested in using Tarski’s work to give a disappear-
ance theory of truth. He wants to say that ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white, ‘Roses
are red’ is true iff roses are red, and so forth: in short, that instances of the schema ‘x is a
true sentence if and only if p’ where any sentence is substituted for ‘p’, and a name or other
singular term for that sentence is substituted for ‘x’, ‘could serve as partial definitions of
the truth of a sentence or more correctly as explanations of various concrete turns of speech
of the type “x is a true sentence”’ [Tar56a, p. 155]. Since that explanation collapses on
the liar sentence, which says of itself that it is not true, it needs some refinement. The
refinements Tarski proposes are principally 1. restricting it to languages that do not con-
tain their own semantic vocabulary and 2. relativising the truth predicate to the object
language for which it is defined.18 The truth schema thus becomes ‘x is true-in-L iff p’,
where ‘x’ is to be replaced by a name or structural description of a sentence in the object
18Strictly speaking, Tarski does not claim to provide a truth definition when he proposes his schema,
but only makes the weaker point that if a definition is formally correct, and the true sentences of the
language form a subset of the set of all its sentences, and it conforms to the schema, such a definition will
be materially adequate [Tar56a, p. 188].
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language, ‘L’ by the name of the object language, and ‘p’ by a metalanguage translation
of that sentence. Quine agrees with Tarski’s point about paradox [Qui66b], even though
he sometimes leaves these refinements implicit. He favours the Tarskian view of truth be-
cause it allows him to elucidate a link he sees between truth as a device of generalisation,
semantic ascent and logical consequence.
The apparatus of reification—variables plus quantification, with a little help from the
truth functions—enables us to generalise over objects. Everything in the domain satisfies
‘x = x’: Hypatia = Hypatia; Parvati = Parvati; 1=1. From these individual truths we can
generalise to ‘∀x(x = x)’, abstracting away from their individual names. Logic enables us
to generalise over sentences in virtue of their logical form. For instance, all sentences of
the form ‘p or not p’ are true in a bivalent logic—‘1 is prime or 1 is not prime’, ‘Hypatia is
a woman or Hypatia is not a woman’, etcetera. But sentences are not unproblematically
names of things in the domain, and in fact Quine proscribes quantificational generalisation
into sentence position: “‘p or not p for all things p of the sort that sentences are names
of” . . . is simply incoherent; it uses “p” both in positions that call for sentence clauses
and in a position that calls for a noun substantive’ [Qui70, pp. 11-12]. The quantified
sentence ‘∀p(p ∨ ¬p)’ would be in the object language, leaving the logician scrambling for
propositional objects. Quine prefers to ascend to the metalanguage, and use the truth
predicate to generalise over sentences with a certain form, e.g. ‘p or not p’. A sentence is a
logical truth iff its truth is preserved under all substitutions of the non-logical vocabulary.
In this case that means that whatever sentence is substituted for the schematic sentence
letter ‘p’, the resulting complex sentence will be true. A logically true sentence is thus true
in virtue of its grammatical form.
Quine’s views on consequence are closely linked to his views on truth. Logic, he says,
is ‘the systematic study of the logical truths’ [Qui70, p. xi], those which remain true
under all lexical substitutions. Logical consequence, for him, is a derivative notion. The
entailment relation’s holding between ϕ and ψ is, given the deduction theorem, equivalent
to the logical truth of the corresponding conditional, pϕ → ψq [Qui70, p. 53-55]. The
explanation of logical truth in virtue of its formal properties extends to consequence: he
proposes a substitutional account of logical consequence.
To say that logic is formal, or concerned with the laws of truth, is not to say that it is
primarily linguistic. Logical truth, and truth in general, is predicated of sentences, but that
does not mean that the subject matter of logic is linguistic objects. Sentences, after all, are
true both in virtue of what their component words mean and in virtue of how the world is
[Qui70, pp. 10-11]. ‘Hypatia is a woman’ is true because ‘Hypatia’ denotes Hypatia, and
Hypatia is, in fact, a woman. Were the name ‘Hypatia’ to denote a continent, the sentence
would be false; it would also be false if Hypatia were a goddess instead of a woman. ‘If
Hypatia is a woman, then she is human’ is similarly about Hypatia and true of Hypatia,
even though the open formula ‘if x is a woman, then x is human’ is satisfied by every
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element of the domain. ‘Either Hypatia is a woman or Hypatia is not a woman’ is, in the
same vein, equally about Hypatia, and not about the sentence ‘Hypatia is a woman’, even
though no amount of substituting other singular terms for ‘Hypatia’ and other predicates
for ‘is a woman’ could falsify it. In the case of ‘If Hypatia is a woman, then she is human’,
we can generalise by using a quantifier. Any substitution of a singular term for ‘x’ in ‘∀x
(x is a woman → x is human)’ will produce a true sentence. But in the case of ‘Either
Hypatia is a woman or Hypatia is not a woman’, that kind of generalisation is impossible
since it would imply that sentences are names of things in the domain. So we resort to
talking about form, without losing sight of the fact that what we are interested in the
most general laws of truth, which involves reality as well as language. The truth predicate
‘preserves . . . contact with the world, where [the logician’s] heart is’ [Qui70, p. 35].
Formality and Continuity between Logic and Other Sciences
Even though the laws of logic are in the metalanguage, unlike the generalities of the special
sciences, the conclusion to be drawn is not that logical truths are true in virtue of language
while the truths of the special sciences are true in virtue of reality. Quine sees no sharp
separation between truths of language and truths of fact, as a consequence of his blurring
of the analytic-synthetic boundary [Qui36b, Qui51c]. His view is not that there are only
synthetic truths, nor even that the extension of the concept ‘analytic truth’ is necessarily
empty. (He does not see any way of explaining necessity without appeal to analyticity; see
footnote 12 above.) It is that all truths are true both in virtue of what the world is like
and what their words mean. If Phaenarete had never had a son, ‘Phaenarete is the mother
of Socrates’ would have been false; it would similarly have been false if ‘is the mother of’
had meant ‘is younger than’. Sentences do not divide up into a language-component and a
fact-component, where the analytic sentences are just those whose fact-component happens
to be empty, and all others are synthetic. There are no analytic sentences in that sense,
but there are no synthetic sentences in that sense either—the distinction itself is specious.
For Quine, this is related to holism: he has no wish to hang on to the positivist orthodoxy
[Car37] that the analytic parts of theories are confirmed by any findings whatsoever. In
exceptional circumstances, he thinks, the best way to improve a theory is to adjust the
definitions of its words [Qui52, Introduction]. Though logic is about the laws of truth,
there is no contradiction in its being simultaneously about reality, because truth itself is
determined by both language and reality, and language is not distinct from reality.
Identity
Since Quine draws the boundary between logic and non-logic at semantic ascent, his philos-
ophy of logic relies on a strict separation between the lexicon (the ideology) and the logical
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vocabulary. The logical truths are those whose truth is unaffected by any and all lexical
substitutions, no matter how much we may expand the lexicon. It follows that predicates
are never logical vocabulary, not even the identity predicate. If an exception were made for
the identity predicate, then there would be some object-language logical truths after all,
like ‘∀x(x = x)’. Quine attempts to dissolve the need for a logical predicate by noting that
a ‘serviceable facsimile’ for identity can be defined for any first-order language with a finite
number of predicates. ‘x = y’ would be defined as short for some clause that expresses
indiscernibility by any of the predicates in that language. He gives the example of a lan-
guage with a one-place predicate ‘A’, two two-place predicates ‘B’ and ‘C’ and a three-place
predicate ‘D’, in which ‘x = y’ can be defined as (3) ‘Ax ≡ Bx ∧ ∀z(Bzx ≡ Bzy ∧Bxz ≡
Byz∧Czx ≡ Czy∧Cxz ≡ Cyz∧∀z′(Dzz′x ≡ Dzz′y∧Dzxz′ ≡ Dzyz′∧Dxzz′ ≡ Dyzz′))’.
‘If, instead of reckoning ‘=’ to the lexicon of our object language as a simple predicate,
we understand all equations as mere abbreviations of complex sentences along the lines
of (3), then all laws of identity become mere abbreviations of logical truths of the purely
quantificational sort’ [Qui70, p. 64], i.e. sentences which keep their truth value regardless
of lexical substitutions.
Quine admits that his definition of identity does not amount to a relation which partitions
the domain into singleton equivalence classes [Qui70, p. 63]. There may be differences
between objects that the predicates of the language fail to capture. But he avers that from
within the language, such differences are inexpressible. It appears counterintuitive that
a language can speak of two distinct objects and not be able to distinguish them, even
if its predicates are limited. Could we not refer to each of them by name, and refuse to
assert that they are identical? Not in Quine’s logic. He dispenses with names, blithely
declaring that for logical purposes, they are ‘frills’ [Qui70, p. 25], and instead of names like
‘a’, we can simply resort to uniquely identifying predicates like ‘A’. The objects cannot
be distinguished by giving them distinct individual names, since such names have been
eliminated. Logical languages à la Quine have no primitive identity predicate either, only
his defined facsimile. Its grammatical categories are limited to the predicates, the variables,
the connectives and the quantifiers (and brackets, but these are strictly speaking optional
as Polish notation could be deployed to dispense with them). So the only way to distinguish
one object from another is by the predicates, or the open formulae it satisfies. The line
between identity and indiscernibility cannot be drawn in such languages.
Quine’s line of reasoning here is one we will find reason to doubt in chapters 3-6. His
tendency to equate being the same thing with being the same with respect to all predicates
of the theory is probably informed by his thin conception of objecthood as whatever sits
on the intersection of persistently overlapping observations: just an x that marks the spot
where characteristics coincide.
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1.5.2 Quine’s Criteria for Logicality
There are several good reasons for using logic as a tool for determining ontology, and
translating theories into a properly logical language: simplicity, a determinate consequence
relation, equal status of implicit and explicit commitments. But why bivalent first-order
logic without constants specifically? The reason for choosing that particular canonical
language of regimentation is to do with Quine’s views on the nature of logic and the
criteria a language must meet to count as a logical language. Quine is explicit about
his definition of logic as the systematic study of the logical truths and his substitutional
account of logical consequence [Qui70, ch. 4], but offers a mixed bag of criteria of logicality.
While some of these would go well with any commitment-based view of ontology, others are
more beholden to particular doctrines of Quine’s that have less widespread appeal.
Quine’s particular conception of formality, going hand in hand with his substitutional
theory of logical consequence, leads him to draw the boundary between logic and non-logic
at semantic ascent. Semantic ascent as used here has much in common with his use of
semantic ascent in ontological commitment. To avoid making reference to the entities whose
existence he wants to deny, Quine ascends to the metalanguage. From this comfortable
vantage point he can demonstrate where his opponent uses a variable and thereby makes
a commitment to an entity. Logical laws are also stated in the metalanguage, in order
to eschew quantifying into sentence position, or using sentence letters in contexts where a
name should go. Quine deplores any kind of commitment to propositional objects. But
the first use of semantic ascent does not mandate the second. Appealing to committing
expressions in the metalanguage to avoid having to refer to objectionable entities does not
entail that logic must be carried out exclusively in the metalanguage. Although drawing
the line between logic and nonlogic precisely at semantic ascent does entail that, this is
uncomfortable for those who would prefer to keep identity as a logical predicate, perhaps
feeling uneasy at Quine’s thin conception of objecthood as positing. Nor is Quine’s position
on logical consequence the only option; notable alternatives include Tarski’s permutation
invariance [Tar56b]. Though Tarski seems a good match for commitmentphiles, modal
consequence [Bla00, Etc90] or inferentialism [Pra65] are not obviously ruled out either.
Still, there are other criteria for logicality to be found in Quine besides having laws statable
only by semantic ascent.
Probably the least controversial among these is what he terms ‘versatile ancillarity’: ‘the
ubiquity of use of logic. It is a handmaiden of all the sciences, including mathematics’
[Qui70, p. 98]. Frege makes a similar remark in the Grundlagen about logic’s applicability
to everything that is thinkable [Fre80a, p. 21]. The next criterion, ‘the lack of special
subject matter’ [Qui70, p. 98] seems to invite similar levels of popular acclaim, but upon
further inspection is a bit more entrenched in Quine’s systematic philosophy. When he
elaborates on what ‘lack of special subject matter’ means, his answer suggests that it
entails a substitutional theory of consequence: ‘logic favors no distinctive portion of the
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lexicon, and neither does it favor one subdomain of values of variables over another’ [ibid.].
That particular explanation is incompatible with the idea that some predicates, such as
‘=’ are universally satisfied as a matter of logic. In the end, Quine resolves this conundrum
by appeal to a defined indiscernibility which takes the place of identity, maintaining that
predicates do not belong to logic, but to the special sciences. Yet he understands the
temptation to count identity as logical, because ‘it treats of all objects impartially’ [Qui70,
p. 62].
Impartiality and the Flat Ontology
Impartiality, the property of applying to all of reality without discriminating according
to nature, is another possible explanation of ‘lack of special subject matter’, one which
non-Quinean realist might prefer because is not beholden to Quine’s substitutional theory
of consequence. A theory which has predicates of its own can still be impartial, as long as
it treats all values of variables equally. If it does have predicates, those predicates must not
exclude from consideration any branch of the special sciences [Qui70, pp. 62, 98].
Logic is concerned with things generally, not with the attributes some of them have and
others lack. Quantification theory concerns the most general laws of being, while the
predicates of the theory supply information about the natures of the things they talk
about. That is why logic is useful in providing a backdrop against which to settle, with
improved clarity, the question of which predicates are really satisfied by things in the world.
There is no need for different levels of being or existence; everything that exists shows up in
the domain as an object, independently of its particular characteristics. The flat ontology
requirement is linked with the idea that ‘existence’ (or ‘being’) is univocal : all existents
show up somewhere in the domain, regardless of their differences. This reflects the fact that
there are no different kinds of being or existence, but only differences in nature, expressible
in ideological terms. Logical grammar talks about being, leaving all talk of nature to the
predicates, elucidated by the special sciences. Any theory that excludes some objects from
consideration could not be logic, since it would not be impartial. Some more comprehensive
theory that talks about all objects would be logic.
Obviousness
Lastly, Quine cites as a criterion of logicality ‘the remarkable obviousness or potential
obviousness of logical truth’. The kind of obviousness he has in mind is behaviouristic:
‘when I call “1 + 1 = 2” obvious to a community I mean only that everyone, nearly
enough, will unhesitatingly assent to it’ [Qui70, p. 82]. It is apparent from the quotation
that obviousness is not a sufficient condition for logicality, because both mathematics and
observation sentences are obvious. Of all the criteria of logicality, obviousness is the most
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deeply embedded in Quinean epistemology. He introduces the idea in the context of logic’s
relationship to radical translatability. In Word and Object Quine had maintained that
after matching her own observation sentences to the native speaker’s, the linguist proceeds
to identify the native equivalents of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. She is then in a position to radically
translate truth functions. Her evidence for translating ‘bla’ as ‘and’ consists in the native
speakers’ tendency to assent to ‘p bla q’ wherever they assent to p and assent to q, and
dissent from it otherwise [Qui60b, pp. 58-59]. He continues to rely on this thought in
Philosophy of Logic, where he infers that because observation sentences and expressions of
assent and dissent are obvious, their obviousness carries over into logical theory. But it
cannot be the case that all logic must be radically translatable; the apparatus of reification
belongs to logic and yet it is not empirically conditioned. It introduces inscrutability. So
another quality that a quantified theory loses compared to its sentential predecessor is
obviousness. At first it may appear as though this should mean that not even first-order
logic counts as logic, but only the translationally determinate truth-functional systems.
Quine avoids this conclusion by distinguishing between the obvious and the potentially
obvious, and adds that proof-theoretic rules count as obvious.19 Now he feels justified in
saying ‘every logical truth is obvious, actually or potentially. Each, that is to say, is either
obvious as it stands or can be reached from obvious truths by a sequence of individually
obvious steps’ [Qui70, pp. 82-83]. Obviousness is therefore preserved in complete proof
procedures. Hence, first-order logic is obvious too, or at least potentially obvious, because
it is complete [Qui70, p. 97].
Awarding the status of logic only to obvious or potentially obvious truths of a peculiarly
ancillary and impartial sort does constitute something of a principled reason for denying
the status of logic to incomplete systems. When Boolos asks why Quine is so adamantly
opposed to second-order logic, his question, ‘Why completeness [as a criterion of logicality]
rather than decidability?’ [Boo75], looks rhetorical. It is often thought to be one Quine has
no answer to. On his own terms, he does: it is based on a peculiarly behaviouristic version
of cognitive primacy. It is a necessary condition for logic that it commands near-universal
unhesitating assent, either immediately or through a series of proof-theoretic steps each of
which has that same property. Second-order logic does not meet that criterion. Decidable
systems do, but they are rather weak. While sentential logic is straightforwardly obvious,
monadic first-order logic is decidable but not as interesting theoretically as full first-order
logic, which can express relations and is also potentially obvious. So an argument for
making completeness a necessary condition of logicality is available to strict behaviourists
who find obviousness appealing. What is not clear is what other advantages are to be got
19Quantificational truths are not obvious, I think not even potentially, to those who never learn to quantify
[Qui79]. Speakers of languages in which reification is not introduced only have the structure, and logical
truths, of sentential logic. Quine might be accused of fudging the proof theory/semantics distinction when
he says that completeness is going from visibly true premises to conclusions by visibly true steps [Qui70, p.
83]. Proof-theoretic rules are supposed to be mechanical and independent of interpretation; truth, on the
other hand, relies on interpretation and some agreement between representation and reality.
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from clinging to this cumbersome behaviouristic machinery. No matter how it seemed to
Quine, there are now few scientific reasons for adopting behaviourism, which is no longer
the venerated doctrine it once was [Mil03, p. 142]. Even apart from behaviourism itself,
obviousness in the sense of near-universal unhesitating assent seems rather too vague to
be of use. Doesn’t hesitation admit of degree [Par08]? And how much of a critical mass is
needed?
Behaviourism is also the root of the trouble when we consider the tension between the
radical Quine, for whom empirical data might lead to the revision of logical laws [Qui52,
Introduction], [Qui51c] and the logic-friendly Quine, who takes logic to be immune from
revision [Qui70, pp. 81-89; p. 96]. If we are merely behaviourally conditioned to accept
the laws of logic, logic must be potentially subject to revision [AS07], and cannot have a
normative role. The historical Quine’s behaviourism leaves him vulnerable to the threat
of logic change. But the minimally mutilatory response is to give up behaviourism rather
than classical first-order logic.
1.6 Unanswered Questions
All things considered, there are many good sides to Quine’s quantificational criterion of
ontological commitment. Pronouns, designed to stand for objects generally, are a rea-
sonable choice of committing expression. Regimenting ontological discourse in a logical
language has the advantages of clarity, simplicity, and a well-defined consequence relation
to incorporate implicit as well as explicit imputations of existence. There is a clear and
cohesive account of negative existentials and of interdependence and reductionism. Quine’s
philosophy of logic makes a good case that logic is the most general theory which is about
reality just as much as about language, because it treats all objects equally and aims to
describe the most general laws of truth and being.
What remains open is whether Quine’s canonical language of regimentation, bivalent first-
order logic without constants, really is the one true logic or not. Quine’s arguments in
favour of that conclusion rely heavily on his own holist system of thought, as well as
on his metaphysical distaste for propositions and universals. Another major influence
behind the scenes is behaviourism, which plays a large role in his rejection of higher-order
logic and in his contention that the boundaries of objects are an inscrutable theoretical
imposition which is not verifiable in objective third-personal terms. Quine’s contention
that the identity predicate must be defined away as indiscernibility-within-a-theory is a
byproduct of his conviction that all logical generalities are metalinguistic, rather than an
independently attractive philosophical treatment of identity.
When read closely Quine’s views on logic and ontology are rather more deeply indebted
to his epistemology and nominalism than would appear at first sight. To what extent can
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Quine’s criterion of commitment be maintained in the absence of his global holism? And
how much of Quine’s views of logic and ontology can be preserved by someone who explicitly
repudiates behaviourism? Is there an independently plausible argument for impartiality,
the view that logical grammar treats of objects in isolation from their natures and is
therefore useful in ontology, and for flat ontologies, without the holism?
In the next chapter, I will argue that despite the fact that Quine’s own treatment of logic
lacks global appeal, plenty of reasons remain for asking and answering ontological ques-
tions in a formalised language, and especially in some form of classical logic. In subsequent
chapters we will see that there is good reason to believe that alternative criteria of commit-
ment may be formulated, with alternative classical languages of regimentation, as a better
match for alternative epistemologies which have more in common with foundationalism or




This chapter is not a defence of Quine against his critics, but rather a defence of the
very idea of a canonical notation. Some of my arguments will have a Quinean tenor
and others will not. My aim is only to defend regimentation, i.e. translating theories
into a formalised language with the aim of answering ontological questions. Which specific
formalised language is the ideal canonical language is a further question which must be held
in abeyance until chapter 3 and following, although we will conclude that such a language
should be some form of classical logic, not a free logic or in any way Meinongian. It is
rare to see a contemporary metaphysician ascribe ontological commitments to formalised
theories. Most think commitments belong to agents speaking in their mother tongues.
They tend to deprecate Quine’s claims that ordinary language is too vague or unclear
for ontology and lacks simplicity. My objection is that quite apart from these concerns
formal languages, unlike natural languages, have well-established consequence relations.
In a formal language it is therefore straightforward which existence claims are entailed by
a theory. Natural languages, by contrast, are very resistant to showing commitment on the
surface, and are therefore not ideal vehicles for settling ontological questions. This is the
substance of section 1.
The next two sections discuss some advantages to meta-ontology of the objectual inter-
pretation of the quantifiers that are not explicitly invoked by Quine. Any interpretation
of quantification, if it is going to be of use for ontological purposes, must be a univocal
interpretation: quantifiers must mean the same whatever they are used to talk about.
Quantifiers must be interpreted as devices of generality that allow for claims about all the
members of a totality. Lastly, they must apply immediately to everything in their scope,
without relying on an implicit or explicit ordering or categorisation of the elements. The
objectual interpretation discharges these tasks better than any other.
Since ontological questions pertain to theories as a whole, quantifiers used for ontological
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purposes must have the force of full generality. The objection (Meinongian or otherwise)
is sometimes made that there are wider and narrower ontological notions, for example
that being is a more expansive notion than existence. The usual Quinean strategy is to
claim incomprehension unless the most comprehensive of these notions is translated as ‘∃’
and the narrower ones as predicates, reducing questions about different kinds of being to
questions about different kinds of nature. I agree with this strategy in principle, but find the
claim that there are ontological notions narrower than being to be not incomprehensible,
but false. Meinongian languages or free logics are defective for ontological purposes not
because they are unclear, but because they do not treat all ontological questions as fully
general. To conceive of a purportedly ontological expression as not applying to all beings
is at odds with the aims of ontology. If (e.g.) existence questions are not questions about
being in the most expansive sense, they are not ontological questions at all.
The remainder of the chapter will cover two versions of deflationism, the view that some or
all existence questions have no interesting answers. Deflationism faces serious difficulties
in accounting for reduction and interdependence. According to Carnap’s version of defla-
tionism, questions of the form ‘are there F s?’ either come down to ‘are there substituends
for the variables associated with F s?’ or to something ill-formed. My objection is that if
each ontological category has its own variables, cross-categorial statements of identity are
undefined. Connections between metaphysical categories, reductive or otherwise, cannot
then be expressed. But what if evidence should come to light that indicates that mem-
bers of categories formerly thought to be disjoint should now be thought of as identical?
Carnap’s deflationism stands in the way of such plausible theoretical developments.
Hirsch’s deflationism alleges that some existence claims are revealed to be trivial by or-
dinary language, such as those relating to mereological wholes, time-slices, fists and laps.
Earlier work by Hirsch suggests that he thinks English does not allow for the kinds of
criteria of identity that these entities demand. If some questions are trivially answered
by ordinary language, interdependence should only be able to run from the substantial to
the trivial; weighty questions about the existence of persons, numbers, properties, or God
may trivially account for wholes and temporal parts, but not vice versa. I call this into
doubt by providing examples from the history of philosophy where categories Hirsch would
call substantial are explained in terms of those he would call trivial: the ancient Indian
debate whether persons have temporal parts, and the classical theist argument for divine
simplicity.
2.1 Formal vs. Natural Language
Many philosophers think ontologies properly belong to people speaking ordinary language,
rejecting Quine’s suggestion that commitments must be ascribed to theories couched in
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the notation of formal logic1 [Jac80, Fin09, Tho09, Hir02, Hir09, Tho07, Cha09]. Some
even discuss themes from Quine as though Quinean commitments are ascribed to natural
language utterances; say, the arguments [Pap59, Jac99, Arm99] against Quine’s rejection
of universals [Qui53a] which rely on natural-language nominalisations of predicates, which
have no obvious analogue in first-order logic.
There is some prima facie plausibility to the idea that formal methods are overused in
contemporary metaphysics. Fruitful ontological and metaphysical debates predate the
advent of fully formalised languages by thousands of years. Plato and Aristotle agreed
that there were properties, but differed over what they were, using Greek. Hindus and
Hinayana Buddhists in ancient India all spoke Sanskrit when one school maintained, and
the other denied, that the self persists through time [Ano62], [Ano89b]. Some very old
texts betray an interest in meta-ontological questions, too. Plato, in the Sophist, reflects
on whether things that are said not to exist must have some form of being in order to be
a subject of such an ascription. His Parmenides queries the doctrine of Forms, wondering
whether it has unpalatable existential consequences. Aristotle reflects on the different
senses of ‘being’ in his Metaphysics and Categories. Scotus responds to Aquinas, whom
he reads as saying that ‘to be’ is predicated in different senses of God and creatures, and
objects that being is a univocal notion.
Talking about the ontological commitments of an English sentence would have been anath-
ema to the historical Quine. But should we follow Quine in this regard? Or could it be
argued that he exaggerates the lack of clarity of ordinary language, and the usefulness of
formal syntax?
1One hypothesis for why the central role of regimentation is often overlooked is that many philosophers
get their sense of Quinean commitment primarily from “On What There Is”, which does not mention
canonical notation, and was written before his interest in translation. Also, “On What There Is” still
speaks of ontological statements following trivially from some conceptual scheme, which is an idea that
fades from view in later papers, I surmise because the idea that anything follows trivially from anything
is suspect after his renunciation of the analytic/synthetic distinction [Qui51c]. (Quine had discussed his
scepticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction with Carnap when he visited him in Prague in the early
1930s [Qui04b, p. 55], but it may have taken him some time to recognise this consequence.) “On What
There Is” contains passages like ‘This, I think, is characteristic of metaphysics, or at least of that part of
metaphysics called ontology: one who regards a statement on this subject as true at all must regard it as
trivially true. One’s ontology is basic to the conceptual scheme’ [Qui48, p. 29] although a partial answer to
Carnap can already be gleaned from his remarks that ontological disputes are meaningful if both parties’
conceptual schemes overlap sufficiently to discuss semantics, and that ontological questions are subject to
theory choice just like any other.
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2.1.1 Consequence
The main argument for regimentation, I think, is not that formalised theories are clearer2
than natural language theories—they are in the sense of making apparent what their posits
and primitives are, but not in the sense of being immediately perspicuous to human lan-
guage users. It is that formalised theories have well-defined consequence relations. I
stressed in chapter 1 that any attempt to extract ontological commitments from an iso-
lated sentence is mired in uncertainty. Formal languages may have one or more syntactic
categories which the interpretation explicitly assigns to objects: the objectual expressions.
Natural languages, by contrast, do not have a category of expressions that are inalienably
objectual. There is no context-independent way to tell from the structural features of a
natural-language expression whether it, or some part of it, is a committing expression. If
such a sentence appears to contain a proper name, or ascribe a predicate, its structure
does not reveal whether it is a genuine name or an indispensable predicate. Even natural-
language existence claims, like ‘there is a statistical trend’, are often used to do something
other than assert that there is an entity. While formal languages may contain implicit
definitions to explain away such apparent quantification, there is no agreed-upon recipe for
getting from the structure of a natural-language sentence to an identification of its objec-
tual expressions. I also remarked that an as yet unregimented theory should be committed
to its implicit posits—those not there on the surface of its natural-language formulation—
just as much as to the things it explicitly asserts there are. Regimentation creates a level
playing field for implicit and explicit commitments: they are all posits, all introduced by a
sentence beginning with ‘∃’ which occurs in the set of sentences closed under consequence
which constitutes the formalised theory. Formal languages, unlike natural languages, have
clearly circumscribed consequence relations [Tar56b, Bla01, Sha07], which determine what
existence claims they entail.
Proponents of regimentation need not hold that most, or even many, metaphysical disputes
are best carried out in a clinically formalised language. Regimentation is mainly useful for
ontology. Although disambiguation in other areas of metaphysics is another application of
formalisation, the concern of ontology is to list the kinds of beings there are. Within the
particular predicates that characterise the kinds, formalism is not of paramount impor-
tance. What matters is that it should be unambiguously clear what follows from a theory.
Quine, in fact, is frequently content to leave the particular predicates in untranslated
English even as he is championing regimentation: ‘(∃x) (Tom believes that x denounced
Catiline)’ [Qui60b, p. 166], ‘(∃x)(x walks)’ [Qui70, p. 23].
2This argument is offered by some contemporary Quineans, e.g. [Hyl00, p. 239].
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2.1.2 Generality of Ontology and Interdependence
Even non-holists can see the appeal of evaluating ontological questions not in isolation,
but in the context of a theory. Reductionism about some purported kinds of entities is one
motivation. Another is that ontological questions have the force of full generality. Suppose
a philosopher, say, van Inwagen’s Norma [vI09], alleges that she is a nominalist, and does
not believe in abstract objects. We would be unlikely to react sympathetically to Norma if
she went on to freely make use of some apparent abstracta, e.g. invoking sets or properties
or numbers in her explanation of mathematics or natural science, and protest that those
abstract objects were not within the remit of her existence claim.3
A philosopher’s answers to existence questions will depend in part on her answers to other
ontological or general metaphysical questions. If Norma denies the existence of abstracta,
but relies on numbers or vectors for her philosophy of physics, our (charitable) response
will be to ask her why she considers these entities to be nominalistically acceptable. Can
she offer an account on which they are plausibly described as concrete? Any interesting
metaphysical theory will have interdependence between the categories of things it admits:
certain categories are explained in terms of others, for example ‘Mental states are brain
states’, ‘The natural numbers are the von Neumann ordinals’. We saw in chapter 1 that
it is imperative for meta-ontological theories to explain interdependence, and also that
regimentation is especially helpful for explaining interdependence between metaphysical
categories. The regimented version of ‘F s are explained in terms of Gs’ is ‘statements
about F s are reducible, by direct or contextual definition, to statements about Gs’.
2.1.3 Logic and Generality
One of my assumptions which is at work in the background, and will be touched upon in
this chapter and in later ones, is a realist view of logic as being about the most general
features of reality. This view is mine, not something I attribute to Quine. It has some
affinities with some of Quine’s views, less so with others. Logic, on my view, is the most
general of all theories of the world, but is nevertheless about the world, not just about
language or reasoning.
One aspect of my position is continuity between logic and the special sciences. The differ-
ence between logic and other theories is one of degree, not kind. Logic is not, by contrast
to the empirical sciences, merely about the form of thought or language, or about ‘good
3Some philosophers, mostly of an anti-realist persuasion, will feel uneasy at the mention of full generality.
Perhaps they deny that we have a clear enough grasp of absolutely general quantification [Dum91, p. 317].
Or perhaps they are wary of the idea of one undivided domain of all beings [Ben65, p. 64]. We will return
to this in the next section, but for now, I hope they will agree that existence claims have, at least, as much
generality as we can muster, and that abjuring absolute generality does nothing to help Norma.
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reasoning’, but also about reality. Logic does not have a completely different subject mat-
ter from other theories. The truths of logic are about the world just like other truths,
although they are more general. Quine would probably have agreed with this statement.
His rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction leads him to deny that there is a sharp
division between truths about reality and truths whose truth depends only on language.
But Quine’s route is not the only route to that particular conclusion. Frege, though in some
moods he sounds like an inferentialist, in other moods affirms something similar. He claims
that logic is concerned with the most general laws of truth [Fre79b, p. 128]. Truth is not a
matter of language or reasoning alone—it needs some cooperation from reality. Virtually
all theories of truth (with the possible exception of the coherence theory of truth) agree
that a true representation is true because the way it represents things as being is in fact
the way things are. Logic is about truth, and logical laws concerning truth apply to all of
the special sciences.
Logic itself is a true theory. The assumption that logic must say absolutely nothing about
reality, or must be true even if reality were not there at all, turns logical truth into a
completely different species of thing from ordinary truth. Logical truth, on such a view, is
true no matter what, but the truths of logic, unlike other truths, do not correctly represent
anything. The opposing view is logical realism, according to which logic is a theory like
any other, but more general than all others. For realists, logic is not different in kind
from, but continuous with, all other theories. All theories properly so called are about the
world, and logic is no exception. Logic is about the most general features of the world,
and logical truths are the most general truths. But like all truths, they are true because
of an agreement between representation and reality. We will explore this question in more
detail in chapter 5.
A specifically Quinean argument for continuity would be based on his rejection of the
difference between the analytic and the synthetic, between truth in virtue of reality and
truth in virtue of language. Consequently, logic is not a purely linguistic discipline, to be
contrasted with all other sciences, whose content is empirical. The laws of truth are not
just about sentences, but also about the things talked about in those sentences. Logic
concerns the most general laws of both truth and being. The task of the one true logic,
the unique most general theory, is only to speak of things insofar as they are things, and
of the generalities of truth. There is a rigid division of labour between logic and the
special sciences, which is indicated by the boundary between the logical vocabulary and
the predicates. The logical part of the theory confines itself to the most general features of
reality: objecthood, existence, self-identity, non-contradictoriness, entailment. By contrast,
the special sciences deal with the information-bearing part of the theory: the predicates,
which convey what in particular is true of the beings. The predicates ascribe natures to
things; logic talks of things qua things.
I will rely on the ‘division of labour’ argument at some points in chapters 2, 3 and 5. I take
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it to be one way in which continuity, a flat ontology, and logical realism can be justified.
But the strict division of labour between logical theory and the special sciences is a stronger
thesis than logical realism in and of itself, and it is also stronger than the continuity thesis
or the thesis that we should have a commitment-based approach to meta-ontology. It is
possible to accept any or all of those three and reject the division of labour argument,
and some commitmentphiles will. The division of labour relies on a strong form of logical
impartiality. We saw in chapter 1 that it is plausible to call logic impartial: it treats all
objects the same way, regardless of their natures. It does not discriminate with respect to
the characteristics of things. According to the strong impartiality thesis connected with
the division of labour argument, any thing that satisfies any predicate whatsoever is in
the domain, and beyond that, it is explicitly not the business of logic to group objects.
Classifying and ordering objects according to their natures falls to the special sciences,
which expound links between the various predicates of the ideology. It forms no part of
the business of logic, which merely collects together all the beings so they are available
for being talked about all at once. It is possible that this motivates Quine’s desire for
a flat ontology, according to which there is a single undifferentiated domain of all the
objects. Logic’s tendency to treat all things impartially is what makes it an ideal tool for
making decisions about ontology. The contents of a theory, the meanings of the particular
predicates that feature in the theory (‘x is an electron’, ‘x has top spin’) do not affect the
laws of logic at all, for they can always be replaced with other predicates without affecting
the logical laws.
I want to tentatively endorse the ‘division of labour’ argument, but an alternative interest-
ing argument for logical realism, possibly compatible with mitigated impartiality, might be
squeezed out of Frege’s contention that logic concerns the laws of truth, which are law-like
in two crucially distinct ways: descriptive and prescriptive [Fre79b, p. 128], [Fre79a, p.
4]. It is now considered almost a platitude to say that logic is about ‘the laws of good
reasoning’ [Sha01, Pri00]. But what does it mean to call logical rules laws of reasoning?
Are they just descriptive laws, like laws of nature, simply recording generalities? Or are
they laws in the sense that they have normative force? According to Frege, they are both.
He thinks of these laws as natural laws; analogous, in different ways, to both laws of nature
and ethical laws. Relative to the bearers of truth—Fregean thoughts—they are descriptive
laws. Relative to rational beings, they are prescriptive: they set standards our reasoning
must meet. This indicates that although it is in a way correct to say that logical laws are
laws of reasoning, it is insufficient to say that logic is about good reasoning. Its subject
matter is not reasoning, but reality, or possibly Fregean thoughts. Fregean thoughts are
mirrors of reality, reflecting the structure of the world in their own structure: ‘The analysis
of the proposition corresponds to an analysis of the thought, and this in turn corresponds
to something in the realm of meanings’ [Fre80c, p. 142]. Those who do not believe in
abstract propositional entities could take some liberties with Frege’s point and modify it
to the following: logical laws are descriptive from the point of view of reality, prescriptive
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from the point of view of reasoning. Logic describes the most general regularities that
govern absolutely everything. Our beliefs and patterns of reasoning are correct only if they
reflect these most general features of reality.
2.1.4 The Objectual Interpretation of the Quantifiers
If quantifiers can be of help in our attempts to answer ontological questions, we must
impose some restrictions on the interpretation of those quantifiers. The constraints I am
proposing to adopt here, and against which I will measure Quine’s objectual interpretation,
are intended as spelling out in more detail the contents of some logical-realist intuitions
about quantification and logic. According to logical realism, quantifiers are for talking
about everything. Quantification is concerned with the most general features of being, and
that is why quantifiers are useful in ontology. The proposed realist constraints, I hope, will
bring us as close as we can to ensuring that existence questions posed in a formal language
have determinate answers. Another useful feature of these constraints is that they will help
us identify where those opposed to the version of realism outlined here are likely to demur,
and what their reasons may be.
Univocacy
Firstly, quantifiers must not shift their meaning relative to context or category. If there were
no univocal interpretation of the quantifiers, this would jeopardise the project of settling
the cardinality of a theory’s ontology. The correct cardinality can only be found if we avoid
double-counting the same object under two different descriptions. But if quantifiers are
assigned different meanings relative to different categories, the question whether objects
from different categories are identical cannot be raised. We might try to index quantifiers,
or variables, according to category,4 e.g. ‘∀numberx(x/x = 1)’; or ‘∀propositionx(x∨¬x)’,
or ‘∀n(n/n = 1)’, or ‘∀p(p ∨ ¬p)’, but the motivation for any such project is dubious,
except as a convenient but dispensable shorthand. An argument would be needed why we
could not simply express the above in univocal quantification theory as ‘∀x(Nx→ (x/x =
1))’ or ‘∀x(Px → (x ∨ ¬x))’. And generalising from true premises or drawing particular
conclusions from true general premises would be problematic wherever the ontological
category restrictions on any of the quantifiers were unclear or unknown. The question
whether there are both numbers and propositions, in that case, could not be answered in
a word, even though it seems that ‘Yes’ (for the believer in both) or ‘No’ (for the sceptic
about one or the other category) are perfectly coherent replies. The question whether
4By this I mean indexing according to category with the implication that the objects that make up the
domain of each type of quantifier are radically different from each other, and cannot be subsumed under
the same domain. I am not talking about many-sorted logics.
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(some) numbers are identical with propositions would also be ungrammatical, rather than
true or false.
A similar proposal is made by van Inwagen’s ‘existence is univocal’ [vI09, pp. 482-492],
but his differs from mine in that he also attributes to some logicians the position that
both speakers of natural languages and logicians equivocate on the meaning of ‘exists’—
that some existence claims are made in one ‘logical tone of voice’ and others in another.
According to van Inwagen, the culprits are Ryle (who cheerfully commits himself to it)
and proponents of substitutional quantification. Although I think he is right to insist on
univocal quantifiers, I see no evidence for his contention that only the objectual quantifier
meets this constraint. There may be other unequivocal ways of interpreting quantification
besides ‘there exists some thing’ and ‘everything’. He is right to object to the ordinary-
language philosopher that there is insufficient data to show that natural-language ‘exists’ is
equivocal. Still, that does not show that all non-objectual interpretations of quantifiers—
formal or informal—are equivocal. A univocal neo-Meinongian such as Parsons [Par80],
for instance, will allege that although ‘there is’ really is a quantifier, ‘exists’ is a predi-
cate. So his quantifier always univocally means ‘there is’, and he just disagrees with van
Inwagen over the meaning of ‘exists’. van Inwagen’s contention that the truth-conditions
of substitutional quantifiers are inherently equivocal does not seem to hold water, either.
His claim is that proponents of substitutional quantification make essential use of different
‘logical tone[s] of voice’ [vI09, p. 488], and that they give no explanation of its truth condi-
tions other than that the substitutional particular quantifier is true whenever the objectual
existential quantifier is, but that they nevertheless express different propositions [vI81, p.
282]. van Inwagen does not cite or identify a target as such, only quoting minor points
in passing made by Ajdukiewicz and Orenstein [vI81, p. 284]. Anyone who makes these
claims would certainly seem to be equivocating. But I see no reason why proponents of
substitutional quantification need make them; certainly the canonical papers on the topic
[DB68, Mar72, Mar78, Kri76] make no mention of tones of voice or any such confusing truth
conditions. Barcan Marcus, who invented substitutional quantification, actually argues for
univocacy: ‘a direct, unequivocal colloquial reading of [‘∃’] ... [such as] the nontemporal
“sometimes” or “in some cases” or “in at least one case”’ [Mar61, pp. 16 – 17, my italics].
We have not yet succeeded in ruling out variant readings of ‘∃’ other than ‘exists’ such as
the Meinongian ‘there is’, or the substitutionalist ‘in some cases’.
Generality
Secondly, quantification for ontological purposes should always be read as a device of
generality. It allows us to talk about everything, all things in the domain, either severally
or collectively. Being a device of generality does not by itself imply that absolute generality
is mandatory. The idea that the role of quantifiers is to facilitate talking about everything
and yet deny the possibility of speaking about absolutely everything, though apparently
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contradictory when framed in those exact terms, can be made coherent with the help
of limitations of size. One way of limiting size, on an objectual reading, is to impose
a domain restriction. Objectual variables range over a domain of discourse—typically, a
set. Valuations are defined in terms of the members of this domain. So, for an objectual
quantifier belonging to a particular language, the members of its domain count as ‘all of
them’ for the purposes of this language. Constraints of model-theoretic elegance demand
that the domain be non-empty [Qui54]. Otherwise, it can be any size as long as it is
set-sized. Perhaps some collections of things are more than set-sized, though; if the entire
set-theoretic hierarchy exists, the collection of all its members certainly is not set-sized, on
pain of Russell’s Paradox. For a language to talk about totalities that are too big to form
a set, the standard model-theory is too restrictive [RU09]. Adhering strictly to a Tarskian
model-theoretic approach to semantics, while believing that some collections are more than
set-sized, is thus one possible route towards the denial of absolute generality, though I will
assume that the collections we are interested in are set-sized.5
Intuitionist or constructivist leanings can also be a reason to deny absolute generality.
If every totality we can quantify over is such as to give us the idea of yet more things
that intuitively clearly fall under the concept, but were not included in the scope of the
quantification, leading to the formation of a new domain of quantification by adding new
elements to old, the concept ‘domain of quantification’ is correctly described as indefinitely
extensible [Dum91, p. 316]. The constructivist opponent of absolute generality will state
her position along the following lines: ‘Whatever the domain of quantification, there exists
another domain, the cardinality of which is strictly greater than the first’ [RU09]. The
difference between the model-theoretic objection and the constructivist one pertains to
realism vs. anti-realism about the underlying ontology. The Dummettian holds to a version
of objectual quantification that is afflicted with a hazy outer boundary. She will agree that
variables range over a domain of discourse, and quantifiers are used to assert of the objects
within it, severally or collectively, that the open formula following it applies to them.
She just believes that not every domain of discourse is such that all objects within it are
themselves sufficiently determinate to ensure that nothing is left out; the concept they
fall under has ‘an increasing sequence of extensions’ [Dum91, p. 317], trailing off into the
distance. This extensional vagueness of certain types of entity—usually mathematical—is
an anti-realist challenge to my realist strategy, which I will not attempt to answer here.
5This is a weighty issue for those who believe that mathematics is true, since its posits include all
the sets. Quine disavows commitment to any mathematical posits that are not indispensable to physics,
remarking that higher set theory is merely recreational [Qui86b, p. 400]. Philosophers who do want to
commit to the existence of all sets may appeal to modality to argue that not all totalities actually form a
set, but any totality is in principle such that it could form a set [Uzq10], or perhaps attempt to specify the
domain as a plurality rather than a set, using Boolos’ [Boo84] plural logic.
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Immediacy
Quantifiers, then, are devices for talking about everything, leaving aside the potential
problems with helping ourselves to absolutely everything. A third constraint is that for
ontological purposes quantifiers are devices for talking about everything all at once, a
characteristic of theirs I shall call ‘immediacy’. A quantified statement does not need to
wait to take effect until after the domain or the individuals within it have submitted to
some ordering or arrangement. Quantification is not order-sensitive; it is neither process
nor procedure. It has no beginning or end.
Univocacy demands that when we say everything is self-identical, it does not matter what
kinds of things we are talking about, nothing is excluded from consideration; similarly,
immediacy gives some substance to the intuition that nothing is left out of the range of the
quantifiers because it is somehow harder to reach than the other objects, or has to wait until
a certain stage, or may remain out of reach. Quantification applies equally to all values
of variables, whatever they may be. Quantified statements are true or false immediately.
There are no things that are left out because the statement has not yet got to them, no
things for which it is not yet determinately settled whether they fall under it. If there
are borderline cases, the application conditions of the predicates is where the vagueness
lies, not the quantifiers. Who denies immediacy? Certain constructivists, for one; I aim
to head off at the pass interpretations of quantification such as Dummett’s [Dum91, ch.
16–18], on which quantification is openly defined as a process, tapering off at the edges of
the hazy extensions of certain domains. Although generality on its own does not rule out
indefinitely extensible domains, the combination of generality and immediacy does.
Some more realist-seeming interpretations of quantification are at odds with the immediacy
requirement, too, notably those where the quantifier reduces to the atomic, such as the
Tractarian quantifier [Wit74] or the quantifier of Leśniewski’s Ontology [Lej54]. Reduction
to the atomic is an attempt to show that quantifiers are not strictly necessary to our logical
syntax by explaining them away in terms of concatenations of atomic formulae. Existen-
tial quantifications like ‘∃xFx ’ are a mere façon de parler, their true logical form being a
long disjunction of atoms starting with ‘F ’: ‘Fa ∨ Fb ∨ Fc ∨ Fd ...’ for all objects in
the ontology. Reduction to the atomic sits uncomfortably with the aims of ontology, since
it relies on the assumption that everything in the domain has a name. A language with
only three names has no trouble quantifying over a domain of four objects on the standard
interpretation, but fails to achieve this goal on the reductive interpretation. Any model
where the cardinality of the domain exceeds the cardinality of the set of names will invali-
date reduction to the atomic. This severely limits the interest reductive interpretation of
the quantifiers might hold for meta-ontologists, even though they are grammatically par-
simonious. A quick sampling of ontological questions that are of interest to contemporary
metaphysicians shows that many of them have ontologies of very large cardinalities, and
wish to settle questions of cardinality through metaphysical means. Just look at the ani-
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mated discussions of such questions as: What would happen if the parthood relation were
non-wellfounded? [Lew91], ‘[W]hen we quantize relativistic field theories, do we . . . get
violations of determinism and of conservation principles?’ [Arn06], Can a single theory
comprise principles of both unrestricted composition and unrestricted set-membership?
[Uzq09]: it is clear that to be confined to a language that can only talk about finitely many
things would be very irksome to these philosophers. But if we are barred from using quan-
tified phrases that go beyond conjunctions and disjunctions of atomic predications, this is
exactly what will happen. In non-infinitary languages, conjunctions and disjunctions must
be finite in length. Even if longer conjunctions and disjunctions were somehow available,
names themselves must always form a list. A language in which quantification reduces to
the atomic is thus not suitable for discourse about domains whose cardinality is strictly
greater than the cardinality of the set of its names—it is unsuitable for any nonenumerable
domains.
Here we find a better argument against substitutional quantification as used for ontological
purposes than the one offered by van Inwagen: it is not that substitutional quantification
is equivocal, but that it reduces to the atomic. A substitutional reading of the quantifier in
‘∃xFx ’, as ‘F is sometimes true’ or ‘in some cases, F ’, is spelled out in terms of substitution
instances containing syntactically singular terms [Mar61]. It is crucial for this interpreta-
tion that variables do not stand for things, but are stand-ins for singular terms, which may
in turn be referential. So the substitutional quantifier is inescapably non-immediate. Sub-
stitutional quantifiers must be equivalent to conjunctive or disjunctive lists of substitution
instances. And since substitution instances are minimally a predicate plus a term, that is a
form of reduction to the atomic, albeit one that allows for potentially infinite denumerable
lists.
Objectual Quantification and the Constraints
Objectual quantification is in harmony with these constraints. Quine’s insistence that
‘[e]xistence is what existential quantification expresses’ [Qui69a, p. 97] suggests that the
objectual existential quantifier is primitive, univocal, and irreducible. We might explain to
someone who professes not to understand what ‘exists’ means how domains and variables
work in order to demystify the interpretation and remove any suggestion of equivocality.
‘We may indeed take [existential quantification] as explicating ... “exists” ... This is just
what existential quantification is for, of course. It is a logically regimented rendering of
the “there is” idiom’ [Qui69a, p. 94]. But there is simply nothing more to be said if the
interlocutor persists in her bafflement. ‘[E]xplication of general existence is a forlorn cause’
[Qui69a, p. 97]. Attributions of existence statements to someone endorsing a particular
theory, by contrast, can be explicated: ‘Existence statements in this philosophical vein do
admit of evidence, in the sense that we can have reasons, and essentially scientific reasons,
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for including numbers or classes or the like in the range of values of our variables’ [Qui69a,
p. 97].
Quine also stresses that it is vital that nothing is left out if we are to talk about everything.
A sufficiently high level of generality, such that quantifiers apply to all kinds of entities,
is a central precondition for formulating our best theory of the world. Science, according
to Quine, can, and should, be used to talk about everything, in the same way, and all at
once. The project of corralling all the beings together into a huge domain cannot proceed
without univocacy, generality and immediacy. A theory cannot be committed to all values
of its variables if it is uncertain whether its existential quantifications will ever take full
effect. The theory already says they do: the theory itself is just an unordered set of
sentences, the domain one big undifferentiated set. How could we hope to assess and test
a theory some of whose sentences lack determinate truth values either because something
about their internal complexity is holding them up, or because even the most logically
rigorous expressions we can muster are vague around the edges? The objectual quantifier
is irreducible, and has no need for atomic substitution instances: ‘through our variables
of quantification we are quite capable of committing ourselves to entities which cannot
be named individually at all in the resources of our language; witness the real numbers’
[Qui51a, p. 67]. All in all, objectual quantification appears to be very congenial to the
aims of ontology.
2.2 Objectual Quantification, Translation, and the Most Gen-
eral Category
But what are we to make of objections that objectual quantification is not general enough,
and that the traditional view of meta-ontology fails to give a satisfactory account of intra-
ontological distinctions? Various members of a motley collection of philosophers, for a
wide variety of reasons, have put forward this kind of response to the classical approach
to meta-ontology. This classical conception of ontology and meta-ontology they attack
includes the view that being, existence, and being a thing or being an object are all the
same. It embodies a liberal notion of thing or object which does not put any constraints
on the natures of things, such as requiring that they be concrete. When a philosopher
comes to the conclusion that all objects are concrete, this must be a result of empirical
discovery, not a priori stipulation. The corresponding expressions ‘there is’, ‘exists’, and
‘is a thing/object/entity’ can be applied to whatever can be said to have a characteristic
or stand in a relation. After all, if something can be truly said of it, it must first of all
be there—otherwise, what is there to be the subject of this ascription? This does not
rule out that there are coherent statements of non-being: what is said by them is that
some condition is not satisfied by anything, or some description does not single out a
being, or some name does not refer. I will refer to the view described here as ‘classical
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meta-ontology’. I intend to defend it and I think it goes well with any commitment-based
approach. It is shared by Quine, as well as by most temporal parts of Russell—e.g. his
theory of descriptions [Rus05] exemplifies it—and possibly Scotus. We can sum up the key
aspect of the classical meta-ontology as the idea that being is the most general category:
anything which satisfies any condition whatsoever must be in it.
Proponents of intra-ontological distinctions decry the classical view as the default assump-
tion most philosophers unthinkingly fall into, overlooking some significant distinctions be-
tween different kinds of ontological vocabulary. It is coherent, they allege, and true, and
indicative of flaws in most philosophers’ conceptual scheme, to say things like
1. There are things that do not exist. [Syl80], [Par80], [McG01]
2. Some objects do not exist. [Pri05]
3. ‘[It is] no part of reality that there is a chair over there, even though it is in fact true
that there is a chair over there.’ [Fin09, p. 175]
4. ‘A body does not exist; it is, rather, extant.’ [Hei88, p. 28]
The prejudices inherent in the classical view, they contend, have blinded great philoso-
phers to monumental distinctions. Often they draw their examples of intra-ontological
distinctions from natural language; sometimes they propose a regimented language with
quantifiers that are distinct from and more wide-ranging than the objectual quantifier. Hei-
degger, who sees Hegel as the source of classical meta-ontology, accuses him of confusing
questions about what things there are with questions about what it is to be a thing at all:
what Jacquette [Jac02] calls ‘applied vs. pure ontology’ and Heidegger calls ‘ontic vs. on-
tological questions’ [Hei62]. Sylvan [Syl80] accuses Quineans of thinking all quantifiers are
‘existentially loaded’, thus mistaking existence questions for quantificational questions—
what quantified phrases follow from a theory, many of which, in his view, do not bear on
existence at all. Fine also toys with the idea of “‘thin”, ontologically neutral’ vs. “‘thick”,
ontologically loaded’ [Fin09, p. 163] senses of the quantifier as found in natural language,
before rejecting it in favour of his reality operator.
I am not concerned to discuss the details of any of these philosophers’ views, or to enter
into debates about who is properly called a Meinongian or neo-Meinongian. All I want
to establish is that the classical view that there is only one most comprehensive cate-
gory of being—and correspondingly no significant differences between different ontological
expressions—is defensible. I believe that it is in fact false to assert that there are several
non-equivalent ontological expressions, or multiple wider and narrower ontological cate-
gories. There is only one ontological category, and that is the maximally comprehensive,
all-encompassing category of being. This is because the aims of ontology are fully general;
ontological questions have the force of full generality. Questions that only apply to some
categories of things but not others are not ontological.
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2.2.1 Translation and Intelligibility
The usual Quinean response to intra-ontological categories is that they are unintelligible.
Sentences like ‘there are things that do not exist’ just cannot be understood except as
contradictory. Similarly, ‘there is’ just means ‘exists’, ‘entity’ just means ‘thing’, ‘to be
there’ just means ‘to be part of reality’, etcetera. Usually this is accompanied by a proposal
about translation from anti-Quinean into Quinean discourse. The Quinean aims to show
one of two things (or both). Firstly, that because she does not think that the different
kinds of ontological expression connote membership in different categories, she can drop all
but the most wide-ranging of them, usually ‘being’ and its derivatives. By reformulating all
her statements in this way, she demonstrates the equivalence of all ontological vocabulary.
‘The only way I know of coping with this obfuscation of issues is to give Wyman [the
fictitious Meinongian] the word “exists”. I’ll try not to use it again; I still have “is”.’
[Qui80a, p. 3]; ‘When you people say “Dragons do not exist” that just means “Everything
is not a dragon”.’ [vI09, p. 479]. Secondly, the correct way to translate anti-Quineans’
natural language statements into a regimented language is to map their most comprehensive
ontological expression to ‘∃’, and their narrower ones to some special predicate. The result
is a first-order regimented theory, which, if true, has all the beings in its domain, and
assigns to the lesser ontological categories subsets of the domain. This is a translation
according to which so-called ontological differences, or distinct ways of being, are translated
as differences in nature, and are thus revealed not to be ontological, but ideological. A
forerunner of this style of argument is to be found in [Rus05]. In the precise sense of
translating rivals into Quine’s preferred idiom of classical first-order logic, it was pioneered
by Lewis [Lew90], and its main contemporary proponent is van Inwagen [vI98], [vI08],
[vI09].
I think all proponents of commitment, Quinean or not, should endorse the translational
strategy proposed by these explicitly Quinean commimentphiles, but for reasons other than
unintelligibility. There are several components to the classical view. The following four
are important to the debate about intra-ontological distinctions:
Univocacy of ‘being’. The word ‘being’ and its cognates (‘is’, ‘there is’, ‘a being’) always
mean the same thing, and do not shift their meaning according to context or category.
Equivalence All vocabulary that is genuinely ontological, whether it is ‘being’, ‘existence’,
‘thing’, ‘entity’, ‘real’, etcetera, is equivalent in meaning.
Unity of being. There is one single most comprehensive category: being (existence, thing-
hood). Corollary: All ontological vocabulary connotes being in this category, and no more.
Non-Being There are true, coherent statements of non-being. A true statement of non-
being of the form pThere is no x such that ϕxq is true because ‘ϕ’ does not apply to
anything.
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The first two are theses about language, the third is metaphysical, and the fourth is about
truth-conditions. Unintelligibility arguments focus on the first two, attempting to show we
must default to them, because we cannot truly grasp the content of their negations. But
I would suggest that the truth of the first, second, and fourth theses is best explained by
the truth of the third, and the most satisfactory argument for the classical view is one that
argues explicitly for Unity, and shows how the others follow.
A simple unintelligibility argument which is not propped up by additional assumptions
may establish some particular equivalences between ontological expressions, and perhaps
the univocacy of those particular expressions. We may be convinced by the fact that we
can make no sense, whatever the context or information supplied, of there being things
that fail to exist, that the meaning of ‘there is’ is not context- or information-dependent,
and is in fact the same as that of ‘exists’. But it does not establish the unique intelligibility
of a position that entails Univocacy and Equivalence, because the argument would have to
be repeated for each pair of ontological expressions we want to show equivalent. Nor does
it by itself suffice to prove Unity or Non-Being.
What kind of argument would suffice to prove Unity? It is difficult to say; usually something
like Unity is just tacitly assumed, and to some extent the best we can do is just to elucidate
this central assumption. But it does find some support in the arguments for preferring a
flat ontology and the kind of logical realism that sees logic as the most general theory
of all, whose task it is to treat all objects impartially, independently of their natures.
Purely objectual expressions help bring about strong logical impartiality. The presence of
a variable signals only that its value is a thing. Nothing is revealed about what sort of thing
it is, and there aren’t distinct notions of objecthood that are relevant to logic, but only the
most general one. The most general description of an object is simply ‘∃x(x = x)’, and this
is all the flat ontology requires of a being. No further strictures can be imposed by logic,
because as far as logic is concerned, everything there is just functions as an element of the
domain; it features only qua object. All information about its other features is provided
by the predicates, the contents of which belong to the special sciences. Logic is the theory
that has all objects in its remit. It is continuous with other theories, but more general. It
speaks of the same objects, but is unconcerned with their specific natures.
Another point in its favour is the generality of ontology. Ontological questions must always
be given the widest possible reading, because ontology is concerned with what there is: with
what is in the most general category. Think of Norma the nominalist, who claims that
there are no abstract objects. She had better be able to explain everything she needs to
explain without ever mentioning abstracta. If she ends up having to make indispensable use
of abstracta at some point, her only choice is to give up nominalism. It is unacceptable to
claim that some abstract beings were not included in her original statement of her ontology,
since they do not count as objects, or as really there. Such a statement is just confused:
an ontology must be fully general, an inventory of all the beings. It cannot simply leave
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some out of account. Being is the category that anything has to be in in order for anything
to be true of it at all. If an object is going to be immaterial, for instance, or stand in a
causal relation, or have anything at all predicated of it, it must first of all be. All facts
about the characteristics of the beings are not ontological facts: they are not about what
beings there are, but about how they are: they belong to the ideology. The ideological
vocabulary is where distinctions about the things are made; the ontological vocabulary,
by contrast, conveys only that something is. All truly ontological vocabulary is applicable
to anything whatsoever, because of the lack of constraints on the most general category.
Anything with any characteristics at all is in there—hence Univocacy. So if an expression
is truly ontological, it cannot make any further distinctions: all it connotes is being (which
we also frequently call ‘existence’, or ‘being a thing’). Whatever makes further distinctions
is ideological; if some expression differentiates some things in the most general category
from others, it is not truly ontological, so all ontological expressions must be equivalent in
meaning. This picture implies that it cannot be the case that non-being is some special
property had by some entities. There is nothing outside the most general category of being.
So statements of non-being cannot attribute a property. There is nothing there for them
to ascribe it to. Not to have being simply is not to be there at all. Statements of non-being
must be true in a different way from simple predicative sentences. Since whatever has some
attribute truly predicated of it must have being, statements of non-being say that there is
no thing, nothing in the most general category, that fulfils the condition they specify. The
truth conditions of such statements are straightforward: if none of the things in the most
general category has the attribute in question, the statement of non-being is true.
In what remains of section 2.2, we will see some reasons to believe that arguments against
Univocacy and Equivalence fail to prove the negation of Unity. Since Unity is an existence
claim, there are two ways it could be false:
1. There is more than one most comprehensive category: being is not unitary, but
pluriform.
2. There is no such thing as the most comprehensive category.
The latter would be an anti-realist objection, an argument that it is impossible to make
sense of a theory-independent notion of an object. Since objecthood is theory-dependent,
according to this view, we can infer that there is no category of all objects. I think this is
the most philosophically interesting line of attack, but explicit arguments for it are rare.
Putnam appears to argue that there is no unbiased way of specifying how many objects a
given domain contains in [Put87, pp. 17-19]. I have two reasons for setting this type of
challenge aside: firstly, I am working within a realist framework for present purposes, and
secondly, I don’t think most proponents of intra-ontological distinctions intend to attack
Unity in this way. What they mean is the former: that being is not unitary, but pluriform.
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The statement that being is pluriform could be made true by two distinct kinds of situation.
One is that there are ever-widening concentric circles of ever more expansive categories of
being beyond the one we are accustomed to. The ‘widening concentric circles’ view is held
by the votaries of wider and narrower kinds of ontological vocabulary. On this picture, there
is overlap between the different domains, some encompassing more objects than others. For
example, if some entities only have being, and some have a special kind of being known
as existence, then the domain of existents is a sub-domain of the larger domain of beings.
The unintelligibility arguments are directed against this kind of pluriformity, which will be
the subject of the remainder of this section. The ‘widening concentric circles’ view is not
a ramfied collection of domains, where items of level 0 never occur together with items of
higher levels [Rus67b], as in such domains there is no overlap.6
The second way in which being could be pluriform is that there are multiple parallel highly
general categories which are incommensurate. Arguments for that claim are vulnerable
to the threat of collapsing into ideology. Suppose there are two allegedly equally good
candidates for the most general category, being1 and being2. If there are two categories
vying for the title of ‘most general’, the first thing to investigate is why we cannot take their
union as the most general category instead. The union must be either equally general (if
they happen to overlap completely) or more comprehensive (if not). If there is no such thing
as their union, why is that? One option is that it collapses into the anti-realist argument
we discussed above that there really is no sense to be made of objecthood in a theory-
independent way. The only other option is that something about the beings1 and beings2
keeps them apart from each other, preventing them from forming a set together. Excluding
limitations of size, what is forcing them asunder must be something about their natures:
something that makes a difference, two characteristics that repel each other. Being1 and
being2 would not be logical categories in this case, as they discriminate according to nature.
Multiple incommensurate categories of being are incompatible with impartiality. We will
briefly return to pluriform being in section 2.3 when we consider deflationism.
6The acceptance of typed variables conflicts with the division of labour argument, according to which
logic speaks only of beings qua beings, leaving all sorting and ordering to the ideology. Since the intended
interpretation of higher-order variables is that they have sets or properties as their values, they must be
either capable of being eliminated or reduced by paraphrase, or else taken as impurely objectual committing
expressions. The latter is incompatible with the strong impartiality I prefer, but does not entail that there
are different levels of being or existence. The point of type theory is to prevent paradox-involving statements
from being formulated by limiting the grammar. It does not have to be taken as saying that the values of
variables are themselves incommensurable or cannot exist side-by-side. Proponents of type theory could
count as commitmentphiles if they had a suitable philosophy of logic containing some doctrine of mitigated
impartiality.
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2.2.2 Unintelligibility in Natural Language
Unintelligibility arguments are not quite sufficient if they are conducted entirely in natural
language. van Inwagen defends some natural-language unintelligibility arguments [vI98, pp.
235-237], even though he ultimately also wants to invoke formal languages [vI08]. Natural-
language unintelligibility arguments are conducted by appealing to the reader’s intuitions
that e.g. ‘there are things that do not exist’ is either contradictory or unintelligible, because
we have no better account to offer than that ‘exists’ just means ‘there is’. And similarly
for all other ontological expressions: ‘entity’ just means ‘thing’, ‘something’ just means
‘exists’, ‘there is’ just means ‘is real’. The natural-language debate over unintelligibility
will most likely remain inconclusive. It is true, as is evinced by van Inwagen’s dissection of
arguments that rely entirely on natural-language ontological distinctions, that the evidence
that ordinary English speakers clearly mean different things by ‘exists’ vs. ‘there is’,
or ‘thing’ vs. ‘entity’ is scant, as is the evidence that ‘exists’ is equivocal [vI98, vI09].
The inability of philosophers wishing to draw intra-ontological distinctions to agree on
vocabulary is also telling. While Sylvan [Syl80], Parsons [Par80] and McGinn7 [McG01]
are all happy to say that there are things that do not exist, Sylvan takes ‘there is’ and
‘exists’ to be two different quantifiers, while Parsons and McGinn believe that existence
is a first-order property that some things lack. Priest, although some flavour of neo-
Meinongian, cannot hear a distinction between ‘there is’ and ‘exists’, but does think that
both are distinct from ‘something’ [Pri05]. Whether ‘thing’, ‘entity’ or ‘object’ is the more
general term is anyone’s guess; it looks like intra-ontological distinctions are at least not
very naturally read off the structure of natural language.
More generally, the reason that natural-language unintelligibility arguments are unlikely
to fully resolve meta-ontological disputes is that natural language has insufficient resources
to express interdependence between metaphysical (ideological) categories, like elimination,
reduction, and paraphrase. Regimented languages take care of this quite seamlessly, but
in natural language we use ontological-sounding expressions to deny commitments: e.g.
‘There is such a thing as gender, but it is not really real’, or ‘Nation states exist in some
sense, but they are not ultimate constituents of reality’. The ontological appearance of
such expressions can be explained away by expounding entailments between the sentence
in question and others.
The main concern about natural-language unintelligibility arguments is that they are
supremely unlikely to convince anyone who believes they do hear a difference between
distinct ontological expressions. Why should such a philosopher not be within her rights
to dismiss the classical meta-ontologist as not trying hard enough? Natural-language un-
intelligibility is very vulnerable to the ‘Yes, Virginia’ response: ‘Why, yes, there is indeed
7The first two are uncontroversially neo-Meinongians. McGinn is a neo-Meinongian only in an extended
van Inwagian [vI08] sense, as he does not accept a Meinongian object comprehension principle stating that
for any condition whatsoever, some object satisfies it.
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something you have failed to understand’. The conclusion is an unsatisfying stalemate
where neither side is convinced that the other is saying anything at all.
2.2.3 Translation into a Formalised Language
Proponents of unintelligibility often try to break through the impasse by proposing trans-
lation into a formalised language. Each side is treated as though they speak their own
ontological language, and the expressions of each are to be mapped onto those of some
shared formal language acceptable to either party. Both van Inwagen and Lewis [Lew90]
think that the uncontroversially shared formal language must be classical first-order logic.
van Inwagen’s argument is that ‘there is’ and ‘exists’ very naturally translate into first-order
quantification, as variables can simply be read as the formal analogues of the third-person
pronoun, ‘∃’ and ‘∀’ as ‘some’ and ‘all’, and predicate letters as predicates. Quantification
is just a tidied-up version of something we already understand quite well [vI98, p. 238],
[vI09, p. 499]. We understand at least this much, and at most this much; there is no
residual need, he asseverates, for further ontological notation. Ontological expressions not
translatable as quantifiers are unintelligible. An unrestricted ‘all’, or ‘absolutely every-
thing’, meaning any thing whatsoever, is intelligible and can be used in true statements.
For such statements to be true, the word must of course apply to whatever is a thing; and
given that the existential quantifier ‘∃’ is definable as ‘¬∀¬’, for an F to be or exist is just
for it to be false that not everything is not-F .
Lewis’s argument is spelled out in terms of charity. He contends that Sylvan [Syl80], who
distinguishes ‘neutral’ quantifiers—∃xFx — from ‘existentially loaded’ quantifiers—∃x(x
exists ∧ Fx)—is wrong to say most philosophers assume that all quantification is exis-
tentially loaded. Sylvan translates our ‘∃’ as his ‘∃x(x exists ∧ Fx)’, with his particular
quantifier meaning something less restrictive: quantification without existence assump-
tions. Lewis objects. Charity dictates, he says, that we translate others into a shared
language whenever we can. It is more charitable to translate Sylvan’s neutral quantifier
as ‘∃’—after all, Quineans like Lewis understand that—and his existence predicate as a
new primitive predicate. Lewis admits that he finds the non-quantificational existential
primitive unintelligible as well, but finds at least understanding neutral quantification to
be a step forward.
Although more rigorous, this style of argument still seems to succumb to the Yes, Virginia
reply. The opponent can insist that the shared first-order language is insufficient to express
all that she considers worth saying, even though it is a comfortable fit for the theories of
van Inwagen and Lewis. She understands all they want to say, but she also claims to
understand assertions that defy first-order formalisation and require a language richer in
expressive power. She may say that this is unsurprising, because she has a richer conceptual
scheme, which can only be expressed in languages with a more fine-grained logical form
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than first-order languages can offer [Pri10]. The old language must grow to accommodate
the new, improved formulae of the new bigger, better conceptual scheme. Can it be shown
that any such expansion of a language with more expressions interpreted as ontological is
ex hypothesi unintelligible?
First of all, it must be noted that the ‘richer conceptual scheme’ objection is apparently
premised on the assumption that the ontological expressions added to the formalised lan-
guage will be logical expressions, leading to a richer logical form. The proponent of a richer
conceptual scheme also apparently accepts that first-order quantifiers count as ontological
vocabulary; she is proposing a richer conceptual scheme. First-order languages can of
course always be expanded with further predicates, but if the opponent were happy with
that, she would not have objected to the paucity of the first-order shared language, but
only to the content of van Inwagen and Lewis’s interpretation of its predicates.
The classical ontologist cannot argue that any expansion of the language with new logical
idioms will render the language incoherent. There is a miscellany of languages that extend
standard first-order logic for which there are well-established soundness proofs, some of
which have been proposed as characteristic models of ontology. This class of languages
includes free logics [Lam01], (notably Leśniewski’s Ontology [Lej58], [Hen69]), modal first-
and second-order logics [Bar47, Wil13], second-order [Sha00] and plural [Boo85] logics. Nor
could it possibly be a purely syntactic or proof-theoretic matter. Supplementing a language
with expressions that look syntactically (operators that can make a wff out of a wff by
variable binding [KMS95]) or proof-theoretically (having quantificational introduction and
elimination rules) like quantifiers cannot render it incoherent. A defence of the classical
view must focus on interpretation.
2.2.4 Ontology and the Interpretation of Quantification
The classical ontologist’s best chance is an argument pertaining to the interpretation of
quantification in formal languages. One constraint on formal languages in general is that
they must be free from equivocation and ambiguity. A constraint on ontological claims in
general is that they must have the force of full generality. When Norma the nominalist
denies that she has abstract objects in her ontology, she had better not be invoking abstract
objects in any sense anywhere in her theory. If she does rely on abstract objects in any
context, she is no longer a nominalist. She cannot argue that she did not include those
particular objects in her non-existence claim.
The interpretation of quantifiers marks them out as devices of generality. I identified
generality as one of the constraints on quantifiers as ontological expressions above. The
standard model-theoretic reading of the quantifiers reflects this fact. Taken by itself, it
is consistent with the totality mentioned being subject to some limitations of size, for
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example by using a restricted domain which forms the universe of discourse of the language
in question, and thus counts as ‘all of them’ for the purposes of this language. But uses of
restricted quantification cannot be helpful to ontology, because ontological claims ought to
be fully general, not just general enough for some limited language. The aim of any ontology
is for its members to correspond exactly to the constituents of the world. Limitations are
inappropriate.
Quine proposed, and Lewis and van Inwagen appear to be following suit, that first-order
logic is exactly the language which is ideally suited to the formalisation of theories with the
purpose of determining their ontology. I suggested as a possible motivation that quantifier-
variable notation neatly decomposes into a lexical category whose sole purpose is to convey
the message that there is a thing present, in the widest possible sense of ‘thing’—namely,
the variables—a lexical category interpreted as telling us what is true of those things—the
predicates—and a lexical category which indicates whether the things are singled out sev-
erally or collectively (‘out of all of them, some/all’)—the quantifiers. The great advantage
of quantifier-variable notation is that its syntax splits off the words we use for ontological
purposes from those destined to express the ideology. It separates being from nature. The
only truly ontological idiom is comprised of the variables. Variables are also logical vocab-
ulary. They treat all objects the same, independently of their natures. Thus being, the
most general category, is identified with the most general domain of quantification; this
establishes the unity of being. Anything whatsoever that is a thing must be in it, since the
truth-conditions of predicative sentences require that something in the domain satisfies the
predicate ascribed to it. Hence anything that truly satisfies some condition has being—is
in the domain—and if a condition ϕ is not satisfied, there are no such things as ϕs. Here
we have the Non-Being thesis. Univocacy and Equivalence also follow, since there only is
one kind of genuinely ontological idiom, the variable, and it is univocal because it is logical.
Ontological idioms must always be given the widest possible reading, because ontological
questions are questions of the most general kind. Therefore, ontology should not discrim-
inate according to what kinds the beings belong to. Their natures or characteristics are
described by the ideology. The business of ontology is just to note that there is something,
whose nature is supplied by the ideology.
It is difficult to see how this picture leaves room for distinctions expressed by different
ontological idioms. We are in a position to dismiss the non-classical iconoclast who posits
different ontological categories, some of which are more comprehensive than others (referred
to above as ‘widening concentric circles’). According to them one kind of ontological
expression—frequently some variant of ‘being’—has the widest reading, used to denote
the most comprehensive category. Others—usually ‘existence’, and sometimes ‘object’ or
‘thing’—have narrower readings. An unsophisticated version of it would be Norma the
nominalist’s: ‘existence’ only applies to concrete beings.8 The classical ontologist now
8I think I agree with Lewis [Lew90] that to attribute this view to neo-Meinongians would be uncharitable.
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seems within her rights to say that she understands this position well enough, but does
not take it to be a meta-ontological dispute at all. Norma uses ‘exists’ to mean nothing
more than ‘is a concrete being’. But this is not an ontological use of ‘exists’ at all, since
the application conditions of Norma’s ‘exists’ require that the being in question satisfies
the condition of falling under some particular kind: being concrete. Ascribing particular
kinds, though, is a task for the ideology. So ‘exists’ is not an ontological idiom at all for
Norma, since it does not have the force of generality. It behaves merely like a predicate
with the same extension as ‘is concrete’, which does nothing to dissuade us from the idea
that there is a most comprehensive, absolutely general category, a domain of all and only
the beings. It leaves the Unity of Being intact. ‘Exists’ in this sense is not an ontological
expression after all, but one that should be relegated to the ideology. This was never what
the classical ontologist meant by ‘exists’, though; she intended it to have the force of full
generality.
But even a more sophisticated reading of more and less comprehensive ontological vocab-
ulary seems to fall prey to collapsing into ideology. Sylvan, for example, appears to accuse
the classical view of conflating the narrower category of existence and the wider category
of being by failing to recognise that there are two different quantificational idioms, each
appropriate to one category only. Lewis denies that he means the narrower notion of quan-
tification by his own quantifier, as we have seen. For Quineans like Lewis, if a category is
to be ontological, it must be as general as possible, and of course corresponding vocabulary
should be brought in line and be given the widest possible reading. Even if it is not entirely
clear what a ‘loaded’ quantifier is, it is apparent from Sylvan’s formalism that it is more
restricted than the other quantifier. And by the classical definition of ontology, ontological
vocabulary should always be as general as possible. Hence the loaded quantifier does not
suit her aims at all.
The Quinean solution, translating others into a language with one maximally general kind
of quantification, is preferable for all commitmentphiles. Our language of regimentation,
whatever other features it has, should be classical in this regard, not a Meinongian language
or free logic of any sort. The Quinean tenet that being is the most general category, which
everything must be in just to be a subject of predication, is independently defensible and
does not rely on any artefacts of Quine’s systematic philosophy. Since it also has advantages
for the philosophy of logic, facilitating impartiality, commitmentphiles of all sorts would
do well to adopt it.
But the view is out there in some sense; it’s popular with undergraduates, and Geach also attributes to
Rush Rhees the view that ‘existence’ only applies to physical things [Gea71].
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2.3 Deflationism
Deflationism is the view that some or all existence questions have no interesting answers.
According to deflationists different kinds of existence questions are associated with different
kinds of quantifiers, variables, or other ontological vocabulary. These different kinds of
ontological expressions are incommensurate. Metaphysical kinds come with their own
variables: number variables, propositional variables, mereological-sum variables, etcetera.
So questions about existence cannot be fruitfully addressed independently of their linguistic
context—but without the linguistic background, they have no determinate meaning. Some
deflationists, like Carnap, think that this applies to all existence questions; some, like
Hirsch, adhere to a weaker deflationism that only relegates some existence questions to the
realms of the uninteresting. In my view, all kinds of deflationism face serious difficulties
in accounting for reduction and interdependence. Deflationist languages lack the resources
to express identifications between the values of the different kinds of variables that belong
with each metaphysical category. Ontological reduction by paraphrase, or other kinds of
interdependence between metaphysical categories, cannot be expressed; but it seems unwise
to let grammar dictate what kinds of interdependence theories might contain.
2.3.1 Carnap’s Deflationism
Carnap, who is a positivist, wants to dismiss existence questions as pseudo-questions
[Car50, pp. 37-39]. On that basis, he qualifies as a global deflationist [Cha09]. Car-
nap intends his thesis to apply to all languages: if something is a pseudo-question, then it,
its negation, and all its translations are nonsense. He focuses especially on the formalised
languages whose utility to science he promotes throughout his work [Car28, Car37, Car56].
Carnap’s position on ontology has recently come in for a resurgence, with [Car50] being
cited approvingly by [Cha09, Ekl09, Pri09, Hir09].
Carnap regards what he terms the introduction of new kinds of entities as governed by
what he calls a linguistic framework. Such a framework comprises at least
1. a ‘general term’ [Car50, p. 30] for these entities, such as ‘number’,
2. ‘introduction of variables of the new type’, such as ‘n’, ‘m’, where the ‘new entities
are values of these variables’ [Car50, p. 30], plus quantifiers to bind them,
3. names to function as substituends for these variables, such as ‘5’, ‘111’,
4. further predicates, relation signs and function signs ascribed to the entities, such as
‘n is prime’, ‘n is the successor of m’, ‘n plus m’.
He asserts that 1. and 2. are essential for the acceptance of the new entities [Car50,
p. 30]. He also appears to say that the framework must include not only kind-specific
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variables, but also kind-specific quantifiers: ‘quantifiers for universal sentences (“for every
n ...”) and existential sentences (“there is an n such that ...”)’ [Car50, p. 24]. This
indicates that the quantifiers are read as ‘some number’/‘every number’ and so on, instead
of ‘something’/‘everything’.
An existence question regarding a particular kind of entity can, according to Carnap, be
read in two very different ways. ‘Are there numbers?’ might be a so-called internal ques-
tion, in which case the answer is trivial; it is also possible to take it as a so-called external
question, which is a pseudo-question. The internal/external distinction is difficult to un-
derstand, but Carnap himself seems to identify internal questions with questions whose
answers follow analytically given some coherent linguistic framework.9 He explains that
Quine’s rejection of the internal/external distinction is a direct consequence of his blurring
of the boundary between the analytic and the synthetic, ‘between questions of meaning
and questions of fact, between the acceptance of a language structure and the acceptance
of an assertion formulated in the language’ [Car50, footnote 5]. My interpretation is that
when he says the internal question ‘does not say more than that the new system is not
empty; but this is immediately seen from the rule which states that words like “five” are
substitutable for the new variables’ [Car50, p. 25] and that the answer to the internal
question ‘follows from ... “five is a number”’ [Car50, p. 25], he means that internal ex-
istence questions (e.g. ‘are there numbers?’) are equivalent to asking whether there are
substituends for a particular kind of variable (number variables). At times he appears to
claim that external questions are nonsense because they draw upon the kind of recherché
metaphysical properties we can make little sense of, like ‘ideal reality’ [Car50, p. 25].
Other passages suggest that external questions are not answerable because they are not
well-formed according to the framework: all things said of a particular kind of entity that
are not explicitly contained within its linguistic framework are senseless.
2.3.2 Objection to Carnap: Implicit Commitments and Reduction
Carnap does not countenance the possibility that a scientific language may hide its use
of a particular category of entities. He appears to assume that an existence question
which is not either given by or analytically inferred from a linguistic framework must
be ill-formed. What this leaves out is any kind of implicit commitments uncovered by
interdependence between metaphysical categories, as well as the kind of interdependence
implicated in ontological reduction by paraphrase. Russell, whom Carnap cites as one
of his main opponents, often expounded reductive links between different metaphysical
kinds in an attempt to get rid of some purported entities. Propositions are a prominent
example; Russell attempted various strategies to reduce them to something else, construing
9See [Pri09] for an argument that Carnap is wrong to think deflationism requires the analytic/synthetic
distinction.
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propositional locutions as incomplete symbols. Carnap explicitly forswears such reduction
by paraphrase:
‘The fact that no references to mental conditions occur in existential statements
(like [“There is a p such that p is not necessary and not-p is not necessary”] and
[“There is a p such that p is a proposition”], etc.) shows that propositions are
not mental entities. Further, a statement of the existence of linguistic entities
(e.g. expressions, classes of expressions, etc.) must contain a reference to a
language. The fact that no such reference occurs in the existential statements
here, shows that propositions are not linguistic entities’ [Car50, p. 26].
Carnap’s claim that the absence of linguistic-sounding language in the proposition frame-
work shows that they are not linguistic seems hard to square with his later claim that ‘the
apparent negation of a pseudo-statement must also be a pseudo-statement’ [Car50, p. 30].
If the proposition framework contains no linguistic predicates, is it not a pseudo-statement
that propositions are linguistic?
In 1.2, I put forward as a constraint on meta-ontological theories that they should account
for both implicit commitments and interdependence between metaphysical categories. Car-
nap’s view cannot account for either. If there are different ranges of variables for the
entities in each metaphysical category—‘n’ for numbers, ‘p’ for propositions and so on—
cross-category identity statements are ill-formed. Not only does the framework provide
insufficient data to answer the question whether ‘n = p’ is true, the question cannot even
be formulated in a syntactic sense, because the two frameworks are incommmensurate. The
idea that the presence in our grammar of disparate frameworks with their own syntactic
behaviour means that cross-framework identity statements are ill-formed could be taken
as an implicit argument against the Unity of Being. It might be thought to show that
being is pluriform because the categories of entities they posit are incommensurate, given
that the corresponding grammar allows us no way of expounding theoretical links between
the kinds in question. My objection is that the grammar of our present language is not a
good guide for deciding whether categories of things in the world are incommensurate. It
is always possible for language to expand and grow in coherent ways to incorporate new
discoveries that lead to cross-categorial identifications which would have appeared to ear-
lier generations like obvious category errors. The idea that psychosis might be treated by
medicating the body might have appeared so senseless as to be ungrammatical to even the
most well-informed mediaeval scholar or healer, but our language has evolved along with
our theories. On Carnap’s account, the question whether (some) numbers are identical
with propositions would be ungrammatical, rather than true or false. That is difficult to
accept because it looks like a case of syntax placing limits on what things might be like,
what their natures could be. This, I think, is not the business of syntax. Syntax should not
force interpretation in this way; it should leave room for theories to develop in unexpected
ways and have explanatory links that earlier kinds of theories could not have foreseen.
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Some conceivable theoretical developments, whether we accept them or not, would at least
make it appear quite sensible to say that some numbers are propositions; because they
are both reducible to sets, for instance, or because they are Gödel numbers which encode
statements.
2.3.3 Objection to Carnap: Pragmatism and Translation
Another reason to suppose that there is less to Carnapian deflationism than meets the eye
is to do with semantic ascent. Carnap admits that in addition to what he calls internal
and external existence questions, those settled just in terms of the analytic consequences of
a framework—are there substituends for F -variables?—and therefore trivially answerable,
and those that are just ill-formed and therefore unanswerable, there are also pragmatic
questions: is this framework useful? Carnap thinks that pragmatic questions are answer-
able, but they are not yes/no questions [Car50, p. 30]. Answering them is a multi-faceted
affair that admits of degree. I surmise, although he does not say so explicitly, that he thinks
that consequently we cannot identify existence questions with these pragmatic questions,
because existence questions are yes/no questions. But this distinction can only be upheld
if answerable existence questions are analytic and trivial. I, on the other hand, think, as
I explained in 1.3.5, that we should take a pragmatic approach to translation into canon-
ical notation: a rarefied kind of translation whereby we move from old theories to new
ones optimised for answering ontological questions and identifying ideological primitives.
Regimentation does not demand meaning equivalence, or even material equivalence in all
cases. When we notice that some posits of our current best theory may be dispensed
with, we now hold them to be false. We must work within our best available theory to
gradually develop a newer, better one without the offending posits, supplanting the old,
false statements with new, true ones. This pragmatic attitude is hard to square with the
idea that existence claims are ever trivial, or that they are tangential to the strictures of
theory choice. Asking and answering questions about the existence of F s is not divorced
from the pragmatic concern whether F s are useful. Carnap is wrong to separate ques-
tions of language choice (pragmatic questions) from questions about the existence of its
referents (external questions). Existence questions, since they may be implicit or explicit,
paraphrased away or discovered by expounding explanatory links within the theory, are
not so far removed from questions of usefulness as they may seem at first sight.
2.3.4 Quine’s answer to Carnap
When Quine responds to Carnap, he makes the case that Carnap’s position can be trans-
formed into a Quinean one in two easy steps. The first step is to diffuse the boundary
between external and internal questions. He draws a distinction between ‘questions of the
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form “Are there so-and-so’s?” where the so-and-so’s purport to exhaust the range of a par-
ticular style of bound variables, and questions of the form “Are there so-and-so’s?” where
the so-and-so’s do not purport to exhaust the range of a particular style of bound variables’
calling them category questions and subclass questions respectively [Qui51a, pp. 68-69].
Internal questions he identifies with the subclass questions and the category questions
whose answers are analytic (or contradictory), external questions with all other category
questions. Quine maintains that there is no need for this distinction. The compartmen-
talisation of variables which assigns a distinct style of variable to each kind of entity is
always dispensable. ‘Is there an n such that n is a number?’ is a category question if n
can only range over numbers; but let it range over both numbers and sets, and the same
question becomes a subclass question. Quine believes that nothing could stand in the way
of dropping compartmentalised variables and using just a single style of variable. Even
type theory allows this, via the convention of typical ambiguity. Just x, y, etcetera will
do—no need for n or p—and all existence questions become subclass questions. The result
is a single domain, a flat ontology, of which the question ‘does it contain F s?’ is both
useful and meaningful. This first step, he says, Carnap could adopt without doing violence
to his own account of ontology. The second step is the one Carnap resists: dissolving the
distinction between analytic and synthetic. The idea that some existence questions are
trivially answered given the rules of a language is safeguarded by analyticity.
2.3.5 Hirsch’s Deflationism
Inspired by Carnapian deflationism but different in character, Hirsch’s version of deflation-
ism is both local—only some ontological questions are trivial—and mild—even the trivial
questions have answers, but nothing deep is at stake. They can be resolved by reflecting
on semantic facts. He finds an ally in Chalmers, who terms the position ‘lightweight dis-
missivism’ [Cha09]. Hirsch’s deflationism, unlike Carnap’s, is based on the behaviour of
ontological and metaphysical vocabulary in ordinary language, not formalised or scientific
language. He believes that some existence questions carry great metaphysical weight—
he mentions theism [Hir09], and Hawthorne claims that Hirsch accepts the nominalism-
Platonism debate as substantial too [Haw09]. But certain types of existence questions
amount to no more than different but intertranslatable ways of speaking. This category,
the trivial questions, is typically taken to include questions about the existence of parts
and wholes [Hir02], time slices [Hir09], and such objects as fists and laps. Questions about
the existence of such objects are settled by appeal to facts about linguistic use and common
sense, because the debate is over what linguistic convention to adopt, rather than about
reality. The endurantist or mereologist may have a more concise or intuitive language than
the perdurantist or the nihilist, but each speaks the truth in her own language. Everyone
agrees on how the world is, but some choose to use terminology in different ways.
Any interesting metaphysical theory will have interdependence between the categories of
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things it admits: certain categories are explained in terms of others. The phenomenon of ex-
plaining away apparent reference to objectionable entities by paraphrase is also widespread,
even amongst those who are not explicitly pro-commitment. Holism need not be a mo-
tivating factor; a foundationalist theory equally relies on its ontological posits to answer
other metaphysical and scientific questions. Foundationalism may perhaps be a motivation
for the idea that some ontological questions are weightier than others. If there are deep
ontological questions, that ground all the others, perhaps there are ones that seem com-
paratively less important, or carry less explanatory weight. Even if this is admitted as an
alternative meta-ontological strategy, though, what still seems extremely puzzling is how
it is settled that these ontological questions are more trivial tout court, as opposed to less
central to someone’s epistemology.
2.3.6 Metaphysical Interdependence: Two Problems for Hirsch
The notion that some ontological questions are trivial is most clearly expressed by Hirsch
[Hir82], [Hir02], [Hir09]. That is not to say that Hirsch presents decisive criteria for reck-
oning a question to one camp or the other. What emerges is what the paradigm cases of
trivial existence questions are. At times he hints at what the more substantial questions
may be. They appear to coincide with the more traditionally central questions of ontol-
ogy. Certainly ‘Is there a God?’ is amongst them [Hir09], and also ‘are there numbers?’
[Haw09]; perhaps this extends to other venerable posits like persons, properties, facts,
etcetera. Questions like ‘Are there temporal parts?’ and ‘Are there mereological fusions?’
[Hir02] are not considered weighty. Neither are questions about objects such as laps (the
flat surface formed by the thighs of a person who happens to be sitting), “‘incar[s]” . . . any
segment of a car situated inside a garage’ and “‘outcar[s]” . . . any segment of a car situated
outside a garage’ [Hir82], and fists (clenched hands). It is a mistake, according to Hirsch,
to think that the substantial structure of metaphysical explanation is much affected by
whether we choose to describe a certain event as one in which a fist comes into being, as
opposed to one in which the person clenches her hand.
Look at your hand while you are clenching it, and ask yourself whether some
object called a fist has come into existence . . . There can’t be anything deep or
theoretical here. The facts are, so to speak, right in front of our eyes. Our task
can only be to remind ourselves of relevant ways in which we describe these
facts in our language . . . [Hir02].
One forthright response available to his opponent is to appeal to Ockham’s razor, and insist
that posits have to be justified in terms of their explanatory value. Incidentally, the concern
with whether the innocent use of words like ‘fists’ should be taken to incur commitment
to an entity is not some artefact of newfangled pedantry. Here is Buddhagosa, a first-
century CE Buddhist commentator, providing a semantics of ‘fist’ remarkably similar to
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van Inwagen’s treatment of ‘table’ [vI90]:
. . . and just as the word “fist” is but a mode of expression for the fingers, the
thumb, etc., in a certain relation . . . [Bud89]
The commitmentphile, like Buddhagosa, does not object to talk of fists in ordinary par-
lance. Neither does she object to everyday English talk of watching the sunrise, because
that does not entail a commitment to a geocentric astronomy. When it comes to asking
existence questions, though, we must dispense with such loose and metaphorical talk, and
choose whether to accept it as committing, to treat it as eliminable or to paraphrase. When
she queries whether there really are fists, she wants to know whether the predicate ‘x is
a fist’ must be included among those of our best theory, and assigned an extension. This
is only justified if some of the needs of overall explanation are best met by admitting fists
as posits. The issue of explanatory tradeoffs, and interdependence between ontological
categories, is re-introduced.
Of course the believer in trivial ontological questions will usually accept interdependence.
They may simply believe that there are some foundational metaphysical kinds, acceptance
or rejection of which substantially affects one’s overall theory. A nominalist’s theory may
turn out to be impoverished with respect to expressive or explanatory power compared to
the Platonist, as proposed in [Haw09]. A theist’s posit of God may affect her views on
causation, if she views God as a first cause, or it may lead her to re-examine her definition
of ‘person’, if she views God as falling into that category. Perhaps there are some categories
that are more likely, at least in theories we are likely to consider adopting, to effect such
seismic shifts in overall explanatory role.10 The idea that some questions are less weighty
than others may be given some plausibility in these terms.
Even if we grant this much to Hirsch it merely goes to show that some questions are more
trivial than others within the context of a particular theory, relative to a given epistemology.
His earlier work on identity [Hir82] suggests that he thinks English does not allow for the
kinds of criteria of identity that entities such as outcars and incars demand. But that
does not entail that some questions—‘Are there wholes, as well as parts?’, ‘Are there
four-dimensional objects?’, ‘Are there fists?’—are simply such as to carry less ontological
weight, independently of any language or theory. The distinction between serious and
trivial ontological questions is problematised by interdependence. To show these questions
inherently trivial, it would have to be clear in any language or theory that the answers
10The commitmentphile would still protest at this point that, although of course she accepts that some
posits are nearer the periphery of the theory than others, all posits are equally posited, and the test is
whether or not they can be paraphrased away, or must be invoked in the theory. The difference between
central and peripheral posits is not one of degree of positedness, but concerns the question which we would
be more likely to give up when recalcitrant data are found. I think this is correct, as it happens, but
am concerned to show here that even on a sympathetic reading of Hirsch’s methodology, it is difficult to
maintain that there are ontological questions which are trivial independently of epistemology.
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to the substantial questions never crucially depend on the answers to the allegedly trivial
ones. This is false for questions such as the existence of parts or time slices, judging from
the history of philosophy. Take a question Hirsch considers substantial: ‘Is there a God?’
An integral part of the doctrine of classical theism—the theism of Maimonides, Aquinas,
Avicenna—is divine simplicity. It is essential to God, according to classical theists, that
God has no parts [Ans98, ch. 12, ch. 18], [Aqu64, Ia, 13, 11]. Some express this by
saying that God is identical with God’s parts [Ben69]. A metaphysical category of central
importance is thus linked to a so-called trivial one. The criterion of identity for God—or
for Maimonideans who balk at predicating any positive attributes of God [Mai63, I, ch.
51-60], the criterion of distinctness from God for everything else—makes indispensable use
of parthood, for whatever has proper parts cannot be God.
Another example is the debate about personal identity and the existence of persons in
ancient India (assuming that ‘Are there persons?’ is a substantial metaphysical question).
A rough-and-ready summary: Buddhist philosophers, adhering to a strictly empiricist
methodology, noted that our self-perception is changeable and fragmented. We perceive
no stable self persisting through time and growth, but a succession of mental episodes:
a colour-perception here, an emotion there, an inference after that. Since there is no
perceptual evidence for an extra thing, a persisting person, over and above this series or
bundle, the Hinayana Buddhists concluded that if there were persons, they must be wholes
composed of parts. But no perceptual evidence of wholes was forthcoming either. No extra
thing is perceived to come into being when wheels, an axle, shafts, and a body are put
together to form what we call a chariot. Ultimate truth makes no mention of chariots. The
term ‘chariot’ really denotes all these in plurality, as each of those words really denotes
some smaller parts in plurality, all the way down to the atoms. Since there are no wholes,
there can be no persons. The following, a very early (ca. 350 BCE) statement of the
doctrine that some seemingly singular terms are really plurals in disguise, is attributed to
the priestess Vajira, who is said to have been an associate of the historical Buddha:
‘Even as the word of “chariot” means
That members join to frame a whole;
So when the groups appear to view,
We use the phrase, “a living being”.’ [Ano89a]
Her Hindu opponents, disinclined to accept the empiricist method, would retort that per-
sons did not have parts at all. Of course the persisting subject cannot itself be perceived: it
is the locus of perception, and can no more see itself than a light can shine on itself. They
argued that something in need of explanation is being left out of the Buddhist picture:
if there is just a succession of disparate perceptions, whose perceptions are they? True,
the self cannot be identified with any of its ideas, perceptions, or emotions, since they are
not what remains the same over time. What remains the same is the perceiver, who is
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a unitary thing [Ano62].11 Whatever one makes of these arguments, it is evident that in
the past some competent philosophers found parthood, temporal or timeless, indispens-
able in explaining the (commonly thought to be) substantial metaphysical categories of
personhood and God. A modern analogue of the debate might appeal to either time-slices
or mereology in giving criteria of identity for persons. It seems difficult to maintain a
division of ontological questions into those that are pre-theoretically trivial and those that
are universally substantial. If it is only English that sorts questions into the trivial and
the substantial, then English is perhaps sufficiently parochial that we have good reason to
adopt the philosophers’ language Ontologese instead.
2.4 What Should Our Language of Regimentation Be?
In sum, Quine’s idea that ontological questions should be answered in a logical language
of regimentation has much to recommend it. Commitmentphiles of all stripes can agree
that their well-defined consequence relations make them a good medium for explaining
interdependence and levelling implicit and explicit commitments. Deflationism is no match
for it in this regard, as it is hard put to explain any kind of interdependence, and Carnap
explicitly disavows implicit commitments. The objectual interpretation of the quantifiers
also has advantages to meta-ontology other than those explicitly cited by Quine. Objectual
quantification presents being as a logical notion, and a univocal one, as there is only one
domain. Since ontological questions pertain to theories as a whole, quantifiers used for
ontological purposes must have the force of full generality. So it is safe to assume that
commitmentphiles ought to subscribe to regimentation in some form of classical logic, with
an objectual interpretation of the quantifiers. But how much universal appeal can be
claimed for Quine’s preferred logical language, his one true logic, bivalent first-order logic
without individual constants?
11Here I paraphrase the canonical statement from the Bhagavad-Gita. This is not to be taken to mean
that the Bhagavad-Gita is explicitly addressing Buddhist arguments; there is no mention of Buddhism in the
text, leading scholars to conjecture that it is pre-Buddhist [Mas62]. Given the doctrinal import of the text,
though, commentators defending the Hindu conception of the self were likely to draw on its presentation of
the issues in their argument against the Buddhist picture.
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Chapter 3
The Problem of Individuals:
Quine’s Eliminative Treatment of
Names and Identity
Intuitively, directly referential expressions, such as proper names or the word ‘I’, seem to
be committing expressions just as much as variables. After all, any expression whose task
it is to stand for a thing directly must be counted as one which commits to the thing it
denotes. Directly referential expressions are easily modelled in a formal language by the
use of constants, and their role, like that of variables, is to be assigned elements from the
domain—existents. Yet Quine is adamant that constants have no place in the one true
logic. As a result, his language of regimentation has trouble accommodating attempts at
commitment via direct reference or use of the first person. In Descartes’ cogito, for example,
the first-personal form is essential to the argument that ‘I exist’ must be true whenever
uttered, since its negation is self-defeating. Quine claims logic has no need for direct
reference. But a logical grammar which rules out our describing the mere possibility of
direct reference or the first person seems needlessly restrictive. Being able to regiment and
disquote others’ outlandish ontologies, whatever the values of their committing expressions,
was part of the irenic point of Quine’s theory of ontological commitment.
The purpose of this chapter is to make a case for a language of regimentation with a
bifurcated category of committing expressions comprising both variables and constants.
Such a language is useful because it is epistemology-neutral. It allows us to translate and
identify the objectual expressions of theories which commit only to objects-qua-F, best
suited to Quine’s global holism, as well as those who use directly referential expressions to
indicate a case where, they believe, the mind reaches out to an object directly. The latter
would include cases like the cogito, where the thinker concludes that s/he personally exists,
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Russellian acquaintance characterised by the use of ‘this’, ‘that’, and ‘I’, and Millian names
introduced ostensively.
In the first three sections I will demonstrate why Quine’s eliminative strategy, intended
to show names are always dispensable because they can be converted into predicates, is
problematic: ‘x pegasises’ cannot have all the expressive strength of ‘x = Pegasus’. One
uncomfortable consequence of ‘pegasising’ is that it implies that ‘a = b’ must be translated
as ‘the A-er satisfies all the same predicates as the B-er’—the latter is consistent with
further evidence coming to light to show that they are two, the former entails that nothing
can make a and b distinct. Although Quine claims this is for reasons of grammatical
economy, a more plausible explanation is that Quine’s epistemology compels him to take
this line. Quine can only commit to objects-qua-F, not to objects qua individuals. Given
global holism, contact with objects is never direct, but always mediated by a complete
theory. Any posit we countenance is only there because it seems to be the best explanation
of intersecting observations. Identification requires all theoretical resources available, so it
makes sense for Quine to think of identity as mere indiscernibility according to a theory.
In section 4, we will see that this treatment of identity is unappealing, as it is always
logically possible that indiscernibles are distinct. And even Quine admits that in the home
language we think of identity as meaning simply sameness of thing, not a concatenation
of descriptions. A criterion of commitment on which only commitments-qua-descriptive-F
are permitted now seems less attractive.
Section 5 is concerned to show that alternative criteria of commitment to go with alternative
epistemologies are just as coherent as Quine’s. Acquaintance has the mind reaching out
directly to objects, without having to describe their natures, using purely objectual names
to capture such cognitive acts in language. If acquaintance is the object-foundationalist
equivalent to Quine’s description-only object-holism, foundherentism about objects is a
middle way. This would be a hybrid criterion of ontological commitment where both
directly referential and pronominal expressions are committing. It is still possible for these
names to be purely objectual, directly referential in the sense that their meanings are just
their bearers, encoding no descriptive information. But the hybrid criterion’s descriptive
component allows for purely objectual names to be assigned with the help of descriptive
vocabulary, too.
3.1 Directly Referential Committing Expressions
3.1.1 Committing to an Individual
On Quine’s quantificational criterion of ontological commitment, commitments are cap-
tured by existentially quantified statements: say, ‘∃xFx’. The commitment incurred by
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such an assertion is a commitment to whatever satisfies the open formula following the
quantifier: an object-qua-F. The only committing expressions are the variables, and com-
mitment must always proceed via the satisfaction of some predicative phrase, some kind
to which the object belongs. Kinds may be very specific, even such that only one being
belongs to them, but the beings themselves never make an appearance except insofar as
the open sentence governed by an existential quantifier is true of them. As values of vari-
ables, they are only there qua ‘ideal nodes at the foci of intersecting observation sentences’
[Qui92, p. 24]. As a consequence, no commitment is ever incurred to an individual qua
individual, but only those describable in terms of objects-qua-F. A theory can be commit-
ted to the existence of the inventor of computer programming, but not to the existence of
Ada Byron Lovelace.
The intuitive idea behind ontological commitment is that a theory imputes existence to
the things it talks about: those it asserts there are, those it mentions, and those talked
about in the sentences entailed by it. When a philosopher or scientist puts forward a
theory, existence claims made in the theory commit her to there being such entities as
she claims there are, even implicitly, thanks to regimentation. But mentioning things by
name is another legitimate natural-language way of talking about objects, even though it
is not a type of existence claim. When we use a genuine name or other directly referential
expression, there must be a corresponding referent. (I take ‘directly referential expression’
to mean directly referential proper names as well as other objectual expressions whose
semantic role is to single out an object in a non-descriptive way. This may include words
used to refer to the self or current mental states, such as ‘I’, and ‘me’, or perhaps ‘this’ and
‘that’ [Rus12].) Sentences involving directly referential expressions do not have the surface
form of existence claims. On the other hand, singular direct reference might be thought to
at least entail an existence claim. Doesn’t it seem incoherent to conjoin a genuine attempt
at reference with a non-existence claim, like ‘This is Maryam, but she does not exist’, or
‘I think, but I do not exist’? Such sentences are naturally read as attempting to commit
to the existence of an individual, not in virtue of their satisfying some description, but
through singular reference using a directly referential expression.
3.1.2 Modelling Directly Referential Expressions in the Language of
Regimentation
There is an obvious formal analogue for directly referential proper names available in the
form of individual constants, a standard part of the machinery of traditional first-order
logic. They are devoid of structural complexity and are assigned values from amongst the
elements of the domain by the interpretation. They are unlike variables in that they do
not denote generally, ranging over all objects prepared to stand for any one of them; once
assigned, they stand for a single object exclusively. So constants, and their natural-language
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equivalents, directly referential expressions, are objectual expressions: their semantic role
is always to denote an entity. If they are used correctly, they will stand for an entity. If
not, the sentence they occur in will be false, or possibly incoherent. This indicates that it
may be worth exploring their potential as committing expressions. Perhaps the language
of regimentation should be expanded to include individual constants, with the caveat that
admitting that directly referential expressions can be committing is in no way equivalent
to thinking that all apparent proper names or words for the self in natural language should
be translated as committing expressions. We need not render every apparent name as a
constant in the language of regimentation any more than we have to translate every ‘it’ or
‘there is’ as ‘x’ or ‘∃’. Apparent names might be paraphrased away or eliminated altogether
just as much as apparent pronouns or quantifiers.
A further question is whether directly referential committing expressions are also, like
Quine’s first-order variables, purely objectual expressions, those whose function is only to
stand for objects, without communicating anything about their natures. We will return to
this question in sections 3.3.4 and 3.5. An example of a purely objectual directly referential
committing expressions would be a Millian name, whose meaning is just its bearer. A
case could be made that the formal properties of constants make this interpretation seem
natural. The fact that constants are interpreted as being assigned values from the domain
by the interpretation could be seen as reflecting the property of directly referential names
to single out their bearers directly, without relying on any other part of the language.
Quine’s criterion of commitment, though, does not allow for commitment via the use of a
genuine proper name. He insists on first-order bivalent logic without individual constants
as the one true logic and canonical notation, and demands that names be translated into
the language of regimentation as predicates. Quinean commitment implies that the formal
analogue of the existence claim is the only way an object can be talked about. A theory is
committed to all the entities-qua-F that count as the values of the existentially quantified
sentences of its translation into the language of regimentation. After the process of radically
translating into the language of regimentation has been completed, the only vehicles of
reference are the variables. They are the only objectual expressions, and therefore the only
committing expressions. But why is Quine so opposed to directly referential committing
expressions?
3.2 Quine’s Dispensability Thesis
I will refer to Quine’s view that a name ‘a’ can always be converted into a predicate ‘Ax’
where ‘Ax’ is satisfied only by the object formerly named a, as the Dispensability Thesis.
The Dispensability Thesis is descriptivist in a sense: it provides a recipe for converting
names into definite descriptions. But it should not be confused with what is usually called
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‘descriptivism’ in the philosophy of language, comparable to what Kripke calls the ‘Frege-
Russell’ theory of proper names [Kri80]. That kind of descriptivism is a theory about
the meaning of natural-language proper names, viz. that their meanings are definite de-
scriptions. Quine’s descriptivism, on the other hand, is an eliminative strategy employed
to dispense with an entire grammatical category which he thinks of as complicating mat-
ters with respect to the ontology. He has devised a template for excising that category
completely from the language of regimentation. When translating a natural-language the-
ory into a regimented theory, any directly referential expressions occurring within it are
translated out as predicates. It is not a priority to preserve the usage or intuitions of the
speakers of the natural language in question like it would be for natural-language descrip-
tivism. Quine’s first argument for the Dispensability Thesis turns on his philosophy of
logic.
3.2.1 The Argument from Quine’s Philosophy of Logic
In the 1930s, Quine had thought of names as committing expressions: ‘To ask whether
there is such an entity as roundness is thus not to question the meaningfulness of “round-
ness”; it amounts rather to asking whether this word is a name or a syncategorematic
expression’ [Qui66a, p. 197].1 He distinguished, then, between apparent names and names
‘in the semantic sense’, i.e., names with bearers. ‘Many words form essential parts of intel-
ligible statements—truths and falsehoods—without being names of anything . . . the word
“Pegasus” is not a name in the semantic sense, i.e., . . . it has no designatum’ [Qui39, p.
703].2 He first states that names are inessential in [Qui40, par. 27], and explicitly abjures
their use in ontology in the late forties, saying variables, not names, are the paradigmatic
categoremata: ‘The use of alleged names is no criterion, for we can repudiate their name-
hood at the drop of a hat unless the assumption of a corresponding entity can be spotted
in the things we affirm in terms of bound variables’ [Qui48, p. 32].
From the forties onwards, Quine proposes to regiment in a language devoid of proper
names. The reasons he adduces for this decision appear to belong to the philosophy of
logic. He states that logic has no use for proper names or constants: ‘[c]hief among the
omitted frills is the name’ [Qui70, p. 25, emphasis in the original]. Firstly, he argues,
omitting names simplifies the syntax. A single language containing both constants and
variables cannot have a single category of singular terms, because constants and variables
have different syntactic properties. A variable can be appended to a quantifier symbol
(‘∀’ or ‘∃’) in order to bind all of its subsequent occurrences in a subformula; a name
cannot [Qui70, p. 26]. This is true enough, but not decisive. Even Quineans can trade
1This paper, dated 1939, remained unpublished until [Qui66c]. The Erkenntnis volume it was due to
appear in never materialised because of the outbreak of WWII.
2Although this paper contains the phrase ‘to be is to be the value of a variable’ [Qui39, p. 708], in it
Quine still speaks of genuine names of things being substituends for variables.
82
simplicity of syntax for greater expressive power. A quantified language has a more complex
grammar than a language with only sentence letters and truth-functional connectives,
but the apparatus of reification confers such great explanatory benefits that simplicity
of grammar is a comparatively small sacrifice. If a bifurcated category of singular terms
bestows other theoretical virtues upon a language, that would be good reason to opt for a
more complex syntax.
But, Quine avers, names are a dispensable grammatical category. They can be converted
into predicates without loss of information. ‘Fa’ is equivalent to ‘∃x(a = x ∧ Fx)’. As a
consequence, the latter can always be substituted for the former wherever it occurs. So ‘a’ is
dispensable except in the context ‘a =’, which can be written more concisely as ‘A’. Using
that convention, ‘Fa’ is equivalent to ‘∃x(Ax ∧ Fx)’. The typical use of a proper name
is to uniquely specify an object. But, by hypothesis, the new predicate ‘A’ does exactly
that. After all, it is just short for ‘a =’. This amounts to a general strategy for dispensing
with names efficiently and in all contexts [Qui70, pp. 25-26]. There is an air of sleight of
hand about this argument, which is only intensified when we recall that Quine’s identity
predicate is in fact a shorthand for indiscernibility-within-the-theory. Indiscernibility does
not in general entail identity, and certainly indiscernibility according to the predicates of
some particular theory, which may have scant expressive power, does not. So Quine’s
defined identity-facsimile does not express what we ordinarily think of as identity. But the
argument for the dispensability of names in the one true logic is the formal equivalent of
his well-known ‘pegasising’ argument.
When Quine first makes the case that names are not the locus of commitment, he again
argues that they can be banished from the grammar altogether without loss of information.
Names are dispensable because they can always be converted into uniquely identifying
predicates. Such predicates may then occur in uniquely identifying definite descriptions.
Since Quine takes a Russellian line on definite descriptions, they are not singular terms,
but incomplete symbols analysable in terms of quantified phrases [Rus05]. So an apparent
unit like ‘a’ or ‘Pegasus’ becomes ‘the A-er’ or ‘the pegasiser’. On the Russellian analysis
it turns out to have the deep logical structure ‘∃x (Ax ∧ ∀y (Ay → x = y))’ or ‘there is
one and only one thing that pegasises’ [Qui48, p. 27].
3.2.2 The Argument From Empty Names
One of Quine’s concerns is to avoid imputing an existence claim to uses of so-called empty
names, often deployed to make non-existence claims, like ‘Pegasus’ and ‘Aphrodite’. If
they were genuine names occurring in true sentences, an existence claim would be entailed
by Existential Generalisation: from ‘Fa’, infer ‘∃xFx ’. For them to entail an existence
claim would invalidate any non-existence claims we may wish to make using them. Quine
suggests that we must convert ‘Pegasus’ into the description ‘there is one and only one
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thing that pegasises’. Because nothing pegasises, ‘Pegasus does not exist’ comes out true.
[Qui48, pp. 26-27].
But the mere fact that replacing names with descriptions provides a convenient treatment
of at least some empty names, like ‘Pegasus’, does not imply that all names should be
given this treatment. Perhaps this is the correct translation into canonical form of fictional
names,3 or of empty names generally, but it does not follow that it is the right treament
of referential names. For all we know the correct course of action may be some kind of
disjunctivism about names: known empty names go into the language of regimentation as
predicates, referential ones as constants.
Quine wants to conclude that in spite of their widely divergent grammatical structure,
names and existence claims in fact share the deep logical structure ‘∃xFx’; a conclusion
which suits his overall aims better and upholds his tidy minimalist logical grammar. He
dispenses with names by replacing them with uniquely identifying predicates, and makes
variables the vehicle of reference instead. Any sentence with a referential proper name in
it can be converted into a true existence claim. The role of singling out an individual is, in
its true logical form, discharged by variables—they decide whether or not a name refers.
Only variables are by their very nature committing. Only they are what we have called
objectual expressions: ‘I think it is true that there is no commitment to entities through
use of alleged names of them; other things being equal, we can always deny the allegation
that the words in question are names’ [Qui51a, p. 67]. Quine’s identification of proper
names with quantified phrases is related to his inability to account for commitment to
individuals qua individuals, instead of objects-qua-F. The threat of empty names by itself
does not justify his move—so what is his justification?
3.3 Against the Dispensability of Direct Reference
It is rather unclear how to classify Quine’s strategy for dispensing with the semantic cat-
egory of directly referential expressions. There is some affinity with eliminativism—refusing
to translate a predicate into the language of regimentation—and with reductivism—explaining
one predicate or cluster of predicates in terms of another predicate or cluster—but it isn’t
exactly analogous to either. Its aim is to get rid of a semantic category, while both elimina-
tion and reduction pertain to predicates only. It consists in translating out any occurrence
of proper names like ‘a’ as predicates like ‘Ax’ where ‘Ax’ is satisfied only by the object
formerly named a. Refusal to translate the expression into the language of regimentation
is one (eliminative) aspect of it. Another aspect is more akin to reduction by paraphrase:
3Though this is denied by Lewis, who is an avowed Quinean about commitment. He thinks fictional
names refer to possibilia [Lew83].
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explaining one semantic category in terms of another by contextual definition, instead of
explaining one or more predicates in terms of others by direct or contextual definition.
The Dispensability Thesis has some features in common with the simplification of logical
grammar which consists in moving from a language with five truth-functional connectives
to a language with one (the Scheffer stroke, for instance, or the N-operator), or from
two quantifiers to one. The disanalogy is that choosing a Scheffer-stroke system over a
five-connective system does not dispense with truth-functions as such. The two systems
are exactly equal in expressive power, and provably so. This is less clear, and certainly
not provable, for languages where the Dispensability Thesis holds vs. those where it does
not. Whether the ‘pegasising’ strategy provides a faithful translation of theories with the
grammatical structure of first-order logic with constants depends on whether there really is
no loss of expressive power. If there is some loss of expressive power, or loss of information
conveyed with the help of directly referential expressions, that would be reason to count
constants as committing expressions.
3.3.1 Is ‘The Pegasiser’ a Bona Fide Paraphrase?
Conversely, if it could be shown that there is no loss of information that results from the
‘pegasising’ strategy, and that languages without constants have all the expressive power of
languages with constants, that would give us reason to think that the Dispensability Thesis
is true and ‘pegasising’ a bona fide analogue of paraphrase. Quine writes as though the
description ‘the pegasiser’ by its very nature uniquely picks out Pegasus and never applies
to anything else. If that is true, it seems reasonable to assume that the description does
have the strength required to single out nothing but Pegasus, and is equivalent in expressive
power to ‘being a member of the kind whose sole member is Pegasus’. But a closer look
at Quine’s writings puts paid to that idea. He states explicitly that any description that
happens to pick out Pegasus uniquely will do just as well as ‘the pegasiser’, which is really
only a last resort:
In order thus to subsume a one-word name or alleged name such as “Pegasus”
under Russell’s theory of descriptions, we must, of course, be able first to trans-
late the word into a description. But this is no real restriction. If the notion
of Pegasus had been so obscure or so basic a one that no pat translation into
a descriptive phrase had offered itself along familiar lines, we could still have
availed ourselves of the following artificial and trivial-seeming device: we could
have appealed to the ex hypothesi unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of be-
ing Pegasus, adopting, for its expression, the verb “is–Pegasus” or “pegasizes”.
[Qui48, p. 27, emphasis in the first half of the final sentence mine.]
The quotation indicates that there are two potential ways to accomplish the task of para-
phrasing out proper names as predicates. The first is the brute force method: simply
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declaring that, e.g. the predicate ‘x pegasises’ is equivalent to ‘x is identical with Pegasus’.
The other option is to cut out any form of the actual name ‘Pegasus’ and offer a ‘pat
translation into a descriptive phrase . . . along familiar lines’, i.e. a descriptive phrase F ,
couched in terms of the predicates of the theory, that is satisfied only by Pegasus if it is
satisfied by anything, like ‘the winged horse captured by Bellerophon’.
3.3.2 Dilemma: Name-Recycling Predicates vs. Regress
First, we shall look at the brute force method: the ‘x = Pegasus’ option. When Quine
speaks of appealing to ‘the ex hypothesi unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of being Pe-
gasus, adopting, for its expression, the verb “is–Pegasus” or “pegasizes”’, it is difficult to
read this any other way than as a predicate whose covert logical structure is simply ‘x =
a’. It is not wholly explicit in [Qui48], but is confirmed in [Qui70]: the logical form of ‘Ax’
is ‘x = a’ [Qui70, p. 25].
For the ‘pegasising’ strategy to count as a bona fide paraphrase of names in terms of
predicates, it must be clear that everything said with the help of names can be said with
predicates without loss of information. That is difficult to maintain here. Because Quinean
commitment is always to objects-qua-F and mediated by a description, a theory cannot
be committed to a, but at most to the existence of something such that it is F, where
‘F ’ is some condition only a satisfies. Such is the status of ‘pegasises’ (or so it seems)
because it simply turns the name ‘Pegasus’ into a predicate by brute force. But now the
suspicion arises that Quine is not actually entitled to this theoretical move. Recall that his
treatment of identity in the same work [Qui70, p. 63] presented identity not as a logical
predicate meaning ‘is the same thing as’ but as facsimile identity, or sameness with respect
to all the predicates of the theory. So ‘x = y’ was equivalent to ‘x satisfies all and only the
same open formulae as y’. And ‘x pegasises’ means ‘x satisfies all and only the same open
formulae as Pegasus’.
What is ‘x is identical with Pegasus’ or ‘x satisfies all and only the same open formulae as
Pegasus’ to connote unless something has already been named ‘Pegasus’? Such predicates,
by virtue of containing a proper name as a constituent, crucially rely on the name’s having
been assigned a referent before the predicate is formed. These predicates cannot get off
the ground unless an assignment of names to bearers has already taken place. As Barcan
Marcus puts it: ‘Such devices do not eliminate the name; they recycle it’ [Mar93b, p.
211].
Replacing names with non-name-recycling descriptions is hardly more promising. Even
for descriptive glosses of actual existents like ‘the most illustrious student of Socrates’ for
Plato, a regress potentially threatens. Another description is needed to identify the referent
of ‘Socrates’, perhaps ‘the philosophising son of Phaenarete’; and then another predicate
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must be supplied for the referent of ‘Phaenarete’, etcetera. It is unclear how this process
can terminate without ineliminable uses of either genuine proper names with no descriptive
meaning, or first-personal, indexical or demonstrative words such as ‘I’, ‘this’, or ‘that’, all
of which are directly referential in the sense I am interested in.
3.3.3 Descriptivism by Any Other Name: Loss of Expressive Power
Maybe name-recycling predicates are salvageable if names can be assigned directly to ob-
jects in the home language, to be translated away only for the purposes of regimentation?
Not if the home language was built up according to Quine’s picture of theory formation
that we considered in 1.3.2. For him, all languages are built up in stages, starting with non-
logical, descriptive observations, subsequently linked by truth-functions, and finally split
into a logical objectual part (the variable) and a descriptive non-logical part (the predicate).
Objects only put in an appearance when they are hypostatised on significant intersections
of observations, in which case they are assigned a variable; there are no name-like expres-
sions that are assigned to objects in any other way. Directly referential expressions could
only be introduced if there were some alternative way of getting in touch with an object,
one that did not proceed via observations or predicates. So the home language can only
have directly referential resources if its structure differs quite radically from this template,
with names sometimes being assigned directly to objects, without reliance on observation
sentences. If Quine wants to insist that all intelligible languages share that exact structure,
he must dispense with directly referential proper names in the home language, and endorse
(ordinary) descriptivism about natural-language names too. Ordinary proper names would
need a description in order to mediate their assignment to a bearer. But name-recycling
predicates, by their very structure—‘x = a’—need the name ‘a’ to have been assigned to
a referent before they themselves can be formulated. They are not suitable for use as a
uniquely identifying predicate by the descriptivist, who believes such an assignment itself
needs a mediating description first before it can single out the referent.
3.3.4 Identity Statements and the Case for Purely Objectual Constants
In section 1.5 we saw that Quine dispenses with the identity predicate, replacing it with
the ‘serviceable facsimile’ of a defined predicate ‘x = y’ which is short for indiscernibility
within the language, meaning that x satisfies all the same predicates as y [Qui70, p. 63].
Quine translates sentences with proper names in them into the regimented language as
existentially quantified phrases, using Russell’s theory of descriptions. One of Russell’s
insights in [Rus05] was the relative strength of equivalence relations that can be expressed
using names and variables on the one hand, and descriptive phrases on the other. Names
and variables can legitimately be concatenated with the identity predicate, and it can be
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true or false tout court that ‘a = b’—in other words, that a and b are the same thing.
Descriptive phrases, on the other hand, having the deep logical structure of quantified
phrases, cannot themselves flank the identity sign. Although in natural language, we think
it makes sense to write things like ‘The last pharaoh = the eldest daughter of Ptolemy
XII Auletes’, their true logical form is ‘∃x((Px ∧ ∀y(Py → x = y)) ∧ ∃z((Dz ∧ ∀w(Dw →
z = w)) ∧ x = z))’, with only variables flanking the identity sign. Identity only holds
between an object and itself, and can only be expressed using expressions that refer to
the object directly: ‘x’, or ‘w’, or (for Millians, not Russell) ‘Cleopatra’. The strongest
equivalence relation that can be expressed with the help of ideological phrases is that of
describing the same thing [Mar61, p. 12]. This is because descriptive phrases single out
a thing indirectly, via a description of its characteristics, and two descriptions sometimes
coincidentally hold of one unique thing. For Russell’s point to go through, we need not just
objectual constants, but purely objectual constants: those that do no more than single out
a thing, without encoding any information. Were they to retain some descriptive meaning,
their singling out their values would be conditional upon those values’ satisfying those
descriptions. The strongest equivalence that could be expressed using such expressions,
in that case, would again be just that of describing the same thing. But purely objectual
directly referential expressions encode no information, and manage to stand for an object
without any help from the ideology. According to Russell’s Thesis it is no coincidence,
but a matter of logic, that such words, once assigned to one and the same object, always
denote that same object. They can be used to commit to an individual qua individual,
and to state outright whether individuals are identical or distinct.
We have seen that for epistemological reasons Quine’s criterion does not allow commitment
to individuals as such, but only to objects-qua-F. He recommends translating ‘a’ as ‘the
A-er’, or ‘the x such that x = a’. We also noted that Quine renders ‘x = y’ as ‘x satisfies
exactly the same open formulae as y’. Now Quine is compelled to translate ‘a = b’ as ‘the
A-er satisfies exactly the same open formulae as the B-er’. Although it is of course the case
that everything satisfies all the same open formulae as itself, this is, per Russell’s insight,
a weaker equivalence than ‘a = b’. For ‘a = b’ means that a and b are the same thing,
where ‘the A-er satisfies exactly the same open formulae as the B-er’ does not mean, nor
even entail, that the A-er and the B-er are the same thing. It means no more than that
‘the A-er’ and ‘the B-er’ happen to describe the same thing, even in cases where the A-er
and the B-er are, in fact, numerically identical. But the fact that two descriptions describe
the same thing could be a coincidence — which makes this case completely unlike that of
self-identity. The identity of identicals is a logical fact.
Two distinct things can be indiscernible with respect to the predicates of some language.
As Ramsey said, it is always at least logically possible that indiscernibles are distinct
[Ram31, p. 31]. No matter how numerous and precise the predicates are, they will never
guarantee that whenever x and y satisfy exactly the same predicates and combinations of
predicates, it is a logical fact that they are the same thing. For that to happen, conjoining
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the regimented version of the sentence ‘x and y are indiscernible’ with ‘x 6= y’ would have to
be formally contradictory. But the only way this can be done is by fiat, where the identity
predicate is defined away and replaced with Quine’s serviceable facsimile, or where there
are no directly referential expressions available. For the standard identity predicate, in a
language with purely referential expressions (constants or variables), a contradiction can
never be derived from the supposition that indiscernibles are distinct. It is true, as Quine
says, that such distinctness cannot be expressed within the language in question. But that
just amounts to an argument against his choice of canonical language, and in favour of one
with constants.
This point was brought home forcefully by Ruth Barcan Marcus in her debate with Quine.
It is mostly known for its modal dimension—necessary or contingent identity—but it can
also be put in terms of whether these facts are empirically or logically based. According to
Quine, the fact that identity holds between the Morning Star and the Evening Star, which
are both identical with the planet Venus, is known to us because ‘the discovery is empirical’
[Qui53d, p. 197], and not through doing logic. Barcan Marcus counters that ‘[e]mpirical
discoveries do not identity make’ [Mar93b, p. 226]; the relation of identity holds between
an object and itself as a matter of logic, whether or not we find out about it. Where there is
a self-identical object, there is a single object. No circumstance, discoverable, or otherwise
will ever make it two—sameness of thing is a logical fact. ‘But’, Barcan Marcus asks, ‘does
a mere concatenation of properties make an object?’ [Mar90, p. 197]. The fact that two
descriptions describe the same thing is not a logical fact, but an ideological fact.
Barcan Marcus calls ‘a = b’ type statements ‘valid’ [Mar61, p. 10], and even tautological—
though in the 1960s ‘tautology’ was often used as a synonym for ‘logical truth’ [Mar93b, p.
4]. Her argument is that if ‘a = b’ is true, it is equivalent to ‘a = a’. The exact details of the
argument are slightly murky. My interpretation is that she assumes exactly what Russell
was said to assume above: that constants are purely objectual and encode no information,
so only they or variables can flank the identity sign. I tentatively conclude that she infers
that the empirical discovery is not the discovery that a is the same object as itself, but
the metalinguistic information that both ‘a’ and ‘b’ are names of that object. An ‘a = b’
statement serves to convey two kinds of equivalence. First of all, it shares with identity
statements of the form ‘a = a’ the feature that it communicates that the thing singled
out by ‘a’ is self-identical. The ‘a = b’ statement also conveys the additional information
that this self-identical thing bears two distinct names, ‘a’ and ‘b’. The metalinguistic
statement, that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are names of the same thing, is entailed by the informative
identity statement. But it is not the entire content of the statement, since having the same
name is just a metalinguistic equivalence relation, not the object-language equivalence
relation of identity.
It is beginning to appear as though Quine’s decision to eliminate the grammatical cate-
gory of proper names is not a non-partisan strategy. It represents proper names as being
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reducible to mere descriptive vocabulary because of Quine’s story about theory formation
whereby vocabulary is either a logical operator or variable, or descriptive. This results in
a problematic treatment of identity whereby some of the strength that in the home lan-
guage we have come to expect from identity, namely that indiscernibles can be distinct, but
identicals cannot, has been elided. Even though Quine admits that identity in the home
language means sameness of thing [Qui60b, p. 118]; [Qui70, p. 63], he is unable to express
sameness of thing in the regimented language, retaining only facsimile identity: sameness
with respect to all predicates.
3.4 Identity
Quine’s preference for facsimile identity is partly informed by his substitutional account
of logical consequence and logical truth: predicates are not logical vocabulary because
normally we can substitute any predicate for any other without changing the truth value
of the logical truths. Identity on the usual interpretation—the relation everything has
to itself and to no other thing, the relation which partitions the domain into singleton
equivalence classes—would throw a spanner in the works, but it can be fitted neatly into
the substitutional account if it is thought of as an abbreviation for exhaustive lists of
combinations of predicates, that is, as indiscernibility from within the theory. But there
is an epistemological dimension to his dislike for the standard interpretation of identity,
too. Quine’s requirement that every entity be subject to a criterion of identity applies to
naming too. To assign a name to an object we use a description of it to single it out.
Otherwise, we could never be in a position to identify the object we just named with
some object encountered in a different theoretical context. Suppose we name a river by
ostension [Qui50]. The bearer of that name will be subject to the criterion of identity
for rivers, not those for collections of water particles or spatiotemporal zones. So the
ostended object must first be described as a river. ‘[Ostention] leaves no ambiguity as
to the object of reference if the word ‘river’ itself is already intelligible’ [Qui80b, p. 67].
Later, when we seek to answer the question whether some observed flowing body of water
deserves the same appellation as the subject of our ostension, it must be made apparent
under what circumstances two observed entities count as the same river, i.e. are subject to
the criterion of identity for rivers, or what Quine calls ‘river kinship’: ‘the introduction of
rivers as single entities, namely, processes or time-consuming objects, consists substantially
in reading identity in place of river kinship. ... The imputation of identity is essential, here,
to fixing the reference of the ostension.’ [Qui80b, p. 66].
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3.4.1 Identity and Extensionality
Quine does not deny that counting things that are indiscernible-according-to-the-theory as
identical is a departure from the usual, and very natural, reading of the identity predicate
as ‘being the same thing’. Although in the early Quine, there are some remarks that
appear to construe identity as a relation between names, e.g. ‘[o]ne of the fundamental
principles governing identity is that of substitutivity—or, as it might well be called, that of
indiscernibility of identicals’ [Qui43a, p. 113], in Word and Object he insists that identity
in the home language means no more and no less than sameness of thing [Qui60b, pp.
114–118]. He does not pretend that the meaning of the identity predicate (as opposed to
its defined facsimile) does not go beyond indiscernibility. He simply thinks that reasons of
theory choice dictate that indiscernibility according to our best theory, or ‘identification
of indiscernibles’ [Qui50, p. 71], is the best we can do. Quine’s system is self-consciously
extensional.
3.4.2 Quine on Extensionality
A confirmed extensionalist [Qui94, Qui04a], Quine alleges that his extensionalism consists
in admitting only referentially transparent contexts [Qui53d, p. 142]. He defines ‘referen-
tially transparent contexts’ as those contexts in which co-referential expressions can always
be substituted salva veritate. If that criterion is not fulfilled, the contexts belong to the
obfuscatory theory of meaning, replete with horrors like analyticity, meaning, and neces-
sity, rather than the scientifically respectable theory of reference [Qui53c]. He coins the
term ‘referentially opaque’ for contexts that are not transparent.
The term ‘referential transparency’ is originally from Principia Mathematica. Russell and
Whitehead call an occurrence referentially transparent iff nothing is said of it, but by means
of it something is said of something else [WR64, Appendix C]. The Principia definition of
transparency is concerned with occurrences, not contexts, and does not mention substitu-
tion. ‘Nothing is said of it’, where ‘it’ means the occurrence of the expression, implies that
the occurrence is in the object language and is not used in any kind of metalinguistic way.
It is used solely to denote something, or predicate something of something else, or form
part of a denoting or predicative phrase, or part of the logical vocabulary. It is not used as
a sign for itself, as in the autonymous conventions used in some metalanguages. Nor does
its use in that occurrence in any way depend on either the form of the expression itself or
the form of the sentence in which it occurs. This would suggest that opaque occurrences
are in some sense concerned with the form of the expression and not necessarily with its
denotation or connotation.
There is an ambiguity here: Whitehead and Russell use ‘transparent’ of occurrences of
terms, whereas Quine usually speaks of transparent or opaque contexts. One kind of
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opaque context is the quotation context. This flows naturally from the Russell-Whitehead
definition: when an expression occurs in a quotation something is said about it : e.g. we
can say “‘Alva” is a girls’ name’, or “‘Alva” has four letters’. In this case, we could reason-
ably call the occurrence of “‘Alva”’ opaque, since by means of it something is said about
the expression ‘Alva’. The reason to shift the use of the label to contexts depends on
occurrences Quine calls ‘not purely designative’ [Qui43a, p. 114] (or (im)purely referential
in [Qui53d]) occurrences, like that of the name ‘Giorgione’ in
(G) Giorgione is so-called because of his size.
Quine wants to invoke substitution again in this case. Giorgione may also be referred
to by his last name, ‘Barbarelli’. Everything that can truly be said using ‘Giorgione’ must
be true if we substitute ‘Barbarelli’ for ‘Giorgione’. But Barbarelli is not so-called because
of his size, so (G) becomes false upon substitution of some co-referential terms. The oc-
currence of ‘Giorgione’ in (G) singles out an individual, so it is referential. What is said of
that individual, though, depends for its truth not only on the individual but also on the
form of the name. In this context, the occurrence fulfills two roles: something is said of it,
and by means of it something is said of something else too.
Fine [Fin05] contests Quine’s right to call the occurrence of ‘Giorgione’ in (G) impurely
referential. He puts forward the objection that in the exchange:
A: ‘Giorgione is a sculptor.’
B : ‘Yes, and he is so-called because of his size.’
the occurrence of ‘Giorgione’ in A’s statement is purely referential. The analogue of (G)
is B ’s utterance. But that particular sentence cannot become false upon substitution of
co-referential terms, because it does not contain the word ‘Giorgione’. Perhaps this is cor-
rect as a criticism of Quine. Certainly Fine is right that there is no impurely referential
occurrence within the opaque context, if the opaque context is B ’s utterance, and it seems
hard to argue that the opaque context is A’s. But I think the problem can be dissolved
if what is thought of as opaque is fully determinate contexts, something achieved by the
earlier stages of regimentation. Languages that are not fully regimented but adopt some
of the features of formal languages can disambiguate B ’s utterance so it can be shown
equivalent to one that contains an occurrence of ‘Giorgione’. One option would be to use
Quinean eternal sentences. B ’s sentence could be translated as ‘Giorgione is a sculptor, and
Giorgione is called “Giorgione” because of his size’, which has a metalinguistic component.
The predicate ‘x is so-called because of x’s size’ can be expanded to ‘x is called n because
of x’s size’ where ‘x’ is replaced with an expression and ‘n’ is replaced with a quotation
name for that expression. This formulation is, I think, theory of reference-appropriate, but
is clearly not in the object language, and cannot be formulated as a transparent object-
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language sentence. It can be semi-regimented, but it can be fully regimented only in a
language which contains semantic vocabulary for the object language.
Quotation contexts meet Quine’s definition of opacity, perhaps with the additional stip-
ulation that it should be restricted to eternal sentences. It also seems to accord with
Whitehead and Russell’s definition of transparency, assuming they are happy to define
opaque occurrences as those which are not transparent, and with the caveat that it applies
to fully determinate (perhaps semi-formalised) sentences. Transparency vs. opacity in Rus-
sell and Whitehead’s sense is harder to square with such better-known Quinean paradigms
of opacity as modal contexts and propositional attitude ascriptions. If Tom knows Marcus
Tullius Cicero only as ‘Cicero’, and is unaware that he is also called ‘Tully’, substituting
‘Tully’ for ‘Cicero’ in ‘Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline’ yields a falsehood
[Qui60b, p. 166]. If the that-clause is interpreted propositionally, it can be taken as refer-
ring to a proposition. That is difficult to square with either interpretation of transparency,
substitutional or grammatical. Propositions, after all, are abstract objects; they are not,
like sentences, objects composed of expressions. But the option of calling this a context in
which something is said about an expression is open to Quine, who believes propositions to
be dispensable. The real logical form of ‘Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline’ is
‘Tom believes the sentence “Cicero denounced Catiline”’ [Qui70, p. 14]. Similarly, Quine
believes, at least until the late ’60s, that modal sentences should be translated in terms of
analyticity [Qui43a, p. 120]. He claims that ‘p’ can only be given some semblance of sense
by translating it in terms of analyticity. Because ‘is analytic’, unlike ‘’, is a predicate,
the translation cannot simply proceed along the lines of “‘p” is true iff p is analytic’ since
‘p is analytic’ is ill-formed: it has a sentence letter in a position where a singular term
should go. Instead, ‘p’ should be rendered as an instance of the schema ‘x is analytic’
where ‘x’ is replaced with a quotation-name of the sentence substituted for ‘p’ in ‘p’. He
believes that the sentence letter in ‘p’ can be shown in this way to be merely equivalent
to a claim about sentences—though a dubiously coherent claim, relying on analyticity. So
it meets the Whitehead-Russell definition on relying on the form of the expression.
3.4.3 Barcan Marcus on Extensionality
Another option is to take Barcan Marcus’ definition of extensionality. She aims to pre-
cisify extensionality by characterising it in terms of the strength of equivalence relations.
Firstly, there is no sharp bifurcation between extensionality and intensionality. She defines
extensional systems as those which equate the identity predicate with a weaker equivalence
relation [Mar60], [Mar61]. Her conception of extensionality entails that extensionality
comes in degrees. The weaker the equivalence relation a system uses in place of identity,
the more strongly extensional it is.
There are two kinds of extensionalising principles: implicit and explicit. Explicit exten-
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sionality principles are stated in the object language or in the metalanguage. The general
form of an explicit extensionalising principle is
(EEP) x eq y → xIy
where ‘eq’ stands for some equivalence relation weaker than identity, ‘I’ stands for identity,
‘ →’ is a conditional that is part of the language or a metalinguistic conditional, and ‘x’
and ‘y’ go proxy for names of things [Mar61, p. 7]. (To avoid prejudicing the debate, read
‘directly referential singular terms’ for ‘names’.) An implicit extensionalising principle
holds for a language without being explicitly stated in it. Instead, it forms part of its
governing logic or grammar, which entails that the language cannot express fully-fledged
identity, but only some weaker equivalence, like indiscernibility. Implicit extensionalising
principles can be brought to light, for instance, by the substitution theorems of a language
[Mar61, p. 15].
Suppose a theory is conceived of in Quine’s way, as a set of sentences closed under con-
sequence. Barcan Marcus’ characterisation of extensionality can then be used to explain
opacity. Opaque contexts have a metalinguistic element, broadly conceived to include quo-
tation contexts, impure reference and attitudinatives. Intensional contexts sometimes call
for metalinguistic, rather than object-language, equivalence relations. Of course, for on-
tological purposes, the only relevant equivalences are those between objects, in the object
language. Asking for sameness with respect to all metalinguistic predicates as well as ob-
ject language predicates is legitimate for some epistemological purposes. Quine’s hapless
Tom, ignorant of Cicero’s nomen gentile, reasons correctly when he fails to infer from Ci-
cero’s having denounced Catiline to Tully’s having done so. It would be irrational for him
to resist this inference, though, if he were aware of Cicero’s full name. So for knowledge
ascription contexts it can be appropriate to demand metalinguistic sameness in addition to
numerical identity. But the object language suffices for ontological pursuits. The sentence
‘Cicero exists’ is true or false whether we call him Cicero or Tully.
Barcan Marcus’ approach appears to capture well what Quine is doing in [Qui50]. His
insistence on identifiability (‘reading identity in place of river kinship’) looks like an explicit
extensionalising principle, where criteria of identity for rivers in general and facts about the
spatiotemporal arrangement of the original object of ostension jointly determine under what
conditions the object observed at tn+m can be called the same as the object named at tn:
‘the introduction of rivers as single entities, namely, processes or time-consuming objects,
consists substantially in reading identity in place of river kinship . . . The imputation of
identity is essential, here, to fixing the reference of the ostension’ [Qui50, p. 66]. But
because of his conception of positing as putting a variable on the intersection of overlapping
observations, Quine not only maintains that extensionality holds for his own theories, but
that all theories should conform to it.
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3.5 Objects, Committing Expressions and Epistemology
3.5.1 Global Holism and Indirect Access to Objects
Quine’s criterion implies that all objects are subject to indiscernibility according to the
predicates of the theory. Beyond the use of predicates, there is no theoretical apparatus
available to distinguish them from each other. Hypostatising a posit on the intersection of
observations in the first place is a significant theoretical imposition for Quine, let alone a
single self-identical thing persisting through time or being identified in different contexts.
Positing is an explanatory tactic to make our evidence more fine-grained, to give our
theories more expressive power and more explanatory potential. Any particular posit may
be dispensable; to decide whether the existence of something is really a consequence of the
theory, the entire wealth of theoretical resources it provides must be invoked. Criteria of
identity gleaned from a complete theory are a key component of such decisions:
Our venerable theory of the persistence and recurrence of bodies is characteristic
of the use of reification in integrating our system of the world. If I were to try
to decide whether the penny now in my pocket is the one that was there last
week, or just another one like it, I would have to explore quite varied aspects of
my overall scheme of things, so as to reconstruct the simplest, most plausible
account of my interim movements, costumes, and expenditures. [Qui92, p. 24]
Any pair of things that cannot be distinguished by the predicates of some theory count as
the same posit according to that theory. Adherents of the theory are compelled to view it as
the same object tout court. Whatever name one bears, the other must bear too. Whatever
can be truly said using one of the names must remain true if we substitute the other
name. That is the reason only sentences in which substitutability salva veritate always
holds can be admitted into a theory. But Quine’s extensionalised facsimile of the identity
relation also yields the result that names never rise above the level of descriptions: since
they are relative to a criterion of identity, they must encode exactly as much information
as the descriptive criterion of identity provides. The application of the name is subject
to its bearer’s satisfying the description prescribed by the criterion of identity. There are
no non-descriptive resources available to distinguish them in any other way. There are no
proper names or first-personal devices, only observations and the foci of their intersections.
Quine’s attempt to dispense with proper names in the regimented language amounts to
shoehorning names into the ideology. Dispensing with names in favour of predicates has
the consequence of dispensing with the usual reading of the identity predicate: sameness
of thing. Quine substitutes a weaker equivalence relation: sameness with respect to all the
predicates of the theory.
These reflections provide evidence for supposing that his preference for a logic without
constants is anchored in his holist epistemology. Global holism implies that thought reaches
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out to objects, not directly, but always via the medium of a complete theory. Knowledge
of objects is not achieved by touching upon the objects themselves, but by considering
their place within the theory. Any posit we admit is only there because it has been put
forward, tentatively, as the best explanation for a persistent overlap in observations. Any
one posit is always dispensable. Perhaps, upon consideration, we decide that some other
focus of overlapping observations is the one which deserves an explanatory entity, or the
posit in question is paraphrased away. But to dispense with a posit, we always consider the
theory as a whole: the entity must not be needed by any part of it. Similarly, identifying
one object with another requires a wealth of theoretical resources to be brought to bear.
To be able to assert that two posits are the same, we must first investigate what kinds of
things they are, what it takes for those kinds of things to persist, to be observed again,
etcetera.
There is a prima facie problem with Quine’s tendency to assimilate proper names to the
ideology, as the ideology is the inherently descriptive part of the theory, derived from
the observation sentences. Since they are, for him, derived from devices used to record
observations, they are inherently descriptive. But that only follows if we assume his holist
epistemology. It is not mandated by the very form of logical syntax. There are coherent
theories of names on which they are non-descriptive, as in Mill’s [Mil84], Barcan Marcus’
[Mar61] or Kripke’s [Kri80] work, for example. It is at least theoretically possible to
single out a thing without describing it, using an expression that denotes it without the
intervention of some (attempted) description of its nature or some predicate it satisfies. So
why should logical grammar stand in the way of this being expressed?
3.5.2 Alternative Epistemologies and The Possibility of Direct Access to
Objects
On the opposite end of the epistemological spectrum from global holism is foundationalism.
A special kind of foundationalism is the doctrine that our minds can reach out to objects
and grasp them directly, without need for an intervening theory. Knowledge of objects, on
this view, need not be inferred from anything; the objects themselves are encounterable
without intermediary. Direct, unmediated epistemic access to objects is sometimes called
‘acquaintance’ after Russell [Rus10], who held that acquaintance with an object entails no
propositional knowledge of it. Knowing an object by acquaintance is achieved through an
act of direct contact with an individual, where the mind reaches out to an object directly,
without intermediary. Russell concluded that it carries no propositional information in
its wake, because this kind of contact with an object is not achieved with the aid of
knowledge of any of its characteristics, unlike knowledge by description. The linguistic
expressions which codify direct access to objects are directly referential expressions. Their
semantic role is to single out an object, without conveying anything about what is true
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of that object. They are purely objectual expressions. The semantic role represents an
act of direct contact with an individual: the mind reaches out to it immediately, without
the need for any descriptive vocabulary to single out the object. It follows that directly
referential expressions have no lexical meanings. They have referents, but they do not have
any descriptive meaning, conveying no information about their referents’ natures. There
is nothing to the meaning of a directly referential expression except the bearer it denotes.
This concerns only the issue of how to incorporate directly referential expressions into
the language of regimentation, and is not a thesis about natural-language proper names.4
The ontological point of direct reference is to allow us to commit to an individual without
relying on the ideology.
The view that is diametrically opposed to Quine’s would be a strict object-foundationalism,
according to which the only kind of contact we have with objects is direct, never indirect.
Such a position would come with a language of regimentation in which only constants,
purely objectual directly referential expressions, are committing, each recording in lan-
guage a cognitive act of direct contact with an individual. Those constants are the formal
equivalent of Mill’s directly referential names, which convey no information [Mil84]. Ad-
ditionally, in an object-foundationalist epistemology names not only reveal nothing about,
but are also assigned completely independently of, their bearers’ natures. A complemen-
tary theory of naming would be the causal theory adumbrated in Kripke’s work [Kri80]
and further worked out by Putnam, [Put82, ch.1], Evans [Eva73] and Donnellan [Don74]
among others. An advocate of object-foundationalism could hold on to much of the realist
philosophy of logic that I have been charting throughout these chapters. In particular, they
could defend the impartiality of logic by maintaining, against Quine, that constants help
separate the ontology from the ideology just as much as variables do (also see section 4.3.2
below). Constants resemble variables in denoting the object only insofar as it is a being in
the domain, without discriminating on the basis of anything that can be said about it in
the ideology. Since no ideological resources are encoded in the meanings of constants, they
are neutral with respect to the predicates of the theory. So the foundationalist language
of regimentation upholds logical impartiality.
Perhaps an acquaintance-only epistemology is rather limiting (though some do defend it,
see for example 3.5.4 below), and Russell’s doctrine of knowledge without information may
seem unattractive. Nevertheless, it is at least logically coherent, so a logical grammar that
refuses to represent it at all will not do. Also, there is at least one limited but philosophically
interesting class of entities where something like the doctrine of acquaintance without
4In natural language, the boundary between direct reference and definite descriptions is a little more
fluid and harder to read off the surface structure of sentences. Some expressions that function semantically
like names have the surface form of definite descriptions: ‘The Evening Star’ names a planet, ‘The Iron
Lady’, a woman of flesh and blood, ‘The Holy Roman Empire’, something neither holy, nor Roman, nor an
empire. Some expressions that look like proper names are used attributively or predicatively: ‘Margaret is
no Bismarck’, ‘There are two Jennifers in the group’.
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information applies: mental entities, selves and mental states, whose defining characteristic
is often said to be just the fact that we do know them first-personally, by privileged access.
So it still seems advisable to have some way of representing direct access to objects in
language.
There are intermediate attitudes towards objects available, too. If there are object-holists
and object-foundationalists, there is also the equivalent of Haack’s foundherentism [Haa00].
A hybrid criterion of commitment would have it that both constants and variables are
committing, because both acquaintance and description are legitimate ways for thought
to reach out to an object. Those who admit only acquaintance or only description must
think that every object is accessed in the same way. The hybrid ontologist, though, has a
choice: she may think that some objects are accessed directly—mental states, perhaps—
some only by description—maybe mathematical objects such as numbers. Alternatively,
she might maintain that all objects are accessed using descriptive methods in combination
with direct access. The option of believing in all three kinds of access is also open to her:
some kinds of objects are accessed only directly, like mental states, some only indirectly,
like numbers, some by a combination of methods. A potential example of combined access
is our access to middle-sized physical objects, which arguably involves both a descriptive
criterion for limning the boundaries of an ordinary physical object in space-time, furnished
by the predicates, plus ostensive methods for indicating the object, in order to give it a
name.
Does the combined mode of access reduce names to the ideology again, as in Quine’s
argument that names for rivers are subject to criteria of identity? It need not. Such
inherently descriptive names would not be purely objectual expressions. Impurely objectual
committing expressions are in principle coherent, I think, but for present purposes I will
leave them out of account. Because they contain information, they discriminate according
to ideological category. As a result they compromise the separation between ontological
and ideological vocabulary. To deny this separation calls into question the stronger version
of the impartiality of logic. The hybrid ontologist can maintain a system with two kinds
of purely objectual expressions, constants and variables, even though she allows some
co-operation between the two for the combined mode of access. This is because a direct
reference requirement does not entail having to hold a direct theory of naming. The former
says only that the meaning of the name is completely non-descriptive. For the latter, the
name must also be assigned without ideological intermediary. This restricts the methods
of assigning names to referents to ostension, causal naming and the like. But hybrid
ontologists can coherently believe that names might be assigned using a description, say,
when a parent-to-be asserts ‘my first baby will be called Chris’. Descriptive assignment does
not entail that the name retains the meaning of that description if names, once assigned,
refer to their bearer independently of their satisfying the original description. Let us call
this property of names ‘Dartmouth-invariance’ after Mill [Mil84, p. 20]. Once little Chris
is born, his or her name will not change even if it turns out babies were switched at the
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hospital, and Chris is not the biological child of the parent who uttered the description at
all. Since ‘Chris’ is Dartmouth-invariant, the name has no descriptive meaning, and can
potentially be rendered into the language of regimentation as a purely objectual expression.
Commitment to Chris, after all, we have found, need not depend on any describable feature
of Chris, and can persist even though all the propositional knowledge we think we have of
Chris might be falsified.
3.5.3 Translating Directly Committing Expressions Into Canonical No-
tation
Quine proposed his criterion of ontological commitment in an irenic spirit. He claimed to
demystify ontological disputes by ascending to the metalanguage to describe rival ontolo-
gies in terms of what values their committing expressions (the variables) take. Disputants
can confront the existence questions over which they differ by talking about words, which
they both believe in. But in insisting on translation into an idiom that reflects his own
epistemology, he risks having non-holist parties to the debate being forced to talk past
each other still. Going metalinguistic means the warring factions can avoid stating which
objects they each refer to, and then trying to assess which among those objects really exist.
That strategy would have the disadvantage of apparently making reference to non-existent
objects, and leaves the disputants talking past each other in the object language [Qui48,
p. 21]. In ascending to the metalanguage, what is done away with in particular is the
assumption that any purported use of a name trivially entails a commitment to a bearer.5
It may not commit at all, because it can be coherently denied that the name-like phrase is a
name if it fails to denote [Qui51a, p. 67]. But the fact that some name-like expressions fail
to be names does not warrant the inference that nothing is ever a name, or that names can
always be paraphrased away. The problem is not with directly referential expressions, but
with the assumption that there are trivial existential consequences. Allowing directly ref-
erential committing expressions does not entail that it is trivial that names have referents,
because it is coherent to translate an apparently name-like expression into the language of
regimentation as a description, or eliminate it, refusing to translate it at all, if it does not
fulfil the specific function of committing to an object directly. Quine’s canonical language
does not admit of direct access being modelled at all; it effectively builds epistemological
holism into the very syntax of logic. That constraint is too strong.
Consider the Cartesian cogito. Recall that included under the rubric of directly referential
expressions are not only those which bear close resemblance to natural language names,
but any expression whose semantic role is to denote directly. If direct access to an object is
possible, one such object may be the self, denoted by words such as ‘I’. Acquaintance with
5Quine still asserts that ontology is trivial to the conceptual scheme in [Qui48, p. 29], but drops this
vestige of Carnapianism in his response to Carnap [Qui51a].
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the self is possible, if there is a self, or (more modestly) introspective contact with a present
mental state. Quine has great trouble accounting for such things. Although his language
of regimentation begins with observations, none of these observations are introspective,
and the observer is never clearly in the picture; his language is entirely third-personal.
Descartes’ epistemic position in the second Meditation is diametrically opposed to Quine’s,
since Descartes endeavours to doubt all observations and treats third-personal statements
with suspicion. Despite that, he appears not only to aim, but to succeed, in committing
to something.
‘But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that
there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at
the same time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed,
since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at
once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing
all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived;
and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am
nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must,
in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that
this proposition (pronunciatum) I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it
is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind. [Des01, Med. 2 sec. 3].
The cogito is only effective in the first person. Descartes invites the reader to follow his
method of doubt to the very end, where the thinker him- or herself concludes, in the first
person, that ‘I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me’. ‘I assuredly
existed, since I was persuaded’ and ‘I exist, since I am deceived’ might suggest that the
cogito is an inference. But it is perhaps more instructive to read Descartes’ ‘I am, I exist,
is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind’ as saying
that all assertions, mental or verbal, of ‘I exist’ are (‘necessarily’) guaranteed to be true
when they are uttered, because the negations of such assertions (‘I do not exist’) are self-
stultifying and must obviously be false.6 That the referent of the first-person pronoun
must exist cannot be coherently denied. The first person is essential to his argument,
because the negations of third-personal renderings like ‘Descartes is’ or ‘René exists’ are
in no way self-stultifying. The first-personal logical form, and the introspective aspect, are
integral to the point of the argument, and attempting to translate it into Quine’s third-
personal language of regimentation would mangle the logical form of the original beyond
6E.g. see [Hin62, Hin00]. I read Hintikka’s ‘le locuteur ne réussira qu’à démontrer le contraire de ce
qu’il asserte’ as ‘the speaker only manages to show the contradictory of what he asserts’, rather than ‘the
contrary’. I would opt for this translation, i.e. as though it said ‘contradictoire’ instead of ‘contraire’, in
part because ‘contraire’ is a much more commonly used French word than ‘contradictoire’ and is often used
to mean ‘contradictory’, but mostly because the argument that p must (necessarily) be true because its
contrary, q, must be false does not go through. Contraries cannot both be true, but they can both be false.
The argument only works for contradictories, which must have opposite truth values.
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recognition. Descartes’ hard-to-resist argument that since the negation of ‘I exist’ is self-
stultifying, there must be something, cannot be given a remotely valid form in Quine’s
preferred logical idiom.
My point is not that we should accept the cogito as it stands, but only that it is both log-
ically coherent and committing. It remains committing even when the objection is raised
that Descartes is not entitled to ‘cogito’, but only to ‘cogitatur ’; even though there may be
no self, any occurrence of a mental content like ‘no mental states are presently occurring’
is equally self-stultifying, and leads ineluctably to the conclusion that there is something.
The statement that there are some things that McX has epistemic access to but that do not
exist is a good candidate for being logically incoherent [Qui48, p. 22], but the statement
that I can tell that I exist because I am thinking is not. Another example of introspective
commitment is to be found in Berkeley [Ber68], who contends that although he is directly
acquainted with his ideas, he has no knowledge of Locke’s abstract triangle which is sup-
posed to be ‘neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but
all and none of these at once’ [Loc75, p. 596]. Even if Descartes’ or Berkeley’s arguments
are flawed, they are not illogical. If there is no way in principle of capturing and modelling
a cognitive act of direct access in the language of regimentation, holists and direct access
theorists still risk talking past each other. Even those whose personal epistemology rules
out the possibility of direct contact should admit that other philosophers use it. Opponents
of direct contact will consider these philosophers’ theories false, but not meaningless or in-
trinsically incoherent. Yet Quine’s language of regimentation can only ever model contact
with objects via a third-personal description, because variables, connoting merely that an
object is present, not which object it is, are the only committing expressions. An obvious
extension of the canonical notation of first-order logic is to admit individual constants as
well as variables as potential committing expressions. Which of these a philosopher then
helps herself to is a matter of her epistemology, not logical syntax.
3.5.4 Alternative Criteria of Commitment
Barcan Marcus
Ruth Barcan Marcus’ epistemology is radically opposed to Quine’s: foundationalist and
grounded in the assumption that the main kind of access we have to objects is direct access.
She views her acquaintance-based epistemology as a natural match for her nominalism
[Mar78]. Her philosophy of logic reflects this. She avers that every language needs some
nameable entities, some ‘constant objects of reference’ [Mar61, p. 304].
Her epistemology of encounterable individuals, capable of being grasped directly by us and
assigned a name, seems to come with a markedly thicker notion of objecthood than that
which comes with the holist picture of posits. The objects of acquaintance are there for us
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to bump into and speak of independently of any prior theory. Posits which are tentatively
marked out on the map of intersecting observations betray a thinner sense of objecthood.
The objects are only there at the mercy of the theory, dependent on its intersections
being just there, potentially dispensed with altogether. Barcan Marcus’ independently
encounterable objects comprise the fundament of her theory; it is hard to see how they
could be dispensed with.
There is a clear connection between identity and singular reference in her system. If an
expression functions as a genuine name for a thing, anything it names must be identical with
that thing. Unlike Quine, she holds that identity is primitive. Recall that Barcan Marcus
orders systems by the relative strength of equivalence relations that can be expressed
within them. The strongest equivalence relation is numerical identity, sameness of thing;
all other, weaker ones express sameness in some respect, a sameness of kind (in a broad
sense of ‘kind’). For a coherent statement of identity, we need the expressions that flank the
identity sign to designate the object directly. Descriptive phrases do not qualify, because
they pick out the object by means of some of its qualities, and only serve to express
qualitative, not quantitative, identity.
Barcan Marcus accordingly claims that there is a need for directly referential names, devoid
of lexical meaning, known as tags. Tags are purely objectual, not relative to a criterion of
identity. If a name embodied a criterion of identity, as Quine would have it, such names
could not rise above the level of descriptions with respect to the Russell’s Thesis on the
strength of equivalence relations we identified earlier: that only tags and variables can be
concatenated with the identity sign. So proper names are useful to express the difference
between numerical and quantitative sameness because they are purely objectual. ‘Proper
names have a logically irreducible use. They permit us to entertain a separation in language
of the object under discussion from its properties’ [Mar93a, p. 107].
Tags are not only directly referential and purely objectual, but are also capable of being
assigned independently of any descriptive vocabulary. ‘But to assign a thing a proper
name is different from giving a unique description. For suppose we took an inventory
of all the entities countenanced as things by a some particular culture through its own
language . . . suppose we randomised as many whole numbers as we needed for a one-to-one
correspondence, and thereby tagged each thing. This identifying tag . . . a proper name,
has no meaning. It simply tags’ [Mar61, pp. 309-310]. Although in her later work, Barcan
Marcus endorses the causal theory of naming [Mar78, p. 120]; [Mar93a, pp. 107-108];
[Mar85, pp. 203-204], this earlier view, which says that the giving of names to objects is
direct and unmediated, and that such an assignment is like a functional mapping, is at
least as interesting. It is broader than the causal theory. Causal assignment is just one
form of assignment, one option out of many. Tags also enshrine in language our minds’
capacity to reach out to an object without the use of ideology. ‘Proper names ... may be
used to capture and institutionalize and act of ostension’ [Mar78, p. 120].
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We noted at the beginning of this chapter that intuitively speaking, the ontologically
committing expressions in the theory appear to include both reference by means of proper
names—mentioning things by name—and existence claims—quantifying-over. Quine thinks
that despite appearances, there is no difference in logical form between them. According
to him the former can be paraphrased away, reduced to the latter: their regimented form
is just ‘∃xFx ’. Barcan Marcus expresses puzzlement at Quine’s decision to let variables
‘bear the burden of reference’ [Mar78, p. 121]. ‘There are alternative analyses for locat-
ing references in an interpreted language. Names and their relation to nameable objects
constitute one such alternative. The burden of reference is shifted back univocally to the
name relation’ [Mar78, p. 121]. For her, directly referential tags are the only ontologically
committing expressions. Her criterion can be summed up as ‘to be is to be the referent of
a tag’. But what about existence claims? Aren’t they committing, too? Barcan Marcus
holds that quantifiers, despite appearances, are actually devoid of commitment. She com-
bines her tag theory of reference with an account of quantification on which variables are
relieved of the burden of reference. She brings about her own reduction of one purported
type of committing expressions to another, the reverse of Quine’s: quantifiers are reduced
to names. Her interpretation of the quantifiers is substitutional: their truth is explained in
terms of their substitution instances. Variables are not by themselves committing, because
they do not have values. Variables are placeholders for substituends. Their instances reveal
the presence of an object only where the expressions to be substituted for the variables are
tags. She believes substitutional quantification to be more compatible with nominalism
and a better rendition of many of our ordinary-language statements: ‘There are, even in
ordinary use, quantifier phrases that seem to be ontologically more neutral, as in: “It is
sometimes the case that species and kinds are, in the course of evolution, extinguished”. It
does not seem to me that the presence there of a quantifier forces an ontology of kinds or
species. If the case is to be made for reference of kind terms, it would have to be made, as
for proper names, independently. Translation into a substitutional language does not force
the ontology. Such usage remains, literally and until the case for reference can be made, a
façon de parler.’ [Mar78, p. 122].
A Barcanian language of regimentation, to go with the criterion of commitment ‘to be is
to be the referent of a tag’ might proceed along the lines sketched in [DB68]. Its lexicon
would at minimum contain a finite or denumerable set of constants, a finite or denumerable
set of predicates, a denumerable set of variables, the usual truth-functional operators (for
instance, ‘¬’ and ‘∧’), the quantifiers (‘∀’, ‘∃’), and an identity predicate. There would also
be a category of singular terms that are not constants, never employed as tags. Barcan
Marcus allows for lexical items like modal operators, second-order variables, or set-theoretic
vocabulary, none of which are ontologically committing [Mar72]. The standard syntax
applies, but it must stipulate that only constants or variables can flank the identity sign—
the non-tag singular terms can be concatenated with other predicates, but not identity. Its
interpretation maps the constants to the individuals of a domain, where every constant is
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a tag: each is assigned to an element and each element has a name. The function may be
one-one [Mar93b, pp. 11–12], but need not be. Atomic sentences consisting of predicates
plus tags are true when the bearers of the tags satisfy the predicate, false otherwise. All
atomic sentences of the form ‘a = a’ are true. Those of the form ‘a = b’ are true iff the
bearer of ‘a’ is the same individual as the bearer of ‘b’, false otherwise. All other atomic
sentences, including those with non-tag singular terms, are assigned truth values by the
interpretation. All connectives as well as the substitutional quantifiers can be assigned true
or false in terms of truth alone: ‘¬p’ is true iff ‘p’ is false, ‘p ∧ q ’ is true iff ‘p’ is true and
‘q ’ is true, and ‘∀xFx ’ is true iff ‘Ft ’ is true for all terms ‘t ’; ‘∃xFx ’ is true iff ‘Ft ’ is true
for at least one term ‘t ’ [DB68]. All substitution instances which contain non-tag singular
terms as substituends (for Barcan Marcus, this would include fictional terms, higher-order
terms, and terms for mere possibilia, for example) will have been assigned truth values
by the interpretation quite independently of any ontological considerations, and have no
bearing on the ontology. What, then, is the theory’s ontology? All and only the things it
makes direct reference to, i.e. all the referents of its tags. The quantifiers are ontologically
inert.
Barcan Marcus’ arguments for the committing nature of directly referential expressions
and the strength of equivalence relations are strong, and to a large extent shared by many
philosophers, judging by the favourable reception of Kripke’s development of some of her
ideas [Kri80]. Her reduction of quantification to reference plus truth-functionality is in-
genious, but less compelling. Substitutional quantification, as we saw in 2.1.4, reduces
to the atomic: quantified phrases are just lists of substitution instances. But lists, and
proper names as modelled in standard first-order syntax, must be enumerable. The list
of commitments of a Barcanian language is composed of the referents of its tags. So a
substitutional language can never arrive at a ‘domain of discourse’ (in scare-quotes; really
the set of referents of tag-substituends) with a nonenumerable cardinality. Barcan Marcus’
staunch nominalism leaves her unmoved by this objection [Mar93b, p. 27], [Mar78, p. 124].
Haack makes the additional argument in support of Barcan Marcus that the Lowenheim-
Skolem theorem shows that substitutionalist models are no worse off than objectualist
models [Haa74]. But philosophers who would resist having their ontology forcibly capped
in this way are pushed towards the objectual interpretation of the quantifiers.
Russell
Russell’s position on existence and contact with objects counts as a precursor of a hybrid
view of ontological commitment, with both directly referential and pronominal committing
expressions. He endorses the idea that it is possible to commit both by acquaintance
and by description [Rus10, Rus12]. We already considered the theory of descriptions as a
forerunner of Quine’s attempts to explain away ontological-sounding nonsense attributed to
Meinong. Russell’s directly referential expressions are all indexicals or demonstratives. He
104
describes ‘this’ and ‘that’ as ‘logically proper names’; when he believed in the self, prior to
[Rus19] he also counted the word ‘I’ as a directly referential committing expression [Rus12].
These expressions enshrine in language the commitment that comes with acquaintance.
Proper names in the modern sense are not directly referential expressions for him. They
are to be analysed away as disguised definite descriptions.
There are some considerations that militate against ascribing the hybrid view in its entirety
to the historical Russell. It is a little anachronistic to think of the early Russell as having
an objectual quantifier, which relies on Tarskian notions of satisfaction dating from the
1930s [Tar56a]. Barcan Marcus contests the idea that Russell’s quantifier was a precursor
of Tarski’s, claiming the Principia quantifier as substitutional in spirit because it is glossed
as ‘always true/sometimes true’ [Mar93b, p. 9]. Sainsbury also argues that the higher-order
quantifiers of Principia Mathematica are plausibly read as substitutional [Sai79, pp. 287-
295]. So it is not obvious that Russell has a language of regimentation in precisely the sense
that we are interested in for present purposes. Similarly, there is something anachronistic
about ascribing a criterion of ontological commitment to Russell. His theory of descriptions
can lay some claim to being a Quinean precursor, as it explains when the underlying logical
form of a sentence does or does not demand a corresponding entity. Russell certainly uses it
to dispel Meinongian confusions, just as Quine wants to do [Rus05, Qui48]. He also speaks
of the task of philosophical analysis as breaking everything down to the level of the things
that cannot be dispensed with, and must therefore be believed to be the real existents
[Rus86]. His views, though, tend in a more foundationalist direction than Quine’s; they
do not include the supposition that all objects are potentially dispensable, only composite
objects.
Russell makes strides towards a coherent, universal philosophical language which explains
dispensability in terms of the notion of an incomplete symbol in [Rus05], and has meta-
physical considerations in mind when proposing the hierarchical language of [Rus67b]. He
believes it to be philosophically sound because it avoids his eponymous paradox for prop-
erties and sets, as well as the semantic paradoxes. Still, it is not clear on that basis that
Russell has a language of regimentation in precisely the sense that we have been assuming
here. Ramified type theory includes variables of higher order types, not just first-order
variables. Higher-order typed variables are apparently pronominal, but are they commit-
ting? Quine contests this, thinking Russell mistakenly takes predicates to be the values
of higher-order variables [Qui70, p. 66]. Whether or not Quine’s interpretation is correct,
there is another more philosophically salient concern. We saw in sections 1.4 and 1.5 that
higher-order variables which have sets or properties as their values compromise the strong
impartiality of logic. The standard interpretation of higher-order variables as having sets
of properties as values demands that the values satisfy determinate predicates: ‘x is a
set’ or ‘x is a property’. So higher-order variables are not purely objectual expressions
since they encode the information that their values are sets or properties. First-order vari-
ables in the sense that traditional Quinean commitment calls for are thought of as ranging
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over objects completely independently of those objects’ natures, preserving what I have
called a ‘division of labour’ between ontological vocabulary, denoting objects, and ideolog-
ical vocabulary, ascribing natures to those objects. So commitment to sets or properties
would proceed via a first-order existentially quantified statement ‘∃x(x is a set)’ ‘∃x(x is
a property)’, the logical form of which makes it clear that the value of the variable is an
object, posited qua set or property as laid out by the ideology. But standardly interpreted
higher-order variables, by contrast, themselves encode ideological information: the form of
the variables suggests that their values must be of a particular ideological kind. Assuming
they are logical vocabulary, this interpretation assigns to logic the task of sorting things
according to their ideological characteristics, and therefore goes against impartiality. We
will return to this issue in section 5.3 below. For the time being, though, ramified type
theory cannot really be counted as a legitimate language of regimentation under the con-
straints I have laid out. Still, that is not to say that some philosophy of logic consistent
with Russell’s views could not be formulated by some other commitmentphile, using a
mitigated version of impartiality.
3.6 Expanding the Language of Regimentation
Intuitively speaking, both existence claims and direct reference seem to have committing
force. Both the pronouns in existence claims and directly referential expressions are ob-
jectual expressions, having the semantic role of singling out an individual. To sum up the
findings of this chapter, we found that it would be convenient to expand the language of
regimentation to include at least first-order resources with individual constants in order
to accommodate the intuitively committing force of direct reference. They are especially
useful for philosophers for whom objects need not be, as Quine’s account of ontological
commitment would have it, hypostatised on the intersections of observations, but encoun-
terable directly. Ontological questions arise for philosophers of all epistemological per-
suasions, including foundationalists or foundherentists who believe in direct contact with
objects, via such methods as acquaintance or introspection, as well as holists like Quine.
But Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment is deeply entrenched in his epistemology
of global holism, and does not allow for direct access to objects to be modelled in the
language of regimentation at all, since he provides no way to commit by direct reference
using Millian names or words such as ‘I’, ‘this’, or ‘that’.
We should seek to liberate ontological commitment from these built-in epistemic con-
straints, using an epistemologically neutral language of regimentation that does not rule
out direct access by grammatical fiat. Quine’s criterion has its good points: a univocal
conception of being and a way to explicate interdependence between ontological categories
are useful tools for philosophers whatever their epistemological convictions. All this part
of the account needs is a theory translated into a formal language and closed under con-
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sequence. Non-holists can avail themselves of first-order regimentation, adding individual
constants to represent the parts of language that record instances of direct contact with
individuals. Of course, to allow constants in the syntax does not mean to mandate their
use; perhaps, as a matter of a posteriori discovery, the ontologist encounters no direct con-
tact with anything. But a language of regimentation which has the option of translating
someone as committing to objects directly is preferable to a Quinean one on which such
attempts at direct commitment are simply ungrammatical. Alternative accounts of com-
mitment, after all, have been formulated already—most clearly by Barcan Marcus, who
takes a foundationalist line, but Russell can also be read as a forerunner of a foundherentist
approach, where some objects are posited by means of descriptions, and others are subject
to direct commitment. So it is possible to encounter two philosophers, Andrea and Betty,
who differ over the existence of certain entities, one using direct commitment, the other
only indirect commitment. In such a case, both philosophers are describing their own views
coherently. Quine was concerned to show that it is perfectly possible to differ coherently
over ontology, semantic ascent revealing who endorsed the existence of which entities by
means of bound variables. But although Andrea and Betty’s differences are coherent, too,
Quine’s language of regimentation consigns Andrea’s claims of direct commitment to the
realm of the ungrammatical, even though she uses intuitively committing directly referen-
tial expressions, and she does so for principled reasons to do with her own epistemology.
The advantage of a quantified canonical language with constants is being able to translate
both into a shared language, rendering the first disputant’s theory as one that contains
constants, and the other as using only quantifiers. In that way, it shows the difference





4.1 Potential Objections to Direct or Hybrid Commitment
Our reflections thus far suggest that the best choice for a language of regimentation is
one that has at least two kinds of committing expressions: pronominal ones and directly
referential ones. There are further questions about whether impurely objectual expressions
like higher-order variables or higher-order constants, sortal-indexed names, or certain kinds
of irreducibly modal vocabulary should be taken as committing, but I will set them aside
for now since they have far-reaching effects on the philosophy of logic. We will restrict our
discussion to purely objectual committing expressions.
In the first and second chapter we saw that Quinean commitment makes a good case for
accepting objectual variables as committing expressions. Their semantic role is to range
over objects—all objects, independently of their particular characteristics, which are left
entirely to the ideology. The variables have no role other than to indicate objects, so they
seem ideally suited to the role of determining the theory’s ontology. Variables are the
committing expressions in descriptions, quantified statements and implicit commitments:
all of these amount in their regimented form to existentially quantified consequences of
the regimented theory. The natural-language analogue of such a sentence is the existence
claim: pronominal commitment is the kind of commitment engaged in when someone says
something of the form ‘There is an F ’. The Quinean line we have staked out dictates
that committing expressions must be logical expressions. Being, or objecthood, is a logical
notion. It is introduced into a theory along with the process of introducing posits on the
intersections of observations. Variables, the expressions used to mark the imposition of a
posit on such an intersection, are the ontologically committing expressions. But the idea
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that objecthood equals positing is deeply indebted to holist epistemology.
In the third chapter, we considered reasons for admitting another kind of commitment,
namely commitment via direct contact with an object. Contrast the holist picture of how
objects are introduced—on the intersections of significantly overlapping observations, as
an explanation of how the observations in question came to overlap so persistently—with
the foundationalist picture of introducing an object into a theory. The foundationalist
countenances an object when she gets it in her sights and makes contact with it. She can
then introduce a name for the individual her mind has reached out to directly. Intermedi-
ate epistemologies may admit both ways of making contact with objects, or allow names
introduced by way of descriptions but not reducible to descriptions.
What could stand in the way of either an acquaintance-based criterion of commitment, with
directly referential committing expressions, or a hybrid criterion of commitment, with two
distinct kinds of committing expressions? In the next two sections I will outline and respond
to two possible objections. One is based on traditional Quinean holism: the objection that
science should restrict itself to objects-qua-F on the grounds that objects are of theoreti-
cal importance only in virtue of their third-personally observable characteristics. Besides
ruling out any first-personal discoveries by fiat, this argument also has the disadvantage of
entailing Quine’s unattractive position that identity should be reduced to facsimile identity.
The other is not to be found in Quine, but raises a worry about a Quinean-inspired insight
from chapter 1, namely that logical grammar separates being from nature. The insight is
intimately related to the flat ontology and strong logical impartiality. By separating being
from nature, the syntax allows a division of labour between logical theory, which speaks of
the most general features of reality including objecthood, and the special sciences, which
tell us about the natures of things. So objecthood is a logical primitive on this picture.
The Quinean-inspired argument has it that variables, the ontological expressions, are log-
ical vocabulary, while all other vocabulary ascribes natures; so names must be ideology
after all. But this is itself a holist false dichotomy. For Quine, because he assumes all the-
ories start with observations, variables being eventually interposed on their intersections,
it follows that all words are either logical or ideological. But if direct epistemic access to
objects is possible, denotation without descriptive meaning is made possible as well. It
is denotation without connotation, not logicality, that is a necessary condition of being a
purely objectual committing expression. Objecthood can still be a logical primitive even
if it is not the case that all objectual expressions are logical expressions.
4.2 Objecthood and the Role of Posits in Science
Traditional Quineans will perhaps want to defend the quantificational criterion for reasons
pertaining to the philosophy of science. Although everyday discourse appears to assume
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the existence of individuals, because speakers of ordinary English are interested in talking
about them, Quineans would say that the language of science is better off restricting itself
to descriptions. Individuals only matter to a scientific theory in virtue of the things that are
truly said of them. Quinean holism mirrors science because the only relevance individuals
have is determined by their roles in the overall system. Objects-qua-F, posits located on
the intersections of observations, better characterise the role of objects in science than
individuals qua individuals. Even if we needed, say, to refer to the object which is the
centre of the universe, it is of no concern to the theory exactly which individual object it
is, only that it is the centre of the universe.
4.2.1 Method and the Third Person
Quineans who adhere to strictly third-personal methodology run up against the problem
of introspective knowledge and the use of introspective data in the sciences. A modest
characterisation of introspection is that it is a process which yields first-personal beliefs
about the subject’s own current mental states, usually by immediate access. The science
of psychology has a need for both self-reports which are introspective in that sense, and for
grammatical differentiation between self and other. For example, first-personal judgements
are reliably remembered even by patients with severe Alzheimer’s [SBK03], brain scans
reveal distinct medial prefrontal cortex activations for first-personal vs. third-personal
character trait ascriptions [HKMK07], and attitude surveys use first-personal self-reports
as their primary kind of evidence [SHS+99]. Of course, there are reasons to be sceptical of
introspective data, and philosophical arguments against the infallibility or incorrigibility
of introspective judgements [Arm63]. But the fact that there are legitimate limitations to
the use of introspective methods or the data they yield does not entail that they should
not be used at all [Mil03, p. 142], much less that they are not coherently describable.
And yet Quine’s preferred logical grammar provides no way at all of even describing direct
access to anything, including one’s own mental states. Behaviourists traditionally held that
attributing mental states to the self is in no way different from attributing mental states to
anyone else, because both are based on nothing but overtly observable behaviour [Ski84].
Quine’s logical language of regimentation makes behaviouristic methods compulsory. There
is no way to express the difference between self-attribution and other-attribution, because
no linguistic markers of ‘self’ or ‘other’ are present in its syntax. There are philosophical
reasons, as well as those based on the science of psychology, to find this unsatisfactory.
For instance, the first person is instrumental to the ‘replicative method’ [Hea86, p. 135]
of Heal’s simulation theory, in stark contrast with the third-personal method of what she
terms the ‘theory theory’.
Quine’s aim to start with observations and posit objects only on significant intersections of
them is another force, in addition to behaviourism, that drives him towards a completely
third-personal language. Grammatical categories to distinguish between the self and the
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external world suggest that the self is an object. To reify without the intermediary step of
locating such significant intersections and refer to the objects directly imperils the principle
that any posit is dispensable. But it is difficult to deny that one object at least would have
to be present to get language off the ground: namely, the observer. Even if the observer
is not a single enduring object, but a succession of observer-states, there must still be
something there, or a bundle or succession of somethings, to have the experiences for
which observation sentences are the linguistic labels. Is the observer a dispensable entity?
Quine’s language of regimentation, in which the observer is always hidden from view, does
not give us any obvious ways of formulating that question either.
The structure of Quine’s logical grammar impedes the use of any first-personal, intro-
spective, or ostensive methods in the sciences under any circumstances, even where such
methods promote the aims of science. But all scientific practice relies on the fact that there
is someone making observations. Some disciplines, such as psychology, make indispensable
use of introspective data, which cannot be shoehorned into third-personal form. So it seems
unwise to rule out in principle any way of referring to individuals, whether referentially,
ostensively or using the first person, since there are some small but significant ways in
which being able to use such expressions is a virtue in a scientific theory.
4.2.2 Direct Access and Numerical Identity
Science, in certain scenarios, must be concerned with whether the things it is about are
identical or distinct, not merely indiscernible. Numerical identity becomes especially rele-
vant when we are interested in the cardinality of a theory or the cardinality of a particular
kind within it. Since it is logically possible for indiscernibles to be distinct, it is far from
obvious that indiscernibility will do to answer the question of how many objects of a certain
kind there are in a theory’s ontology. Suppose Sally the scientist is collecting statistics, and
finds two data points that are indiscernible according to her best theory, but discernible
ostensively. They have all the same structural properties and relations as far as the de-
scriptive resources of the theory are concerned, but Sally can clearly perceive two objects,
and distinguish between them by using a demonstrative or a first-personal statement, like
‘x satisfies all the same predicates as y, but x is closer to me than y is’, or by introducing
constants or proper names: ‘I call the F object closest to me “a”, and the one that is
qualitatively indiscernible but distinct from it “b”’. Prima facie it seems like a good idea
for Sally to do so, because it is useful for her to know when two data points are two rather
than one. Employing only descriptive, not directly referential, resources in this case would
lead to under-counting of statistics. Getting the numbers of data points wrong leaves the
testability of the theory compromised. Perhaps keeping a record of exactly which individ-
uals’ properties were part of the observations of a theory is also helpful for the purposes of
refinement, confirmation or disconfirmation. If individuals are identified as test subjects,
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researchers can return to those same individuals to check whether those same individu-
als may have had additional properties, originally left out of consideration, that caused
anomalies, interfered with tests, or were otherwise relevant to the theory.
4.2.3 Posits and Identity
Quine’s insistence on a wholly third-personal language can thus lead to getting the num-
bers wrong, incorrectly identifying descriptively indiscernible but distinct things. Quine
acknowledges that on our ordinary conception of identity being indiscernible according to
a theory, even the best available theory, does not suffice for numerical identity. Still, he
advocates replacing ordinary identity with a defined facsimile in logical languages, reading
‘x = y’ as short for some clause that expresses indiscernibility according to the predicates
of that language. His argument is that even though in ordinary language it is coherent to
say that two things can be distinct and yet descriptively indiscernible, all that matters for
logical purposes is that we cannot tell them apart if we are working within the language
[Qui70, p. 63]. But his argument only holds if no proper names can be assigned directly,
and also fails to account for Sally who distinguishes her objects ostensively.
Indiscernibility-within-the-theory, Quine’s ‘serviceable facsimile’, is not needed for logical
rigour; ‘being the same thing’ is sufficiently rigorous, especially because the identity relation
can be explained in model-theoretic terms as ‘the relation which partitions the domain into
singleton equivalence classes’. Quine’s facsimile need not coincide with such a relation. In
chapter 3 we considered Ramsey’s critique of a similar defined analogue of identity in
Principia Mathematica because it stipulates that it is contradictory that two indiscernible
things are distinct [Ram31, p. 31]. Ramsey’s criticism applies to Quine’s fascimile too.
Take Quine’s own example of the identity facsimile for a language with a one-place predicate
‘A’, two two-place predicates ‘B’ and ‘C’, and a three-place predicate ‘D’. In that language,
‘x = y’ is defined as ‘Ax ≡ Bx ∧ ∀z(Bzx ≡ Bzy ∧ Bxz ≡ Byz ∧ Czx ≡ Czy ∧ Cxz ≡
Cyz ∧ ∀z′(Dzz′x ≡ Dzz′y ∧ Dzxz′ ≡ Dzyz′ ∧ Dxzz′ ≡ Dyzz′))’. Given that definition,
of course in that particular language ‘Ax ≡ Bx ∧ ∀z(Bzx ≡ Bzy ∧ Bxz ≡ Byz ∧ Czx ≡
Czy ∧ Cxz ≡ Cyz ∧ ∀z′(Dzz′x ≡ Dzz′y ∧ Dzxz′ ≡ Dzyz′ ∧ Dxzz′ ≡ Dyzz′)) ∧ x 6= y’
is by stipulation contradictory. That does nothing to allay our worries that a model can
easily be found where two distinct objects are indiscernible with respect to ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’
and ‘D’. It just shows that the defined facsimile does not pick out the relation of identity.
No matter how detailed the description, a description of the properties of x and y can
never entail that x = y for the ordinary, non-facsimile identity predicate.
Ramsey’s point is especially salient because first philosophy is not an option for holists
like Quine. He cannot declare that it is a priori that only third-personal or behaviouristic
methods are scientifically acceptable; they should prevail only if they are empirically better
than all others. In the case of theory change, we might have two things that are descrip-
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tively indiscernible, facsimile-identical, according to one theory, but discernible by a new,
improved theory. Obviously the two things were not actually identical before; they were
always two, not one. In the home language it is very natural to say that, but what does the
regimented language have to say about it? The pragmatist answer is that we must continue
to work within our best theory. Now that we have access to a new, improved theory, we
can say with hindsight that although we used to have good reason to identify the two, it
became apparent that that part of the old theory was false. We can now speak truly with
the help of our new best theory. In some cases, this is reasonable. But it does not apply
to Sally the scientist. She had good reason not to identify the two visibly distinct data
points, but no third-personal expressive resources to avoid it.
4.2.4 Carnap’s Predicament: Identity and ‘Objectivity’
A slightly different case of multiple individuals that are indistinguishable for the purposes
of the theory is what Carnap calls ‘homotopic points’ in the Aufbau. Homotopes have
all their characteristics according to the theory in common: they are structurally indis-
cernible.
‘Let us look at a railroad map . . . all stations are marked as points, but the
map is not to contain any names nor any entries other than rail lines. The
question now is: can we determine the names of the points on the map through
an inspection of the actual railroad network? . . . what happens if there are
two intersections for which we cannot find any difference even after surveying
the entire system? This simply means that there are two points with identical
structural characteristics (homotopic points) as far as the relation to neigh-
boring railroad stations is concerned. We would rather that this relation does
not suffice to give a definite description of the objects of the given object do-
main. We would have to take recourse to ostensive definitions or to one or
more other relations . . . how can we produce a definite description if all of these
relations do not suffice? . . . If we are still left with two homotopic elements of
the object domain, then we simply have two locations that are geographically
indistinguishable. If we then move on to a new type of relation and take into
account all historical relations between the locations, etc., we shall ultimately
have used up all the concepts of the cultural as well as the physical sciences.
If there should still be two locations for which we have found no difference
even after exhausting all available scientific relations, then they are indistin-
guishable, not only for geography, but for science in general. They may be
subjectively different: I could be in one of these locations, but not in the other.
But this would not amount to an objective difference, since there would be in
the other place a man just like myself, who says, as I do: I am here and not
there.’ [Car67, pp. 25-27]
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Some directly referential vocabulary has to be used to distinguish one point from the other.
If there is good evidence to believe that there are exactly two such locations, it is possible to
assign names to both. One name can be assigned directly, and the other can be assigned by
description and function as a directly referential expression. If Jane is at one indiscernible
end of a symmetrical universe and Elizabeth is at the other, they each baptise their location
by ostension, and the other descriptively: e.g. ‘I call my own location “a”, and the one
which is indiscernible from a at which I am not, “b”.’
It is uncomfortable to be pushed towards Carnap’s position, that two locations which share
all their structural properties, but differ in which observers are located at them, differ only
‘subjectively’, not ‘objectively’. The difference between being two and being one is as ob-
jective a difference as any. But it is difficult for Quine not to end up in his own version of
Carnap’s predicament: that descriptive discernibility is objective, while ostensive discerni-
bility is only subjective. For if two things are discernible, there must be some open formula
that is satisfied by one but not the other, describable in purely ‘objective’, third-personally
accessible terms belonging to the ideology. But if the observer can distinguish the two
things only ostensively or first-personally, then there is no ‘objective’—i.e. third-personal,
ideological—reason to posit more than one thing. Embracing the ‘subjective/objective’
boundary here is not only intuitively uncomfortable, it also looks suspiciously like first
philosophy. ‘Subjective’ seems to be a pejorative label given to ostensive discernibility just
because it isn’t ideological or structural. But why should that mean it is not an acceptable
method, when it is the only way to distinguish one thing from another?
Quine could try to escape Carnap’s predicament by appealing to his grades of discernibility
[Qui76]. Homotopic points x and y are not absolutely (or relatively) discernible: there isn’t
some open sentence one does and the other does not satisfy. They are weakly discernible:
there is some relational open sentence that the pair < x, y > satisfies but the pair < x, x >
does not: for Carnap’s example of railway nodes that might be something like ‘x is 25
miles from y’. But even this is dubious without direct access to objects. How can Quine
be entitled to help himself to the pair < x, y >, where x is distinct from y? It must be
because x and y are distinct values of variables in the domain. How did they get there?
They must have been posited at some point, in the usual way. Positing happens when an
objectual expression is assigned to an object which is hypostatised on the intersection of
observations. But the two indiscernibles fulfil all the same observable descriptions. So how
could they amount to two posits? Why does one get to be x and the other y? To say that
one is distinct from the other, one has to be assigned a different objectual expression, like
a name or variable, from the other. But if this cannot happen descriptively, and ostensive
methods are barred, it cannot happen at all. Quine’s characterisation of weak discernibility
comes down to the following: two objects are weakly discernible if there is some relation
in which the first stands to the second, but not to itself. Of course, this assumes identity
in the old-fashioned, ‘subjective’ sense: things already have to be identical or distinct tout
court to be able to stand in some relation to something else but not to themselves. But
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if ordinary, non-facsimile, identity is assumed for weak discernibility, it clearly cannot be
used to escape Carnap’s predicament. Perhaps admitting that identity is a logical relation,
sameness of thing, rather than an amalgam of ideologically pure predicates, is the best way
out.
To sum up, the argument that science demands of us that we restrict ourselves to objects-
qua-F, since it is only concerned with objects insofar as they are posits playing a particular
role in a system, is questionable. Quine’s insistence on a purely third-personal language,
leaving the first person out of the syntax altogether, seems linked to his own behaviourism
more than to empirical evidence. There is no reason to suppose that banning all direct
reference to objects, such as self-attribution of attitudes, introspection, or ostensive defi-
nition, is what is best for scientific methodology. A second disadvantage is that it entails
Quine’s unattractive view of identity as indiscernibility according to the predicates of our
current theory. It it is difficult to see how Quine can escape Carnap’s predicament of con-
signing the numerical difference between two homotopic points to the realm of the merely
subjective.
4.3 Must Committing Expressions be Logical Expressions?
There is another argument for sticking with Quine’s quantificational criterion of commit-
ment without directly referential expressions. This argument is not made by Quine, but
extrapolated from a useful property of his language of regimentation which we identified
in section 1.5: its ability to separate being from nature in its grammar. The argument in
favour of retaining only Quinean commitment is that adding directly referential committing
expressions potentially jeopardises the insight that logical grammar separates being from
nature. The claim is that committing expressions must be logical expressions, as being,
or objecthood, is a logical primitive, and variables represent objecthood by their role of
introducing a posit.
4.3.1 Objecthood, Variables and Strong Impartiality
Part of the point of regimentation—in addition to its clear consequence relation and its
capacity to explain implicit commitments and reduction—is that the pronouns of logic
present beings just as beings. Logic has the capacity to separate natures from object-
hood because it does not discriminate according to nature. Logical vocabulary is an ideal
medium for settling existence questions because it sets apart an object from its charac-
teristics, considering it only qua object—what its nature is is left to the ideology. In 1.5,
we called this aspect of logic impartiality. The kind of impartiality I am assuming is not
the mitigated impartiality which higher-order commitment, for instance, would demand,
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but strong impartiality. Logic does not order, arrange or exclude any objects based on
their natures: it treats them all equally. There is no way of grouping objects in first-order
logic except as members of the domain. The special sciences, theories which use logical
theory as a backdrop, explicate the natures of things, and end up positing objects where
those natures usefully intersect. Logic itself only plays the role of collecting all objects
together to be spoken of by the sciences. There is a division of labour between the logical
vocabulary, whose business it is only to talk of the most general features of reality, includ-
ing objecthood, existence, truth and entailment, and the ideological vocabulary, which the
special sciences use to categorise things according to their natures. Quantified logic is the
most general theory of objects—all objects. If it were to miss out a single one, it could not
be logic because it would no longer be the most general theory: the theory that was about
all objects including that one excluded individual would be. So objects (and truth) form
part of the subject matter of logic; natures, on the other hand, are provided by the special
sciences. The impartiality of logic is a vaguely Quinean insight I want to preserve, and even
strengthen. I think that it is independently defensible; the arguments for it will emerge
in chapter 5. What I do not take it to imply is that all committing expressions must be
logical expressions; let us turn to this idea, which will reveal itself to be an objectionable
vestige of Quineanism.
4.3.2 Why Quine’s Committing Expressions Are Logical Expressions
According to Quine’s story of theory formation which we came across in 1.3.2, when reifi-
cation is introduced into a fledgling theory, the observation sentences are spliced into an
objectual part, the variable, and an ideological part, the predicate. The former denotes a
being, the latter ascribes a nature to that being. The observation sentences made up the
non-logical vocabulary of the holophrastic theory, and the predicates are what remains of
them after the novel logical form has been imposed on them. For Quine, thing-language is
a subset of logical language; all non-logical vocabulary ascribes natures. The interpretation
of Quine put forward in chapter 1 proposed that Quinean logic can be described as having
the notion of objecthood as one of its primitives, since the objectual expressions are logical
expressions. The clean separation of logical from non-logical vocabulary that is guaranteed
by Quine’s language of regimentation ensures that no information bleeds into the objec-
tual expressions. In natural languages, pronouns sometimes carry information: by using
‘he’, rather than ‘she’, we communicate that the subject is male. But logical variables are
purely objectual. In chapter 2 we noted that because the presence of an object can be
indicated in a logical language of regimentation without any information about natures,
such a language lays to rest all speculation about different types of existence or being: all
there is to being a thing is being in the domain. Anything of which something can be truly
predicated has being because it is in the domain—and if a condition ϕ is not satisfied,
there are no such things as ϕs. There is exactly one kind of genuinely ontological idiom,
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the variable, and it is univocal because it is logical.
It is specifically quantification theory that is impartial, because impartiality is a feature
of quantified logic—sentential logics do not speak of objects, so they cannot be said to
treat them all equally, except vacuously. The variables in particular exemplify impartial-
ity. They range over all objects in the domain without regard for their specific properties.
So Quineans will want to draw the conclusion that objectual words, committing expres-
sions, are committing specifically because they are logical. First-order predicate logic, on
this view, has objecthood as one of its primitives because it is able to speak of objecthood
exclusively, without mixing in anything ideological. Regimented theories are an advance
over natural-language theories because of their grammatical separation between ontology
and ideology that allows them to discuss being without interference from nature. But if
variables are univocal and express nothing except that their values are objects, specifically
because they are logical, then directly referential expressions cannot be committing, be-
cause they are not logical expressions. Since they are not logical, they belong with the
ideology.
4.3.3 Committing Expressions: Presenting an Object in Isolation from
Its Nature
The conclusion of the previous section relies on a false dichotomy inherited from Quine’s
holist view of language and epistemology. The only reason to suppose that all vocabu-
lary except sentential operators is either logico-ontological or ideological is the peculiarly
Quinean view of theory-formation which states that all language must begin with feature-
placing observations, variables being eventually interposed where they overlap. But that
assumption will be rejected by epistemologists who allow for the possibility of direct con-
tact with objects. Quine’s variables model commitment to a thing encountered in some
theoretical role or other, where the commitment is to whatever satisfies the description
that fits that theoretical role. This is indirect commitment, mediated by a description,
and, for Quine, it is strongly holist: thought cannot reach out to an object except via the
medium of a complete theory. Constants, on the other hand, can model direct commit-
ment: a commitment incurred by linguistically registering some unmediated contact with
an entity. Although in science, we are much more likely to need mediated commitment, we
saw in the previous section that direct commitment may sometimes be useful for scientific
purposes, e.g. where the question of privileged access is concerned. And of course there are
the famous philosophical cases of purported direct commitment. Descartes, by thinking ‘I
exist’, commits to his own existence.
Although impartiality is a key feature of logic, it is not clear that logic’s not discriminating
according to nature entails that only logical expressions can be ontologically committing.
The role of the variables comprises both 1. standing for objects generally, not for some
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object in particular, and 2. being assigned values by the interpretation directly, without
any aid from the ideology. That impartial discourse is possible is a prerequisite for both
those roles. It is only possible to range over all objects if all and only the objects can be
collected together in some way. If something is left out of any collection because of its
nature, no truly general ranging is possible. Standing for some object directly, without
requiring any descriptive intermediary, can only be done if some expression is available
that can single out an object without first needing to describe some characteristic of that
object. None of this entails that only logical expressions can be committing.
Words like proper names, or ‘I’, or ‘that’, are not logical expressions. Neither are their
formal analogues, constants. Unlike variables, they do not range over all objects generally.
They stand for specific individuals. But in formal languages, constants are assigned values
from the domain just like variables are. The only difference is that the interpretation of
variables requires that there are alternative assignments, while constants simply single out
their unique referents. So although constants are non-logical, they do usefully separate an
object from its properties in the way that ontological commitment demands. Constants
refer without any need to invoke descriptions of what is true of that thing; in Mill’s phrase,
they have denotations, but no connotations [Mil84, p. 182]. Any expression that de-
notes without connoting sets apart the object it denotes from its properties, because those
properties are not involved in the semantics of assigning a denotation to the expression.
Constants are certainly not logical, but neither are directly referential expressions ideology
as defined by Quine—‘what ideas can be expressed’ [Qui51b, p. 14]—because they con-
vey no lexical information. Insofar as a directly referential expression has ‘meaning’, its
meaning is just its referent. As a result, it might be thought that proper names also fulfil
the requirement for ontologically committing expressions that they carry no information
about the natures of their bearers. If ‘denotes without connoting’ is a sufficient condition
for being a committing expression, both names and variables are viable candidates.
4.3.4 What is a Logical Primitive?
But if it isn’t the case that all objectual or committing expressions have to be logical
expressions, can it still be maintained that objects are part of the subject matter of logic,
or that objecthood is a logical primitive? Yes, because something can be a primitive of a
system in more ways than one.
The Quinean argument is that objecthood is a logical primitive because the denoting
expressions, variables, are a subset of the logical expressions. But there are several ways
to disambiguate what ‘primitive’ means. A primitive may be an indispensable piece of
vocabulary which cannot be dropped from the regimented language or paraphrased away.
I will call this a lexical primitive. If something cannot be analysed, reduced by paraphrase,
or simply dropped from the theory, it must be included in the lexicon as a primitive
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predicate. This is the sense in which, for instance, Williamson thinks that knowledge is
primitive [Wil00b]. Attempts to analyse knowledge into justified true belief or justified
true belief plus a fourth condition fail because there are counterexamples of cases which
are knowledge, but not justified true belief, or justfied true belief plus a fourth condition.
Any theory which replaces statements about knowledge with statements about justified
true belief is deficient from an explanatory point of view, compared to theories that do not
analyse knowledge.
Objecthood is not a lexical primitive of first-order logic, since according to Quine logic
has no lexicon, so it cannot have primitive predicates. A different sense of ‘primitive’ is
one in which a primitive of a system is an ineliminable grammatical construction. When
Quine, arguing for ostrich nominalism, asserts ‘[t]hat the houses and roses and sunsets are
all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible’ [Qui48, p. 30], he has this kind
of primitivism in mind. According to him, trying to explain away predication, giving an
analysis of it, fails just as much as analyses of knowledge are bound to fail, but not in quite
the same way. A Gettier case will show that ‘justified true belief’ is not everywhere substi-
tutable for ‘knowledge’ because the subject in the Gettier case has justified true belief, but
does not have what we would like to call knowledge. So the word ‘knowledge’ is indispens-
able. Analyses of predication fail because they do not show the grammatical construction
of predication to be obsolete. An analysis of ‘Fx’ as ‘x has F -ness’ does not eliminate
predication as such, since the proposed analysis still contains a predicate, namely ‘has’. So
predication is a grammatical primitive. The Quinean presumption that objecthood must
be logical because variables are logical vocabulary appears to rely on the assumption that
quantification is also an ineliminable grammatical construction. Without quantifiers and
variables we cannot talk about objects at all; we would be reduced to a feature-placing
language, with the expressive strength of sentential logic. As a conclusion strictly about
the syntax of the language of regimentation, this concern is misguided. Quinean canonical
notation can be transformed without loss of information into a Schönfinkeled [Sch24] lan-
guage which contains no quantifiers or variables as grammatical categories, but is still to
all intents and purposes a first-order language [Qui60a]. A theory in Quinean canonical no-
tation and its translation into a Schönfinkeled idiom would have exactly the same models.
So the insight that objecthood is a logical primitive is not derived from the grammatical
primitiveness of quantification or the variables, but from their interpretation. Converseley,
in a language that does contain quantifiers and variables as grammatical primitives, adding
another category of committing expression does not endanger their primitive status in the
syntax.
Lastly, there are semantic primitives. They are the ones that perform a function in an
interpreted language that cannot be dispensed with without either impairing its expres-
sive power or derailing the interpretation completely. Truth is semantically primitive in
sentential logic, because its interpretation is spelled out in terms of truth values. But the
semantically primitive status of truth does not dictate what expressions are used to intro-
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duce it. In the case of sentential logic, the semantics need to include some truth-functional
operators that are sufficient to express all possible truth functions. But as long as that
condition is met, it is immaterial whether it is done with the help of five connectives, or
two, or one. A sentential logic with only one connective (e.g. the Scheffer stroke) will
have longer sentences and bear less resemblance to the structure of natural languages like
English. It has fewer logical expressions and fewer grammatical primitives, but exactly
the same semantic primitives. Similarly, standing for objects is an ineliminable semantic
function that something must perform in a quantified logic, but it does not follow that
only variables may fill this role. If objecthood is a logical notion, direct contact with an
object is logically possible. So objecthood can be a logical primitive even though directly
referential constants are present in the theory, or co-exist with objectual variables.
4.4 The Role of Objects in Logic
The arguments offered for the position that only logical vocabulary is capable of singling
out an object in isolation from its particular nature do not stand up to scrutiny. So the idea
that directly referential expressions are plausible committing expressions can be upheld,
on the grounds that they denote without connoting, and are therefore purely objectual
expressions. But if direct commitment is to be an option, it must be the case that objects
can be denoted unambiguously. Objects must have sufficient metaphysical standing to
be capable of being referred to in two different ways, generally and by direct particular
reference. To be able to compare and translate first-order theories that have constants
to those that lack them, we need a sufficiently robust conception of objecthood that is
invariant between theories. We will return to the specific question of regimentation into
canonical notation in chapter 6. I will then demonstrate that a conception of objecthood
compatible with both holist and non-holist epistemologies can be devised and put to use
in order to facilitate translation of both direct and indirect commitment, preventing a
breakdown of communications between holists and non-holists.
Traditional Quinean commitment, as I have argued in chapter 1, makes it natural to think
of objecthood as a logical notion. The particular quasi-Quinean argument that objects must
be posits hypostatised on the confluence of intersecting observations and that hypostasis
is done with the help of logical vocabulary is not as epistemology-neutral as we would
wish, as it is informed by holism, so not all commitmentphiles will want to endorse it.
But the thesis that objecthood is a logical notion may well be plausible independently of
those arguments, and can be supported with the help of a realist philosophy of logic. We
have already seen in this chapter that purely referential expressions, non-logical as well as
logical, can be used to separate objecthood from ideological characteristics: they denote
without connoting. In the next chapter we will investigate how commitmentphiles who are
not Quineans in all respects can improve on Quine’s criteria of logicality, proposing a realist
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philosophy of logic which maintains that objecthood is a logical notion, but defending this
idea in an epistemology-neutral way.
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Chapter 5
An Impartial Logic: Realism and
Logicality
Objecthood can count as a logical primitive even in formal languages whose objectual ex-
pressions are not a subset of the logical expressions, as long as objects and their most
general characteristics are part of the subject matter of logic. This much is clear from
the previous chapter; in the present chapter we will revisit the philosophy of logic and the
question of logicality: what sets logic apart from the special sciences? First, there is a
sceptical challenge to be answered: can logic be about objects at all? Second, what criteria
should a theory meet to be worthy of the name of logic? The sceptical question and the log-
icality question are intertwined, since it is often suggested that the measure of logicality is
topic-neutrality, which in turn is interpreted as having no subject matter. We will examine
various disambiguations of topic-neutrality, and find this particular one, having no subject
matter at all, to be inadequate. Topic-neutrality is best understood, not as being capable
of being true even where no objects exist at all, but as treating all objects impartially. So
it is perfectly coherent for logic to have a subject matter that includes objects in general,
though not objects of some special rarefied kind. The answer to the logicality question,
or what sets logic apart from the special sciences, also draws upon its generality and im-
partiality. The difference between logic and other disciplines is not a difference in kind,
but of level of generality. Criteria for logicality do not include a complete lack of subject
matter, but do include epistemic topic-neutrality (being applicable to all areas of enquiry),
and ideological topic-neutrality (not positing any special kinds). Both are compatible with
logic incorporating the notion of a being or object, and therefore being a useful vehicle
for asking and answering questions of ontology, which aims to provide an inventory of the
beings. I will develop a realist philosophy of logic, based on the idea that logic is about
the most general features of reality. It is designed to complement a commitment-based
approach to meta-ontology, and to be compatible with all epistemologies congenial to re-
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alism, whether they take a foundationalist, foundherentist or holist approach to contact
with objects.
Section 5.1 is concerned with different disambiguations of ‘topic-neutrality’: epistemic,
ontological, or ideological neutrality. A theory is epistemically neutral iff it is applicable
to any area of discourse whatsoever. On the metaphysical side of topic-neutrality, a the-
ory may qualify for logicality by being neutral on what things there are (ontological), or
on how they are (ideological). Ideological neutrality is interpreted as impartiality—not
discriminating on the basis of nature—and as such is compatible with having a subject
matter. Logic should not exclude any particular thing from its remit because of its nature,
or because of what can be said of it in the ideology, but this only entails that it speaks of
reality in the most general terms, not that it does not speak of reality at all.
The focus of 5.2 and 5.3 is the idea that ontological neutrality is to be identified with onto-
logical sterility. An ontologically sterile theory is one that has no existential consequences
at all. But sterility is not the only possible reading of ‘being neutral on what things there
are’, nor is sterility independently attractive. Explicit arguments for sterility are few, but
the clearest case in favour is the Kantian line, which presents logic as a discipline which is
exclusively concerned with the form of thought; it cannot in any sense be about objects,
which comprise the matter of a theory. Hence logical truths are true no matter what,
independently of whether there is anything at all. The sharp Kantian dichotomy between
theories that are about reality and logical theory which is true independently of reality
makes it difficult to explain the continuity between logical truths and other truths. After
all, true representations are true because they represent reality correctly, and logical truths
are as true as any.
Although he rejects the form/matter, language/world duality, Quine too is often read as a
proponent of ontological sterility. Although he repudiates second-order logic because of its
‘staggering existential assumptions’, this does not entail that logic must have absolutely
no existential consequences, much less that all commitmentphiles are bound to accept this
view. Quine’s argument is brief and allusive, but it appears to trade on an ambiguity in
the interpretation of ‘no existential consequences’, which may mean either ‘not entailing
the existence of any objects’ or ‘not positing any kinds’. Logic only treats of objects qua
elements of the domain, not qua their specific natures. As the most general theory, it should
not have commitments-qua-F. But the idea that no theory which entails an existence claim
can be logic is strictly false, as rules out first-order logic, too, which entails ‘∃x(x = x)’.
This is not a commitment to an entity-qua-F ; nothing is specified about x ’s nature. It
features only qua object. Logic’s being neutral does not entail that it tells us nothing
about what objects there are, or how they are, but that it confines itself to speaking of
objects in the most general terms. It does not discriminate between objects on the basis
of their natures, which are described in the special sciences. This accords with the flat
ontology requirement: there aren’t different levels of being, everything is equally existent,
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and posited, independently of its characteristics.
5.1 Topic-Neutrality: Epistemic, Ontological, Ideological
What makes a theory, or language, logical? In 1.5 Quine’s answers to the logicality question
were considered and found wanting: like so many other aspects of his view, they are steeped
in behaviourism and global holism. But what really sets logic apart from the special
sciences, and is it compatible with being about objects, or objecthood? Many philosophers
of logic, Quineans and non-Quineans alike, balk at the suggestion that objects are included
in the subject matter of logic. Logic, after all, is supposed to be a topic-neutral discipline
[Ryl54, p. 116], [Haa78, p. 5]. It may seem an intuitive consequence of topic-neutrality that
logic has no subject matter of its own. But this sceptical challenge to logical realism, I think,
relies upon a failure to recognise the ambiguity in ‘topic-neutrality’. The project of this
section will be to precisify the notion of topic-neutrality and to consider the implications
of the different viable candidates for the label.
Although the idea that logic is topic-neutral is an attractive one, exactly how to characterise
topic-neutrality is a fraught question. Calling logic topic-neutral certainly sounds right, in
a way. Logic holds sway over any domain whatsoever, and its rules apply to any area of
enquiry. The laws of quantification are equally valid whether the topic under discussion
is nineteenth-century history, or politics, or mathematics. No type of knowledge fails
to be governed by logic; logic is broad enough to encompass all of them without either
privileging or excluding any kind of content, or any group of individuals. Its broad and
non-discriminatory applications make ‘neutral’ a fitting term. But what exactly does this
neutrality consist in?
The term ‘topic-neutral’ was coined by Ryle in the following passage:
We may call English expressions ‘topic-neutral’ if a foreigner who understood
them, but only them, could get no clue at all from an English paragraph con-
taining them what that paragraph was about ... “not”, “and”, “all”, “some”,
“a”, “the”, “is”, “is a member of” etc. certainly are topic-neutral, but so are
“several”, “most”, “few”, “three”, “half”, “although”, “because”, “perhaps”,
“may” ... ’ [Ryl54, p. 116]
Ryle’s interpretation of topic-neutrality is epistemic: the topic-neutral expressions are
those expressions that do not enable the reader or hearer to gain any knowledge of what
the utterances in which they feature are about. One drawback of his statement of topic-
neutrality is that the topic-neutral expressions, thus defined, are not all and only the logical
expressions. His definition is not extensionally adequate for logicality. Even Ryle’s initial
list, “‘not”, “and”, “all”, “some”, “a”, “the”, “is”, “is a member of” etc.’ contains some
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non-logical expressions: the predicate ‘x is a member of y’ belongs to set theory. It is a
mathematical expression, not a logical one. Adherents of Quine’s substitutional theory of
logical consequence would deny that the ‘is’ of identity belongs with the logical vocabulary
[Qui70, p. 63].
Ryle’s approach is also suspect because the notion of ‘being about’ that it crucially relies
upon is rather vague. Does he mean that logical expressions are about nothing in partic-
ular? But if so, should that be read as meaning that there are no things that they are
about, or are they about everything, about things in general? Boolos notes that ‘being
about’ is ambiguous between ontology and ideology. A theory is about the elements of
its domain, in one sense of ‘about’. But in a closely related sense of ‘about,’ it is equally
about what its predicates and operators express: ‘Is elementary arithmetic really not about
addition, but only about numbers? ... [Logic] can easily be said to be about the notions
of negation, conjunction, identity, and the notions expressed by “all” and “some” among
others’ [Boo75, p. 517]. This leaves open the question of the subject matter of logic.
Ryle’s epistemic reading of topic-neutrality stipulates that the topic-neutral expressions
are those that do not give away anything about what the utterance as a whole is about.
But there is no direct route from this to the metaphysical conclusion that logic has no
subject matter. Ryle’s claim does not enable him to say, for instance, that logic should be
true in the absence of anything for it to be about. If anything it suggests the opposite:
that topic-neutral expressions can only exist in tandem with expressions that do make it
clear what they are about. For more metaphysical interpretations of topic-neutrality, we
need something more than Ryle’s original statement.
Lastly, Ryle’s use of the term ‘topic-neutrality’ differs from the contemporary one because
Ryle restricts its application to expressions. But other philosophers who use the term
usually speak of logic itself as a topic-neutral discipline [Boo75, p. 517], [Haa78, p. 5],
[Mac00, p. 69], though [Lyc89] is an exception. For our purposes it will be more useful to
extend the usage to theories or parts of theories.
5.1.1 Epistemic Topic-Neutrality
There are several potential ways of spelling out topic-neutrality, some of which are mutually
exclusive, some compatible. The first distinction to make is that topic-neutrality can be
thought of as either an epistemic or a metaphysical criterion.1 Ryle’s topic-neutrality was
1There are various kinds of similar distinctions in the literature, but they all seem to differ from each
other, as well as from mine, in their key features. Linnebo [Lin03] distinguishes epistemic from metaphysical
neutrality, but means by epistemic neutrality that knowledge of logic cannot draw on extra-logical resources.
MacFarlane also complains about the vagueness of ‘aboutness’ in topic-neutrality [Mac00, p. 69]. He
suggests that topic-neutrality can be given an epistemic or a metaphysical reading. Unlike me, he thinks of
these as irreconcilable approaches. It is a matter of deciding whether one’s logic is epistemically based or
semantically based, and then tailoring topic-neutrality to mean either inferential harmony or permutation
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found to be clearly epistemic in nature, but brought us no closer to answering the question
of logical subject matter. Epistemic topic-neutrality need not rely on a vague notion of
aboutness. We can take it instead to be the Fregean idea that what is characteristic of
logic is its universal applicability. Logical rules govern ‘everything thinkable’; logic as a
theory is useful to absolutely any area of enquiry. Epistemic neutrality in this sense shows
up in Quine’s writing under the name of ‘versatile ancillarity’.
Epistemic neutrality or versatile ancillarity is an appealing necessary condition for the log-
icality of a theory, but it cannot, except perhaps for logicists, be a sufficient one. As Frege
himself notes, a similar claim can be made about arithmetic: it also applies to anything
thinkable, because anything whatsoever can be counted [Fre80a, p. 21]. But statements
about numbers are not mere rules with no presumed metaphysical consequences. Mathe-
matics as a discipline asserts that numbers exist. They are objects that apply to everything.
(Or almost everything, since there is no number of all numbers. The implications of para-
dox are vast, but one aspect of it will be touched upon in section 5.3.) Even those who
deny the existence of numbers usually acknowledge that if mathematics is true, it entails
such existence claims. They take the burden of proof to lie with them to either give a
reductive account of numbers or declare mathematics to be false or vacuously true [Fie80].
Quine takes the paradigm of a committing science to be physics, and commitment to math-
ematical entities to be licensed only by their indispensability to physics [Qui81d]. But he,
too, ascribes ‘versatile ancillarity’ to mathematics [Qui70, p. 98]. For present purposes,
we may take epistemic topic-neutrality as a necessary condition of logicality, but it is not
the kind of neutrality that is relevant to the central question of this chapter. Epistemic
neutrality so defined does not tell us anything about whether logic has a subject matter,
or, if so, what it consists in. If arithmetic, with its many posits, can lay claim to epistemic
neutrality as much as logic can, this kind of neutrality does not rule out that logic is about
objects.
5.1.2 Disambiguating Ideological Topic-Neutrality
So we must turn to the metaphysical side of topic-neutrality. This in turn has two separate
aspects: being neutral on what things there are, or being neutral on how things are. Call
them ontological and ideological neutrality, respectively. The phrase is borrowed from
Lewis who deploys it in the context of truth’s dependence on being: ‘I want to construe
‘being’ broadly: it covers not only whether things are, but also how they are’ [Lew99, p.
206]. 2
invariance [Mac09, sections 4-6]. I do not think of epistemic and metaphysical topic-neutrality in my sense
as being in tension; a logical realist can adopt both.
2Quine, although at times he conflates the two, touches on both ontological and ideological neutrality.
He states that what sets logic apart from the other sciences is ‘the lack of special subject matter’. He
elaborates: ‘logic favors no distinctive portion of the lexicon, and neither does it favor one subdomain
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A smooth but erroneous path from topic-neutrality to absence of subject matter is to
interpret ‘remaining neutral on what things there are and how they are’ as ‘saying nothing
about what things there are and how they are’. This would result in a stringent standard
for logicality: that any theory worthy of the name of logic tells us nothing at all about
what things there are and how they are. There is even a more stringent standard around,
which demands that logic must be true even in situations where there is nothing at all.
This latter view is associated with Kant. It will be discussed in more detail in section 5.2,
but even without in-depth analysis of what demands this places on logic, there are plenty
of reasons to resist this view of ‘remaining neutral’. Remaining neutral on something is
more fruitfully interpreted as not discriminating, or speaking of it only in the most general
terms.
Logic Is Continuous with Other Sciences
One argument for topic-neutrality as non-discrimination, which is more harmonious with
the position that logic is about the world, has its roots in Frege. Frege avers that logic is
concerned with the most general laws of truth [Fre79b, p. 128]. Truth consists in agreement
between representation and reality. Though Frege himself expresses some reservations on
this front [Fre79b, p. 129], virtually all theories of truth have this in common: that a
true representation is true because the way it represents things as being is in fact the way
things are. This brings to mind again Lewis’s point about the relationship between being
and truth: truth depends on ‘whether [the things that the representation represents] are,
but also how they are’ [namely, as the representation makes them out to be, or not]. To
insist that logic must remain silent on anything to do with reality, or worse, must remain
true in the absence of any reality whatsoever, forces a separation between logical truth
and ordinary truth. Logical truth so conceived cannot consist, like ordinary truth, in an
agreement between representation and reality. Logical realism finds this unsatisfactory and
proposes instead that logical truths do represent reality correctly. Logical representations
just concentrate on much more general aspects of reality. Logic is a theory in exactly the
sense that all other theories are: it differs from them not in kind, but in level of generality.
Logic is continuous with the special sciences: more general, but not a wholly different kind
of theory.
of values of variables over another’ [Qui70, p. 98]. What exactly ‘favor’ means here is a little unclear.
Does it mean that logic does not supply its own predicates or beings, that there are no distinctively logical
individuals, or distinctively logical characteristics? Or does it mean that logic does not practise favouritism,
that nothing is excluded from consideration by logic, and no predicates are too outlandish to be governed
by logical principles? Quine’s remarks on the matter of ontological and ideological neutrality are brief and
sketchy, and the most notorious of those remarks is no exception. This is his deploration of second-order
logic, on the grounds that it has ‘staggering existential assumptions’ [Qui70, p. 68]. We will revisit this
issue in more detail in sections 5.1.3 and 5.3.
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Ideological Topic-Neutrality as Impartiality
Another argument for interpreting neutrality as ‘not discriminating’ rather than ‘saying
nothing’ is based on the fact that logic is a valuable guide to ontology, and that some
purported ontologically committing expressions—like Quine’s committing expressions, the
variables—are themselves logical expressions. Those who think logic is about the world
interpret topic-neutrality as meaning that logic informs us only of the most general features
of reality. But this is very different from saying nothing. The ontological side of the
question may mean that logic speaks in the most general terms of what there is: that
there are things. Being, existence or objecthood are thus not ruled out as candidate topics
that logic can legitimately discuss. On the ideological side, there are the most general
predicates that describe how things are as a matter of logic. Plausible candidates include
non-contradictoriness and self-identity. It is a desideratum for logic that it should be
impartial, i.e. not discriminate on the basis of nature. As far as logic is concerned, objects
feature only insofar as they are beings, not in virtue of some particular characteristics they
have that other things lack. We noted in chapter 2 that impartiality is linked in this way to
the generality of logic. Logic is the most general theory of all; any theory that discriminates
according to characteristics some objects have, and some lack, is not absolutely general, so
this theory cannot be logic; some other theory with a more inclusive domain, comprising
all things regardless of their natures, would be.
Ideological neutrality, or not favouring any part of the lexicon, does not rule out that
objects are part of the subject matter of logic. In fact, objecthood as a logical primitive
is central to impartiality: an impartial theory treats all objects equally. What is ruled out
by impartiality thus interpreted, based on the argument from generality is that logic posits
some particular objects with specialised natures. Logic should certainly be ‘neutral on how
things are’ in the sense that it cannot require the existence of objects belonging to very
rarefied kinds. Since logic is applicable to any area of knowledge whatsoever, any theory
asserting the existence of elephants, or pineapples, or teacups, cannot be counted as logic.
But that is just because logic is the most general of theories, and the existence of these
kinds of things is a contingent empirical matter. Any theory beholden to the existence of
the posits of a special science cannot be neutral enough, epistemically or ideologically, to
be compatible with all the special sciences, as generality demands.
But how far should the argument from generality be taken to extend? It is not yet obvious
that generality by itself entails that there can be no logical entities whatsoever, or that
there are no distinctively logical predicates. One potential defence of logical posits is the
line that there are distinctively logical predicates, and that the things which satisfy the
logical predicates are the distinctively logical objects. Call this the quasi-logicist view:
some objects are the logical objects, others the non-logical objects. Quasi-logicism is not
related to neo-logicism. The only logicist aspect of this view is that there are distinctively
logical objects, whatever they may be. The requirement that logic must be general and
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epistemically neutral is consistent with there being logical predicates in principle. Quine
offers an argument against logical predicates [Qui70, p. 55], but it is not inescapable as
it relies on his particular view of consequence. He subscribes to a substitutional account
of logical consequence; according to him neutrality requires that any part of the lexicon
can be substituted for any other without making any difference to the logical truths. Mere
ideological neutrality, or being neutral on how things are, does not have to entail this
particular position. For instance, MacFarlane [Mac00, ch. 6] suggests that topic-neutrality
in the metaphysical sense can be equated with Tarskian permutation invariance [Tar56b].
The quasi-logicist might have any non-substitutional account of consequence she likes—
permutation invariance, modal consequence, perhaps inferentialism. All she needs is that
her theory of consequence does not contravene epistemic neutrality or impartiality. Logic’s
generality and epistemic neutrality proscribe its positing objects that should properly be
posited by special sciences. But what about classes, sets, collections, or even numbers, all
of which meet the ‘versatile ancillarity’ criterion? These are posits that do not contravene
epistemic neutrality, as they are applicable to everything. Perhaps they are such highly
general things that they might qualify as logical objects.
Quasi-logicism is a view we will ultimately (in section 5.3) find reason to reject. Still, quasi-
logicism has some interesting features, and provides a useful contrast with the alternative
logical-realist view. This view is not logicist—it does not say that logic has its own posits—
but maintains that logic is nevertheless about objects. It is about objects in general, not
about absolutely general objects. Logic concerns itself with the most general features of
reality, so it is about all objects, and the most general truths about them. There are
no distinctively logical objects in the sense that they are the ones that satisfy the logical
predicates, which some objects fail to satisfy. Logical realists think that if there are logical
predicates (e.g. self-identity), all objects satisfy them. But it is possible for objects to
feature in a theory only qua purely logical objects, that is, independently of their particular
characteristics. Logical realism is consistent with most accounts of logical consequence. It
is not tethered to Quine’s substitutional view, but may combine equally well with Tarskian
permutation invariance [Tar56b], or modal consequence [Etc90] for example. Unlike the
quasi-logicist, who says that there are logical predicates, the question of whether there
are logical predicates remains open for the logical realist. This position is consistent with
logical predicates which describe how things are in the most general of ways, which no
object ever fails to satisfy. The impartiality of logic consists in its treating all objects the
same, irrespective of their natures. Although the objects do not divide into the logical
and the non-logical objects, objects are part of the subject matter of logic, because logic
describes their most general characteristics. As far as logic is concerned, objects only
register insofar as they are objects.
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5.1.3 Ontological Topic-Neutrality Versus Ontological Sterility
An ontologically neutral logic remains neutral on what things there are. It is often taken
for granted, though rarely stated in explicit terms, that it is a defining characteristic of
logic that it does not entail that anything at all exists. The position that any theory worthy
of the name of logic must have no existential consequences whatsoever is sometimes called
‘ontological innocence’ [Yi99, p. 141], [Lin06, p. 559], after Lewis [Lew91, p. 81]. But this
position is distinct from ontological neutrality, and it is also distinct, I think, from Lewis’s
ontological innocence. Remaining neutral on what things there are is not the same as
explicitly ruling out that the theory entails the existence of any things. And Lewis ascribes
ontological innocence to plural quantification à la Boolos [Boo84] and (controversially, see
[vI94]) to the mereological calculus, on the grounds that these are devices which, ‘given a
prior commitment’ do not incur ‘a further commitment’ [Lew91, p. 81, his italics]. What
exactly Lewis’ definition of innocence is is difficult to determine [Oli94, pp. 221-223], but
my gloss is that an extension of classical (first-order) logic is ontologically innocent iff
it merely provides a new way of talking about the same objects that are spoken of by
classical first-order logic, instead of introducing new ontological commitments. Since the
participants in this debate always think of ontological commitment as Quinean, incurred
by variables in existentially quantified sentences, this can in turn be glossed as follows:
ontologically innocent theories have no existential consequences beyond those of first-order
logic.
The debates about the ontological innocence or lack thereof of plural quantification and
mereology have their roots in Quine’s dismissal of second-order logic [Qui70]. Boolos
[Boo84] proposed in response the purportedly innocent plural interpretation to replace
the standard set-theoretic one with its manifold ontological commitments. He and his
supporters [Hos00] contend that plural logic is logic because plural quantifiers incur no
commitments to plural objects, since plural variables do not have values of their own.
Their values are just the first-order ones, taken plurally. The new plural notation ‘xx’
only rearranges the first-order variables so as to achieve the expressive power of monadic
second-order logic. Others deny this: they think plural variables, being newly introduced
variables, must have values of their own [Par90, Res88].
For present purposes we will not be concerned with ontological innocence as a test for
the logicality of extensions of first-order classical logic. This would be highly relevant
to the question whether we should regiment in a modal language, or a plural language.
Williamson, for instance, can be read as proposing a higher-order modal language of regi-
mentation [Wil13]. Boolos is obviously concerned with commitment, as he actually called
his paper ‘To Be is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables)’.
But such considerations are not our focus here. The debate on the ontological innocence
of extensions of first-order logic, though, do not necessarily settle whether classical first-
order logic itself has commitments. The implicit suggestion is that the extension cannot be
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called logic if it has ontological commitments because its commitments show how different
in kind it is from classical first-order logic, which has none. Again assuming, as these au-
thors do, that all commitments are in quantificational form, the underlying criterion that
motivates the insistence on innocence is this: logic cannot have any existentially quantified
consequences. I will call this view ontological sterility, after Poincaré’s quip.3
What is an existential assumption, or (non-vacuous) existentially quantified consequence,
and why should having one disqualify a theory from being logic? Syntactically, it is a
statement of the form p∃xϕq, with x occurring free in ϕ, which follows from the theory in
the object language. (Existential consequences in the metalanguage are not ontologically
committing. Vacuous existential quantifiers, where x does not occur free in ϕ, are of no
interest as they make no existence assumptions.) Now the statement that no theory with
any existential consequences in this sense warrants the name of logic is strictly false. First-
order classical logic has ‘∃x(x = x)’ as a theorem. Quine acknowledges this, but hastens
to assure the reader that this is merely an artefact of model theory, occasioned by some
properties of the number zero [Qui54]. As a syntactic criterion of elimination, though, ‘no
existentially quantified theorems’ is clearly flawed.
Proponents of ontological sterility could just amend their criterion with an ad hoc restric-
tion: logic must have no existential consequences except for ‘∃x(x = x)’ in the case of
first-order logic. But it is more interesting to dissect the ambiguity in ‘no existential con-
sequences’, which is not noted by Quine or any of the advocates of sterility. Should it be
read as ‘not entailing the existence of any objects’, or ‘not positing any kinds’? The former
reading disqualifies even ‘∃x(x = x)’, but the latter rules out only existential consequences
of the form ‘∃xFx’ where F is distinct from self-identity. Advocates of substitutional
consequence do not think of identity as a genuine predicate, but an abbreviation [Qui70,
pp. 61-64], and so all that is expressed by ‘∃x(x = x)’ is that there is some value of a
variable. Alternatively, F could be restricted to logical predicates, if identity is considered
a predicate.
Ontological sterility, alone among the disambiguations of topic-neutrality, really does de-
mand of logic that it should not be about objects, and that it should have no subject
matter. But what is the argument for maintaining that logic should be ontologically ster-
ile? Philosophers who champion ontological sterility usually do so by hinting rather than
articulating an argument; I will attempt to tease out two lines of defence in favour of onto-
logical sterility, and argue that neither stands up to scrutiny. The first is the Kantian line.
There are two explicit arguments for ontological sterility to be found in Kant, which do not
carry over into contemporary logic. Quine hints at another with his notorious ‘staggering
existential assumptions’ remark which is effective against the idea that logic posits objects
of some particular kind (objects-qua-F ), but does not rule out the possibility that logic
might entail that there are objects qua objects. By the end of the next section, it will be
3‘La logistique n’est plus stérile: elle engendre la contradiction!’ [Poi06, p. 316]
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clear that ontological sterility is not a serious contender as a criterion of logicality. So we
will conclude that logic can indeed have a subject matter, and that it can speak of objects
in the most general sense, not qua-F, but qua objects.
5.2 The Kantian Argument for Ontological Sterility
Some contemporary philosophers appeal to Kant explicitly when they argue for sterility.
Here is Linnebo:
‘no objects exist by conceptual necessity . . . it is natural to regard anything
having to do with the existence of objects and with their particular character-
istics as belonging to the matter of thought rather than to its form’ [Lin04, sec.
3].
He refers the reader to a paper by Hartry Field as evidence for this view. Field’s paper
states:
‘you can’t get existential assertions out of logic and definitions alone . . . Kant
did provide such an argument’ [Fie84, p. 509].
Linnebo’s assertion appears to me to run together a number of issues. He writes as though
there is a single Kantian argument which establishes that no objects exist by conceptual
necessity because objects are matter rather than form. In fact these are two distinct points,
which Kant argues for separately. Kant contends that logic is concerned with the form of
thought, and not in any way with reality. As a result, logic will hold even if there is nothing
at all for thought to latch onto. When inveighing against the ontological argument for the
existence of God, Kant also presents an argument that no objects exist by conceptual
necessity, because there is no concept which by its very nature guarantees that something
falls under it. Field’s paper only relies on the second argument (conceptual necessity), not
the first (Kantian formality).
Linnebo’s formulation of the problem, ‘no objects exist by conceptual necessity’ is poten-
tially ambiguous in the familiar way which is a theme of this chapter: between the existence
of objects-qua-(non-logical-)F, and objects only considered qua their logical role as objects.
Kant would affirm both readings of ‘no objects exist by conceptual necessity’ because he
denies both of the following claims:
1. That there is some concept such that it is a logical fact that some object which falls
under that concept exists;
2. That logical truths are true because they correctly represent objects.
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Kant’s attempts to refute 1. are intertwined with his rebuttal of the Ontological Argument.
He avers that there is no concept which is such that the assertion that there is nothing that
falls under that concept is contradictory. This is the kernel of Field’s argument from his
paper quoted above, aimed at neo-logicism instead of theology. Both these arguments seem
to me to be sound, but they are effective only against 1., not 2. Kant’s argument against 2.
is based on his conception of formality. For him, logic is the pure form of thought, which
deals only with concepts, and is not concerned with whether a concept correctly represents
reality. This is the argument that is most naturally characterised as being about form
versus matter, but it is heavily indebted to Kant’s own conception of logic as the more
limited Aristotelian kind. Upon closer inspection, it is not obvious that his argument has
to carry over into contemporary philosophy of logic. So the Kantian defence of ontological
sterility fails: contemporary logic need not be devoid of any subject matter. In fact, when
we consider the virtues of Kant’s arguments, they tend rather to suggest that an impartial,
not a sterile logic, is to be preferred.
5.2.1 Kant’s Logic and The Formality Argument for Sterility
The Kantian argument against 2. is premised on his duality of reason and sensibility.
Logic falls on the ‘reason’ side. As such it is concerned only with the form of thought, not
with the empirical question whether the thought in question correctly represents anything.
The logic of Kant’s day is Aristotelian syllogistic logic. Instead of having rules for sentence
connectives and quantifiers, all of its arguments must be presented as syllogisms, consisting
of two quantified premises and a quantified conclusion. All premises and conclusions have
exactly one quantifier as their main (and only) connective.
Kant’s main criterion for logicality is a peculiarly strong kind of formality. According to
Kant, what logic governs is the form of thought only. Its matter is supplied by empirical
investigation of the external world. This duality immediately brings to mind a correspond-
ing one: the analytic versus the synthetic. And that particular duality plays a central role
in Kant’s argument for the formality of logic. His version of formality is distinct from the
contemporary idea that logical truths are true because of their grammatical form. Kantian
formality is defined in terms of thought, not language. Form in the modern sense uses a
mathematical theory of strings and sequences to deliver a (usually recursively specified) syn-
tax. Contemporary syntax delineates, or gives a recipe for deciding, exactly which strings
are grammatical. Kant, on the other hand, does not separate syntax from concepts. To
him, logic is formal because its only function is to rearrange and unfold concepts, whether
or not the concepts are true of anything. Logic has nothing to do with objects in any
sense, because objects are the things which, as a matter of empirical fact, fall under the
concepts. Logic simply unpacks and reconfigures concepts regardless of their extensions,
even if those extensions are empty. Kant’s perspective on the tasks performed by logic
is heavily reliant on his conception of logic as a purely analytic doctrine. He distinguishes
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between explicative judgements—those which merely reveal something already contained
in the original judgements—and ampliative ones, which extend knowledge in empirical
ways. He calls a judgement analytic whenever its predicate is contained in its subject. The
metaphorical notion of containment here has no exact equivalent in contemporary logic.
Analytic judgements of this sort are often explained as ‘true by definition’, but a defini-
tion in the mathematical sense does not rely on concepts or containment or subject and
predicate. It is a matter of specifying a string and stipulating that a string of the definiens
kind can always be substituted for a string of the definiendum kind [Qui36b]. This again
is a purely syntactic operation, swapping strings for strings.4 If an axiomatic or natural
deduction method is used for derivations, or as an account of logical consequence in the
case of inferentialism, this is also done purely in terms of a mathematical theory of strings.
But Kant, who does not separate grammatical form from conceptual form, uses explica-
tivity to explain both definitions and logical validity. Premises entail a conclusion iff the
conclusion is contained in the premises. Each conclusion can be extracted by analytically
unpacking the premises, which includes logical rules like the principle of non-contradiction,
as well as definitions. E.g. it is analytic that a vixen is female, because ‘vixen’ is defined as
‘female fox’. It is difficult to identify any procedure in contemporary logic with this Kan-
tian theory of mining the depth of concepts independently of reference. This is because
modern syntax is mathematised, and interpretation always requires something external to
the strings, something which elements of the syntax represent.
Kant thinks that logic does not represent at all. According to him pure thought deals only
with concepts, and is not concerned with whether a concept correctly represents the way
the world is. It is consistent with logic as he understands it to suppose that there is no
world at all. So objects and existence do not belong to logic, as the question whether there
are any objects is not answered by reason, but by empirical means.
‘For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept
would still be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without
any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it. So
far as I could know, there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which
my thought could be applied.’ [Kan29, B147]
Now this part of Kant’s philosophy of logic does amount to an argument against 2. above
and, if true, would prove that logic is ontologically sterile. It tallies with Linnebo’s char-
acterisation quoted earlier, that anything to do with the existence of objects is ‘matter’
rather than form. One problem that comes immediately to mind is that the quote from
Kant is not exactly uncontroversially devoid of ontological commitments. He speaks of the
possibility that a concept ‘would be without any object’, meaning that it has an empty
4Since it is purely syntactic and does not mention concepts, philosophers who are sceptical about an-
alyticity in ordinary or scientific interpreted languages need not extend their scruples to definition in this
precise mathematical sense [Qui36b, Qui36a].
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extension. Nevertheless, is the concept itself not a thing in the widest possible sense, the
one needed for ontology? The statement ‘there is a concept with nothing falling under it’
should incur at least a prima facie commitment to concepts. Perhaps concepts are elim-
inable. But Kant also invokes the possible scenario that there ‘could be nothing, to which
my thought could be applied’. This ‘nothing’ can only coherently be read as describing not
an empty universe, but a solipsistic one, devoid of extra-mental reality. But a solipsistic
theory still has an ontology. Consider the cogito, committing the thinker to the existence of
a thinker. The cogito holds whenever solipsism is true. At the very least, Kant is commit-
ted to a referent for the phrase ‘my thought’. Objects are only excluded from consideration
here if they are not objects in the wider sense that ontological commitment demands, but
in a weaker sense of ‘empirically discoverable extra-mental entity’. At least one out of the
concept, the self, or the thought should be a subject of commitment, especially if they are
the only things about which true statements can be made.
A representation that is true despite there being nothing for it to represent is a dubiously
coherent thing without a clear language/world duality. Unless it is already established
that there is reality on the one hand, and representation on the other, a situation in which
there is nothing, but there is a representation is contradictory. Judgements or linguistic
things are things. Whenever there are things, it is not the case that there is nothing. But
this issue can perhaps be averted by reverting to a modern version of Kant’s doctrine that
does not rely on Aristotelian logic, and concentrates on grammatical form, not the form of
thought.
Syllogistic and Decidability
Aristotelian syllogistic has the expressive power of monadic first-order logic, and the syl-
logisms comprise some particular subset of the arguments of monadic first-order logic.
Monadic first-order logic is decidable, which means that logical deductions are an entirely
mechanical process. In some sense this fits well with Kant’s theory of concept-unpacking.
The modern characterisation of Kant’s idea can then be rephrased as ‘every conclusion
can be extracted by substituting strings for strings according to the syntax and defini-
tions’.
If we try to go beyond the syllogistic forms to giving a Kantian-inspired account of sentence
connectives, an objection due to Susan Haack rears its head [Haa78, p. 12]. In sentential
logic, P entails P ∨ Q, even though ‘P ’, considered only as a string, plainly does not have
as a part the string ‘P ∨ Q’. Even without considering only a strictly mathematical theory
of strings and parts of strings, in what sense could Kant really maintain that ‘P ’ contains
‘P or Q’? It’s true that the word ‘contains’ is even more metaphorical in this context.
But the objection can be answered by taking a page out of Wittgenstein’s book [Wit74]:
the meaning of the truth-functional connectives is contained in their truth tables. If P is
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true, then, by the truth table for ∨, so is P ∨ Q. The truth tables can be thought of as
providing the basis for syntactic rules that give the proper introduction and elimination
conditions for the connectives.
Objects and Variables in Monadic First-Order Logic
Sullivan suggests [Sul04, p. 717] that Kant’s logic isn’t object-involving specifically because
it is decidable. Statements that cannot be formalised without the help of variables are
synthetic rather than analytic, because variables link subject and predicate. But variables
are not needed in decidable logic—they are dispensable because monadic first-order logic
has no need for ‘nesting’ variables. It can be formalised in such a way that no variable is
ever in another variable’s scope. Therefore, according to Sullivan, Aristotelian logic’s not
being object-involving is to do with the fact that variables are dispensable with respect to
its regimented syntax: ‘the variables have no real work to do, and can be dropped’ [Sul04,
p. 718].
This argument is interesting because it portrays Kant as grouping the notion of objecthood
with that of a variable, as Quine was to do much later. It also raises intriguing questions
about Frege’s disagreement with Kant on the matter of objects and logic: Frege does believe
that logic relies on the idea of what Sullivan calls a ‘common objectual bearing’, to which
we shall return in chapter 6. But the claim that variables have no real work to do stands
in need of further elaboration. Sullivan says that it is because they can be ‘dropped’, but
this cannot be simply elimination of the syntactic kind. That would mean that variables
as a lexical category no longer feature in the syntax. Some formalised languages, though,
have no syntactic category of variables and still manage to do all the work of polyadic
first-order logic. I am thinking in particular of Quine’s variable-free first-order language
in [Qui60a], developing an idea of Schönfinkel’s [Sch24]. We would not say that these
languages aren’t object-involving. The role normally discharged by variables is not made
obsolete even though there are no variables in the syntax. A Schönfinkeled language has
the same models as the corresponding first-order logic with variables. But there is another
very salient point to be made about monadic vs. polyadic first-order logics. Monadic logics
contain no relational vocabulary. A relational predicate has two terms flanking it, and since
these can be two distinct terms relational predicates bring in ‘nested’ variables: one in the
scope of the other. Although monadic first-order logic with identity is still decidable [Loe67,
pp. 243-245], monadic logics are incapable of expressing the weaker equivalence relations
required for criteria of identity. So monadic languages cannot discharge one of the key
tasks of ontology: the ability to determine whether two posits are in fact the same posit.
As a result, taking stock of the cardinality of a theory is very problematic in a monadic
logic.
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5.2.2 Objections to the Formality Argument
The idea that logic is not about reality but wholly about the form, if not of thought, then
of language lives on. Versions of it appear in such otherwise un-Kantian works as the
Tractatus and The Logical Syntax of Language. In the former, the logical truths are not
about anything, but mere limiting cases of propositions. The latter especially embraces
the analytic/synthetic duality of the Kantian account: ‘Pure syntax is thus wholly analytic
.... An analytic sentence is not actually “concerned with” anything, in the way that an
empirical sentence is’ [Car37, p. 7]. This particular style of argument for sterility is
summarily rejected by Quine, who famously believes that no sharp boundary can be drawn
between analytic and synthetic sentences [Qui36b, Qui51c]. His views with respect to
formalised languages are a bit more subtle than a simple prohibition of anything that
looks like analyticity. He does not object to mathematical theories of definitions in terms
of substituting strings for strings, for instance, and in fact promulgates such theories in
[Qui36b] and [Qui36a]. These are just syntax, as far as he is concerned; but no analyticity
can be claimed for interpreted logics or logic as a subject of philosophical investigation
[Qui70, p. 96]. The Kantian argument, by contrast, relies upon a principle which is
anathema to Quine: that there are truths that are true because of the world, and truths
that are true because of language alone. Stipulating that in some given formal language,
strings of one kind may be substituted for strings of another does not make any claim about
truth, since it is a syntactic rule. But Kantian formality does require that sentences (or,
in Kantian parlance, judgements) are separable into a formal component (reason) and a
factual component (sensibility), where an analytic truth has a null factual component—an
idea Quine apostrophises in “Two Dogmas” as ‘nonsense, and the root of much nonsense’
[Qui51c, p. 39].
I take Quine’s arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction seriously, but I will
not adopt a position for or against the distinction here. I do not think that favouring a
commitment-based approach to ontology by itself compels a philosopher to renounce this
distinction. But that does not mean that the Kantian formality argument is a threat even
to commitmentphiles who uphold the distinction, as long as they are realists about logic.
The belief that logic is about the world leads to the idea that although logic is the most
general theory, it is not wholly different in kind from other theories. In other words, there
should be continuity between logic and other theories, between logical truth and truth in
the special sciences. The formality argument implies that logical truth is not, like other
truth, a matter of correct representation. Merely formal truth is expected to remain true
even in the absence of anything at all for it to be true of; its truth depends only on the form
of thought or language. But it is very natural to take truth to consist in some agreement
between representation and reality. If purely formal sentences are not, as Carnap says,
‘concerned with anything’ (on an objectual reading of ‘anything’), because they do not
represent reality, what kind of truth is analytic or logical truth? It does not bear much
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resemblance to the truth of Aristotle’s dictum, which explicitly invokes what is; ‘To say of
what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is
and of what is not that it is not is true’ [Ari84, 1011b, 26].
For the logical realist, on the other hand, logic does represent reality. Logic does not
represent every aspect of reality, but it does represent the most general ones. Logical truth
is continuous with truth in other sciences, because like any theory it aims to describe the
world correctly.
5.2.3 Conceptual Necessity and Definitions
The idea that logical truths are true because they correctly represent objects remains a
viable position, since the previous section provided ample reasons to doubt Kant’s argument
against it. Yet the suggestion is sometimes made that it is Kant’s argument against the
Ontological Argument that leads to the conclusion that logic is ontologically sterile. The
two distinct claims under discussion are:
1. That there is some concept such that it is a logical fact that some object which falls
under that concept exists; and
2. That logical truths are true because they correctly represent objects.
Even though 1. may well be false, its falsehood does not entail that 2. is false too, and
for our purposes we only need 2. to be true, not 1. Field’s claim that Kant proved ‘you
can’t get existential assertions out of logic and definitions alone’ [Fie84, p. 509] gives the
impression that he believes that Kant refuted 2. by refuting 1. But 1. may be false even
though 2. is true. It is perfectly coherent to believe that logic is about objects, but there
are no objects which, because of their special characteristics, are forced into being by logic.
Think of the contrast between the quasi-logicist, who believes that there are distinctively
logical individuals, i.e. those which satisfy the logical predicates, and the logical realist,
who believes the weaker thesis that the truth of quantified logic requires some object, but
any object will do.
The argument against 1. is an argument that there are no objects which exist by concep-
tual necessity. Kant’s attack on 1. is intended as a counter to the ontological argument
for the existence of God. The ontological argument begins by giving a definition of God,
such as ‘the ens realissimum, which possesses all reality’ [Kan29, A596/B624] or ‘the sub-
stance whose essence involves existence’ [dS84, prop. 11 and ax. 7], and concludes that
the non-existence of such a being is impossible, or self-contradictory. Kant declares that
‘impossible’ cannot in this context mean anything but self-contradictory:5 ‘in the absence
5This actually does not seem quite true about Anselm’s ontological argument, which moves from the
definition ‘something a greater than which cannot be conceived’ (as Malcolm translates ‘aliquid quo nihil
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of contradiction I have, through pure a priori concepts alone, no criterion of impossibility’
[Kan29, A595-6/B623-4]. His diagnosis of the flaw in this argument is that there is no
concept such that the assertion that no object is described by it yields a contradiction. For
a contradiction, in Kant’s Aristotelian logic, is formed by adding to a concept a predicate
which is excluded by some other predicate already contained within the concept. But to
say that something does not exist, according to Kant, is not to add a predicate, but to
decline to posit that thing: that is, to make a synthetic judgement. ‘If its existence is re-
jected, we reject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of a contradiction
can then arise.’ [Kan29, A594-5/B622-3].
This argument turns on the idea that existence claims are synthetic, and therefore not
logical. Nevertheless, it does not actually prove the negation of 2. with respect to con-
temporary logic. The argument can be transformed to suit classical first-order logic by
equating Kant’s concepts with our ideology: the predicates. Instead of saying that there
is no collection of (Aristotelian) predicates such that it is contradictory not to posit a
thing with all those predicates, we say that there is no object-language predicate such that
it cannot coherently occur in place of Φ in p¬∃xΦxq. As it happens, this criterion only
fails for self-identity. ‘∃x(x = x)’, after all, is a theorem of classical first-order logic. But
adding ‘with the exception of “x =”’ to the criterion seems a defensible reply, because it
now amounts to the idea that logic has no posits-qua-F. ‘∃x(x = x)’ is a neutral, impartial
characterisation of an object. It is not an object-qua-F, because nothing is said about its
nature. It features only insofar as it is an object in the domain, something for the theory
to be about. It occurs here qua purely logical object, not qua F.
Modernising Kant’s argument so that it bans objects-qua-F, but not objects in general,
establishes the negation of 1., but not 2. One philosopher who affirms both 1. and 2. is
Frege [Fre80a]. His necessary beings are not divine entities, but sets and numbers. He does
not avail himself of concepts that contain existence or being in their essence. Instead, he
uses abstraction principles: biconditionals with an equivalence on one side and an identity
claim on the other, which are taken to be definitional. Examples include ‘the direction of
a = the direction of b iff if a is parallel to b’, or Hume’s Principle, ‘the number of F s = the
number of Gs iff there is a one-one correspondence between the F s and the Gs’ [Fre80a,
sec. 66]. Hume’s Principle is logically equivalent to an existential claim: that whenever
the F s and the Gs are 1-1, there is something which is the number of F s and Gs [Boo97,
p. 308]. Neo-logicists have jettisoned some of Frege’s project, notably his conception of
extensions, which is inconsistent [Rus67a], but wish to hold on to Hume’s Principle and
its existential consequences. They take Hume’s Principle to be a definitional, analytic,
linguistic stipulation. Field, in his [Fie84] in which he invokes Kant, objects to such
neo-logicist stipulations on the grounds that one cannot prove the existence of anything
maius cogitari possit’ and its variants [Mal60]) via the premise that it is greater to exist in reality and
thought than merely in thought, to the conclusion that God exists in reality [Ans98].
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non-linguistic on the basis of linguistic stipulation. According to the neo-logicists’ account,
the definitions they view as belonging to logic, and as analytic, have, in our terminology,
posits-qua-F. Field’s argument seems to me to be sound, but whether or not he views it
as an argument for sterility, what it establishes is that logic should not include analytic
stipulations which introduce posits-qua-F. Although Kant’s objection to the ontological
argument does have merit, it does not prove that logic should be ontologically sterile. In
the form in which it it relevant to contemporary logic, it turns out to be an argument for
impartiality—logic should have no special logical ideology or specialised logical posits—
compatible with the negation of ontological sterility.
5.3 Quine’s Argument for Ontological Sterility
Quine is often cited in support of, or criticised for appearing to hold, the position that
logic should be ontologically sterile [Tha75, Boo75, Boo84, Sha00]. If indeed it is true that
he takes this view, his arguments for it are more allusive than explicit. Much is made of
his brief remark, barely an argument at all, that he questions the logicality of second-order
logic owing to its ‘staggering existential assumptions’ [Qui70, p. 68]. Ontological sterility
does not sit especially well with Quine’s opposition to the analytic/synthetic dichotomy.
Also, there is some tension between the demand that logic be devoid of any existential
consequences, and his choice of first-order logic, whose theorems include ‘∃x(x = x)’ and
whose objectual variables are logical expressions.
One hint is provided in his claim that logic has no special subject matter, since it has the
special property of ‘versatile ancillarity’—what I call ‘impartiality’—which he clarifies by
saying it does not favour any distinctive part of the lexicon or values of variables [Qui70,
p. 98]. His flavour of ontological neutrality entails that there are no special logical objects.
But the question of ontological sterility is not about whether some values of variables
are more logical than others, but whether logic may work just as well had there been
no values of variables at all. Yet he appears to suggest that ‘no special subject matter’ is
equivalent to ‘no existential assumptions’ when he deplores second-order logic. The answer,
I think, resides in a failure to distinguish ‘no special logical predicates or objects’ from ‘no
existential assumptions’. This is fallacious because it equates ‘entailing the existence of
anything at all’ (e.g. ‘∃x(x = x)’), with ‘entailing the existence of something in virtue of
its particular nature’ (‘∃xFx’ for some non-logical F ). In the terms in which I explained
Quine in earlier chapters, the latter constitutes being committed to an object-qua-F. The
former merely constitutes being committed to something.
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5.3.1 Objects-qua-F, Flat Ontologies and Impartiality
According to my interpretation of Quine, ontological commitments for him are always
commitments-qua-F. Reification appears on the scene when sentences receive a newfound
structure by locating a pronoun on the intersection of observation sentences, thereby sepa-
rating them into the logical expression—the variable—and the non-logical predicate. The
variable connotes no more, and no less, than existence; being an object. All the informa-
tion about what is true of the thing is confined to the ideology of the theory. Commitment
only applies to things insofar as they fall under some kinds describable in the theory. A
theory is committed to whatever satisfies some predicate or concatenation of predicates
belonging to it: objects-qua-F. I also noted in chapter 2 that the resulting flat ontology,
an unordered, unstructured domain of all the beings, is an ideal model of the underlying
philosohy of existence. Since variables are the one semantic category that represent the
introduction of reification, or positing beings, the beings are all on a par with no ordering
or hierarchy imposed on them, since all things are equally existent and equally posited.
There are no differences in being, but only in nature, all expressed by the ideology. The
presence of a variable , connotes only objecthood, not nature, which is left to the ‘F ’s
the objects satisfy. Only one notion of being or object is in play: the most general one.
Logical theory is only concerned with entities insofar as they are objects in the domain.
Ordering or arranging them falls to the special sciences, not to logic, which merely collects
together all the beings so they are available for being talked about all at once. This was
called in chapter 2 the unity of existence (and the corresponding univocacy of ‘existence’,
or ‘being’): all existents are in the domain, regardless of their differences. This reflects
the fact that there are no different kinds of being or existence. The only differences are
differences in nature, always translatable into the ideology.
All this is very much in harmony with the argument from generality presented in 5.1.2
above to support impartiality, or ideological neutrality. An ideologically neutral logic
confines itself to speaking of objects only in the most general terms, not discriminating
between objects on the basis of their natures as described in the special sciences. Were a
theory to discriminate in this way, it would be insufficiently general to merit the name of
logic. Logic treats all objects equally. Neutrality does not rule out that logic has a subject
matter where that means that it has a domain. According to the flat ontology picture,
there aren’t different levels of being; everything that exists simply shows up in the domain
merely insofar as it is an object, independently of its particular characteristics. The most
general description of an object is simply ‘∃x(x = x)’, and this is all the flat ontology
requires of a being. No further strictures can be imposed by logic, because as far as logic
is concerned, everything there is just functions as an element of the domain. An impartial,
absolutely general logic is the theory that has all objects in its remit. Any theory that
excludes some objects from consideration is not logic, since it would not be impartial. Some
more comprehensive theory, the one that talks about all the objects, would be logic. So
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the flat ontology picture leads naturally to impartiality.6
The flat ontology requirement helps reveal some tension between second-order logic and
Quinean commitment. If predicate variables have values, it is difficult to see how to phrase
the question, in the language of regimentation, whether they are identical with something
in the first-order domain. But this is necessary to determine the cardinality of the domain.
Identity, according to Quine, is identified in the canonical language with facsimile identity,
or sameness with respect to all predicates of the theory. How to apply this salva congruitate
to the value of a predicate is unclear, even apart from the vagueness surrounding the
intensional or extensional identity conditions of their purported values. Quine hints at this
when he ‘deplore[s] the use of predicate letters as quantified variables’ [Qui70, p. 67], and
entreats those philosophers who really can’t help themselves at least to write ‘x has y’
instead of ‘x has F ’ . But this argument is not decisive for anyone other than Quine, given
that it is so wedded to Quine’s own epistemology.
5.3.2 ‘Staggering’ Existential Assumptions
What are we to make of Quine’s brief and cryptic remark concerning higher-order logic?
He appears to just baldly assert that higher-order logic should not be counted as logic
because of its staggering existential assumptions [Qui70, p. 68]. (He then deletes some of
it from the next edition [Qui86a] after Boolos’s critique [Boo75].) Perhaps the best way
to make sense of this three-word ‘argument’ is that it suggests not a demand for sterility,
but a kind of ontological neutrality that is based on not positing objects-qua-F. Although
‘no existential assumptions’ strictly speaking is not a good criterion for logicality, it is
more reasonable to ask that logic should not be committed to the existence of objects-qua-
F, for non-logical F . For Quine, the number of logical predicates is zero. Non-Quinean
commitmentphiles, on the other hand, will probably include at least the identity predicate
if they have a non-substitutionalist position on logical consequence.
The above is my way of making sense of and expanding on Quine’s cryptic remark. Whether
to endorse the argument and its conclusion is a different matter. Personally, I do want
to tentatively endorse the principle that logic should not be committed to objects-qua-F,
for non-logical F : that is, what I have called above ‘strong impartiality’. In the section
below it will become apparent why sets probably should not count as logical objects, nor
set membership as a logical predicate. But I do not think it is mandatory for anyone who
6Impartiality without a flat ontology might also be possible; for instance, we might say the domains
of ramified type theory jointly speak of all objects but without gathering them all together in a universe
of discourse. In this case there is some ordering according to nature, but no objects are excluded from
consideration because of their nature. No level by itself is sufficient to collect together all objects, but
all levels collectively do perform this task. This would be a mitigated impartiality: although there is an
imposition of order it is still non-discriminatory.
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wants to take a commitment-based line on ontology to think that logic should have no
commitments-qua-non-logical-F ; others may prefer a mitigated impartiality, for instance
to accommodate higher-order languages of regimentation (e.g. see 2.1.3, 3.5, 4.3.1 and
footnote 5 above). Whether it is wise to renounce second-order logic as logic, or to opt
for a non-standard interpretation of second-order logic, I will not attempt to settle either.
I have argued that a Kantian duality between logic and sensibility is in tension with a
realist view of logic and therefore unattractive to the commitmentphile, but this case
seems less clear. There are those who argue that the language of regimentation should be
higher-order [Boo75, Boo84, Sha00, Wil02, Wil13]. Those who follow Boolos think that
this is acceptable only on the plural interpretation, for reasons of ontological innocence
[Boo84, Hos00]. Shapiro and Williamson disagree, the former advocating for the standard,
set-theoretic interpretation, the latter proposing to read second-order variables as ranging
over properties.
To return to Quine’s embryonic ‘argument’, there is one potential misreading I want to
dismiss. It would be an error to interpret ‘logic cannot have staggering existential assump-
tions’ as ‘logic may have existential consequences, but only if they are not staggering in
size’. The reason that the existential assumptions of second-order logic are unacceptable,
and those of first-order logic acceptable, cannot be because the former are simply too
numerous. As we saw in 1.3.4, there can be no legitimate cardinality limit on ontology.
How many F s there are is immaterial; the issue is whether F s are indispensable. If they
are not, then they can be rejected or paraphrased away without considering how many
there are; if they are, then we cannot make do without them and must admit however
many of them there turn out to be. So the judgement that ‘∃x(x = x)’ is an ontologically
kosher assumption, but ‘∃x(x is a set)’ is not, cannot be made on the grounds that the
set-theoretic universe is overpopulated. It must be because there is something wrong with
sets themselves as a logical posit. But this judgement can be made on logical grounds.
Because logic is impartial, and treats all objects the same regardless of their natures, ex-
istential consequences of logic are acceptable only if they do not discriminate according to
nature. Posits-qua-F, where F is some characteristic some things have but other lack, do
not belong to logic.
It is possible to read Quine as refusing to take first-order logic’s existential assumption
‘∃x(x = x)’ with ontological seriousness. On this reading he means to convey that logic
makes no ontological assumptions, but with the ad hoc exception of ‘∃x(x = x)’ for the sake
of model-theoretic elegance. It is not unlikely that Quine in fact intended to say this; the
claim is certainly compatible with his views in earlier papers [Qui53b, Qui54]. I, by con-
trast, prefer what I take to be the more interesting position that we should disqualify only
candidate logics that have commitments-qua-F for F s that are distinct from self-identity.
∃x(x = x) is not a commitment to an entity-qua-F ; nothing is specified about x’s nature.
It features only qua object. The standard interpretation of second-order logic, by contrast,
incurs a commitment to sets: all subsets of whatever the first-order domain is. This is
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a commitment to objects-qua-F, namely qua set. Recall Quine’s [Qui51a] discussion of
[Car50], where he distinguishes between subclass questions and category questions, show-
ing that what Carnap regards as unintelligible category question can be translated into
intelligible subclass questions. There is one category question in a first-order regimented
language, viz. ‘are there objects?’ It is answered, affirmatively, by logic, since ‘∃x(x = x)’
is a logical truth.
For Quine, who has a substitutional theory of logical consequence, there are no logical
predicates, and the identity predicate is interpreted as indiscernibility with respect to all
predicates of the language. So ‘x = x’ is read as ‘x satisfies all the same predicates as x’—it
says no more than that x is an object in the domain. Logic has no commitments-qua-F,
because no F is intrinsically logical according to his theory of consequence. Quineans with
alternative views of logical consequence may think of identity as a logical predicate. They
can still happily assert that logic has no commitments to objects-qua-non-logical-F.
5.3.3 Absolutely General Objects and Paradox
The hypothetical philosopher I have dubbed the quasi-logicist might raise an objection
at this point. It is clear why logic should not incur commitments to things falling under
non-logical kinds. Logic does not favour any kind of thing over another; such discourse
does not belong to the realm of logic. All remarks about what kinds things belong to are
ideological, and favouring particular natures is inconsistent with impartiality. But does
this entail that there should be no logical predicates? Not according to the quasi-logicist.
She is not a full-blooded logicist who thinks analytic stipulations can generate commitment
to non-linguistic objects. The quasi-logicist makes the more moderate claim that it has
not yet been proved that there cannot be both logical predicates as well as distinctively
logical things that satisfy them.
Kinds, predicates, or natures can be more or less specific. For instance, ‘x is human’, ‘x is
physical’, ‘x is a member of some set’, are listed in descending order of specificity. It is clear
that for logic to meet the conditions of epistemic neutrality and fulfil Frege’s demand that
it be applicable to anything thinkable, logic must be as general as possible. Anything that
is applicable exclusively to things with natures discussed only in some particular special
science cannot be logic. In and of itself this does not immediately rule out that there
are some distinctively logical predicates. It has not been established that there are no
predicates that are such that they must be true of everything thinkable. If there are such
kinds, they may have a claim to being logical. Pioneering logicians embraced theories
with numerous existential consequences as logic, like the theory of classes or extensions
[Fre80a, Fre64]. Of course a theory asserting the existence of elephants, or pineapples, or
teacups, cannot be counted as logic; the existence of these kinds of things is an empirical
and highly contingent affair. Why logic cannot entail that there are classes, or collections,
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or properties, is harder to see. Logic should not say that some very particular things exist,
because of its generality, but sets, classes, abundant properties and numbers are such
highly general things that they might qualify. Any collection whatsoever forms a class;
everything has some property. They are highly general like logic itself, and apply to any
realm of thought. So the quasi-logicist proposes that they be counted as logical objects.
If successful, her argument could provide the basis for a case of second-order variables as
committing expressions.
The difficulty with this view, I think, is that logic should not merely be as general as
possible, but absolutely general. Sets, properties and numbers, on the other hand, are not
absolutely general objects, because if they were, they would apply to themselves and so
lead to a version of Russell’s paradox or the Burali-Forti paradox. Frege had high hopes
for his purportedly absolutely general extensions, only to be stymied when confronted with
a version of Russell’s paradox: the set of all sets that aren’t members of themselves both is
and isn’t a member of itself [Rus67a]. It may be that one of Quine’s underlying motivations
is that set theory elevates a the predicate of set membership to the logical even though
it is not fully impartial, unlike logical theory. For a theory to qualify as logic, it has to
collect together absolutely all objects in its remit, and speak of them all purely qua objects,
independently of what they are like. If a highly general theory excludes just a single existent
from its domain of discourse, it thereby violates the impartiality criterion of logicality. It is
no longer a suitable candidate for the label of logic; some even more general theory would
be, whose domain was the union of it plus the singleton of the excluded thing. Frege thought
that his extensions had a comparable property: that they could apply to absolutely any
object or plurality of objects. But the fatal flaw in his account was self-application.7 There
is no number of all numbers, no set of all sets [Rus67b]. Although these things are very
highly general, and their corresponding predicates applicable to almost everything, they
are not absolutely general or applicable to absolutely anything. Perhaps what is behind
modern logicians’ insistence on sterility, and Quine’s aversion to sets as logical posits, is a
wish to avoid being embroiled in Russell’s paradox.
5.4 Objects, Regimentation, and the Subject Matter of Logic
In conclusion, there is no need to suppose that because logic is topic-neutral, it cannot
be about objects—to think that one entails the other is to trade on ambiguities in both
‘topic-neutral’ and ‘being about objects’. ‘Topic-neutrality’ can be interpreted variously
as ‘being applicable to all areas of enquiry’—epistemic neutrality—‘being neutral on how
things are’—ideological neutrality, which can be equated with impartiality, or treating all
objects equally without discriminating according to nature—and ‘being neutral on what
7Strictly speaking, Frege does not allow that concepts ever apply to concepts, or objects to objects—he
corrects Russell to that effect in his letter [Fre80b].
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there is’. We found that there is no obvious reason for demanding that logic be ontologically
sterile, without existential consequences or capable of being true in the absence of anything
at all; rather, we took topic-neutrality to be strong impartiality, having no posits-qua-F.
This means theories with posits qua set, or qua number are potentially problematic, but
‘∃x(x = x)’ as a logical truth is acceptable, since nothing is said of x’s nature. The logical
predicate ‘x = x’ is satisfied by anything whatsoever. So x features only qua object, not
qua F. It is consistent to call logic topic-neutral and also maintain that it is about objects
and objecthood. Identity can count a logical predicate even under strong impartiality.
Impartiality does not prohibit logical predicates as such, as long as they are predicates
satisfied by everything in the domain, as is the case with self-identity.
What does this mean for our language of regimentation? The findings of this chapter
validate the choice of first-order logic with constants and identity. First-order logic is a
safe bet given the tension between higher-order resources and strong impartiality: since
the values of higher-order variables are standardly thought of as sets, higher-order logic
has posits-qua-F in the object language. Alternative interpretations of higher-order logic
and/or mitigated impartiality may bring solace, but for now we will concentrate on using
first-order resources. The intuitively committing force of directly referential expressions
was upheld in chapter 4, where we concluded that denotation without connotation is a
useful sufficient condition for committing expressions. Like variables, directly referential
expressions are capable of singling out an object without communicating anything about
its nature. In this chapter we encountered further reasons to believe that logic can speak
of objects in the most general sense: it does not sort or order objects according to nature,
but collects all objects together in one domain, leaving their natures for the special sciences
to fill in. Since neither variables nor constants are concerned with natures, they do not
interfere with impartiality. In the next chapter, we will consider how our epistemology-




In the previous chapter it became apparent that it is possible for existence and objecthood
to be part of the subject matter of logic even though logic is the most general discipline
of all. Logic can be both absolutely general and topic-neutral, without that entailing
that it tells us nothing about what objects there are, or how they are. All it means
is that logic confines itself to speaking of reality in the most general terms. It ought
not to discriminate between objects on the basis of their natures, since that is the task
of the special sciences. The question now arises how our choice of canonical language
combined with this philosophy of logic affects our conception of objecthood and the process
of regimenting a theory.
We concluded in favour of a language of regimentation with two kinds of committing ex-
pressions: constants and variables. Both are bona fide committing expressions, we found in
chapter 4, since they denote without connoting: they single out a being without making any
comment on its nature. Logic, and the language of regimentation, treat objects impartially:
they leave ordering and categorising things to the special sciences, speaking of them only
qua things. The objective is for the language of regimentation to be epistemology-neutral
as well as neutral on nature. We want to be able to translate object-foundationalists as us-
ing constants as committing expressions, holists as using variables, hybrid theories as using
both. Our main complaint about Quine’s process of regimentation was that it misrepre-
sents those who wish to commit directly. By banishing all directly referential resources, he
built thin objecthood and facsimile identity into the syntax. One of the tasks for a neutral
language of regimentation is to avoid building another epistemological perspective into the
syntax. Strict object-foundationalists like Barcan Marcus assume that objects are encoun-
terable things, out there for us to find without first needing to limn their boundaries by
description. Can our language of regimentation be neutral enough to translate both Quine
and Barcan Marcus without prejudicing the debate? And does the hybrid conception have
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a coherent story to tell, given that it admits both methods?
In this final chapter we will encounter reasons to answer ‘Yes’ to both questions. Logical
languages are especially helpful for ontology for various reasons: they separate being from
nature, and their truth depends on correctly representing the most general aspects of the
world, including objecthood. An additional argument states that non-computable logics,
which have the expressive strength to encode relational vocabulary, are especially useful
for ontology because their ability to express relations enables them to state criteria of
identity in terms of equivalence relations. This conception of objecthood, loosely based on
Frege according to whom logic incorporates the notion of different representations centring
on a common object, gives pride of place to identity. Logic can express representations
of an identical common object. All this is compatible with translating Quinean theories
without demanding that we adopt his problematic identity-facsimile. We adopt a system
with primitive identity that also allows identity to be definable for some systems or some
ontological categories within a system. To achieve this we draw upon Barcan Marcus’
distinctions between different kinds of extensionality. According to her, to extensionalise
is to equate identity with a weaker equivalence relation. Explicit extensionality principles
can be formulated for whole theories of for particular metaphysical categories within the
theory. Some categories within a theory may be subject to criteria of identity while others
are not. The circumstances under which things can be declared identical will depend on
their role in the system and the theory’s epistemology.
Quine declares all objects identical whenever they are indiscernible according to our best
theory. In a neutral language of regimentation, this would take the form of a theory-wide
explicit extensionality principle. For philosophers who admit direct access, indiscernibility
according to the theory does not imply identity. Some descriptively indiscernible things
may be discerned by direct access, e.g. ostensively or introspectively. Such objects will not
be subject to criteria of identity. Hybrid theorists believe in direct contact with things, but
they need not think that all objects can be accessed directly. Our mode of access to some
kinds of objects, mathematical objects for instance, may be purely descriptive. In that case
some kind of extensionality principle applies: e.g. sets are held to be identical iff they have
all and only the same members. I will conclude that for the purposes of determining their
ontology, philosophers should be translated into a canonical language at least as strong
as first-order logic with constants, where their directly referential expressions, if they use
them, are translated as constants, and their discourse, if they engage in it, about ontological
categories whose members we can only access by description or abstraction is translated
in descriptive terms, where the committing expressions are variables.
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6.1 An Improved Canonical Language
6.1.1 Regimentation without Built-In Holism
In chapter 1 we found that there are good reasons for agreeing with Quine that the objectual
variables of a theory translated into a properly logical language are committing expressions.
They neatly separate talk of being from talk of nature, facilitate ontological reduction, and
have no trouble bringing to the fore those commitments that remain hidden in natural-
language theories. But Quine’s language of regimentation has a significant drawback: it
lacks the syntactic resources to model direct commitment via the use of a directly referential
expression. Quine has a rather thin conception of objecthood. He simply equates being an
object with being posited on the intersection of persistently overlapping observations, any
one of them being always potentially dispensable. Both this and the ban on direct reference
are ultimately the result of global holism. Non-holists have ontologies too, so we want a
framework for asking and answering ontological questions that is not beholden to any
particular epistemology. In the third chapter, we considered reasons for admitting another
kind of commitment, namely commitment via direct contact with an object. The contrast
between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description applies to commitment
too: here the contrast is between committing to an object qua individual, and commitment
to an object-qua-F, qua satisfier of some description. There is a good case to be made for
adding directly referential expressions to the language of regimentation because all purely
objectual expressions, at least, present objects as logic sees them: only as objects, leaving
their natures and relations to each other to the special sciences.
If there are acts of cognition where a mind reaches out directly to an object, then intuitively
speaking the object should surely go into that epistemic agent’s ontology. The vehicles for
such codification are directly referential expressions, or in formal languages, the constants.
They are purely objectual expressions—the interpretation assigns them objects as their
values; they stand for objects without any help from the ideology. We need not deny that
pronominal expressions whose regimented analogues are variables are committing on that
basis: it is perfectly coherent to have two kinds of objectual committing expressions. Nor
does it mean that all expressions that look directly referential in ordinary language should
be translated as committing expressions. Although all directly committing expressions go
into the language of regimentation as individual constants, which expressions are trans-
lated as such depends on the theory which is being regimented, and potentially on the
epistemology of the person who propounds it. Philosophers differ over which expressions
are directly referential. Barcan Marcus [Mar61] and Kripke [Kri80] both think that proper
names are directly referential, but Barcan Marcus means by this only names of actualia
[Mar85], whereas Kripke seems to suggest that possibilia can also have directly referential
names [Kri80]. Russell believes in directly referential expressions [Rus10], but thinks that
there are far fewer of them than Kripke and Barcan Marcus do. Ordinary-language proper
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names, for him, are not directly referential but short for definite descriptions. An early
temporal slice of him believes that the self is a proper object of acquaintance, so ‘I’ is a
directly referential committing expression, as are ‘this’ and ‘that’ [Rus10, Rus12]. Soon
afterwards, he ceases to believe in the self [Rus19]; his set of directly referential expressions
then shrinks to only ‘this’ and ‘that’. On these grounds it would make sense to translate
Barcan Marcus’ theory into canonical notation by rendering names of persons as constants,
but names of fictional objects or mere possibilia as definite descriptions. Since she disavows
commitment to fictional objects or possibilia, these should be thought of as logical construc-
tions; no existentially quantified sentences about them follow from her regimented theory.
Unlike Barcan Marcus, Kripke thinks of variables as committing expressions [Kri76]. Since
he also admits ineliminable Millian names, it is plausible to class him, with Russell, as
a devotee of the hybrid criterion of commitment that comes with a foundherentist atti-
tude towards objects: they allow commitment by acquaintance as well as by description.
In translating the early Russell, ‘I’ and ‘this’ would be rendered as constants, names of
persons as definite descriptions. Translating Quine yields only definite descriptions and
existentially quantified sentences, since he rejects proper names and direct contact with
objects. The epistemology-neutral language of regimentation ought to accommodate all
three, so it should be at least as strong as first-order logic with individual constants.
6.1.2 Revisiting the Desiderata
In 1.2 we laid out some desiderata for ontological commitment:
1. that there must be some ontologically committing expressions, and some ex-
pressions that are not committing.
2. that it can account for true and coherent negative existentials, or statements
of non-being, by explaining how a true statement of the form pThere is no x such
that Fxq, or pThere is no x such that a = xq, is true because ‘F ’, or ‘a’, does not
apply to anything.
3. that it counts among the commitments of a theory not only those entities it explicitly
asserts there are or refers to, but also those that it implicitly relies on.
4. that it explains interdependence between metaphysical categories, especially at-
tempts at reduction.
Quinean commitment, which translates theories into a properly logical language and dis-
quotes all existentially quantified sentences of the resulting regimented theory closed under
consequence, performs well on these criteria. The ontologically committing expressions are
all and only the variables; only they stand for objects, all other expressions are logical op-
erators or lexicon. The committing expressions are not only clearly circumscribed, but also
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apparent in the regimented surface grammar. If nothing is F , everything in the domain
fails to satisfy ‘F ’, and so ‘¬∃xFx’ readily follows. This provides a clear account of what
it is for there to be no F s: all the beings, the objects in the domain, are such that ‘F ’ is
false of them. There is no need for obscure categories like impossible objects or nonexistent
beings. Formalisation is also helpful in explaining interdependence. Someone who thinks
that mental states are brain states, for instance, must attempt to state her theory in such
a way that its regimented version quantifies only over brain states whilst explaining mental
phenomena. In general, if talk of F s can be translated speaking only of Gs, then F s are
reducible to Gs. Where the F s and Gs in question are assumed in the background in
a natural-language theory, we naturally think about whether an existence claim logically
follows from its statements. Ordinary-language vagueness and ambiguity can hide their
entailment, so translation into a formal language ensures that implicit commitments are
just existentially quantified consequences of a fully regimented theory.
How does our improved language of regimentation fare on the desiderata? Using a first-
order logical language preserves the virtues of Quinean regimentation: taking into account
implicit as well as explicit commitments, a well-defined consequence relation, a univocal
treatment of ontological vocabulary like ‘there is’ and ‘exists’. The main difference with
Quinean commitment is that the ontologically committing expressions also include con-
stants. Constants will be used in translating some philosopher’s theory into canonical no-
tation whenever she is plausibly interpreted as attempting to commit to an object directly.
So we can account for negative existentials with constants in them, of the form pThere is
no x such that a = xq, by showing that no object in the domain is called ‘a’.
A first-order language with objectual quantification, constants, and identity is preferable to
a language of regimentation with only constants as committing expressions, along the lines
Barcan Marcus proposes [Mar72, Mar78]. Her language can account for negative existen-
tials: ‘¬∃x(x=a)’ follows just in case none of its theorems contain ‘a’ as a tag, and ¬∃xFx’
iff no referent of a tag satisfies ‘F ’. But implicit commitment and interdependence resist
translation into her idiom of choice. We noted in 3.5.4 that since constants must be enu-
merable, Barcan Marcus has no way of speaking about metaphysical categories presumed
to have non-enumerably many members, such as numbers, sets, space-time points, or pos-
sible worlds. I explained then that this is not an oversight, but a natural outgrowth of her
nominalism and strict object-foundationalism; she prefers to interpret such locutions, in-
cluding modal and propositional vocabulary, in substitutional terms. Contact with objects
is only ever direct, the mind reaching out to an individual and assigning a tag to it—a pro-
cess which seems as explicit as any. There are no hidden existential assumptions, since the
variables in existentially quantified consequences of a theory do not count as committing
expressions for her. Our language of regimentation respects her insistence on commitment
via direct access to objects; her substitutional reading of mathematical, propositional and
modal discourse can be rendered as simulated quantification, as in Quine’s virtual theory
of classes [Qui70, pp. 68-74] and simulated propositional quantification [Qui70, pp. 74-75].
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On this reading, sets, propositions, etcetera are logical constructions to which there is no
commitment.
6.1.3 Primitive vs. Facsimile Identity
Another change we have made compared to Quine’s language of regimentation is the in-
terpretation of the identity predicate. In 1.4–1.5 above, I conjectured that there is a
connection between Quine’s strangely thin conception of objecthood and his predilection
for facsimile identity which boils down to indiscernibility-within-the-theory. The variable
is no more than an x that marks the spot where observations overlap. Objects are mere
posits, always dispensable if the theory demands it. Quine’s criterion of commitment is
very well integrated with his epistemology and his philosophy of logic, but thereby becomes
ill-equipped to account for individuals that can be identical or distinct simpliciter. His con-
strual of objecthood as positing fits with a philosophy of logic which separates being from
nature. Objects qua objects, not qua satisfying some description, are part of the subject
matter of logical theory, since logic treats all objects impartially. But according to Quine’s
criterion theories only have commitments to objects-qua-F, for F s supplied by the ideology,
because objects are hypostatised on their intersections. So to say that two objects are the
same is just to say that they are the same object-qua-F : that is, indiscernible according
to the theory. Stronger equivalence relations are not needed. And replacing the primitive
identity predicate with a defined facsimile means that nothing stronger than intra-theoretic
indiscernibility can be expressed. Translating Quine into canonical notation now poses the
problem of accurately representing his weakening of the equivalence relation in question
(called ‘extensionalising’ in 3.4.3).
6.2 Identity, Identifiability, and Thin vs. Robust Objects
The arguments of chapters 3 and 4 made facsimile identity seem dubious. The usual reading
of the identity predicate is that it expresses the strongest equivalence relation, namely being
the same thing. A key objection to reading facsimile-identity in place of primitive identity
was Ramsey’s (see 3.3.4, 4.2.3): it is always logically possible for indiscernibles to be
distinct [Ram31, p. 31]. In the object language, all weaker equivalences are necessary,
but not sufficient, for sameness of thing. Identity entails indiscernibility, sameness of
spatiotemporal location, sameness of colour, etcetera; but sameness in a respect can never
formally entail sameness of thing.
Ramsey’s objection is one reason to favour identity as a logical predicate. Another consid-
eration is the possibility of direct contact with an object, such as introspection, ostension
or acquaintance. Descriptive indiscernibility may do very well for objects-qua-F, but does
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not imply identity where objects are introduced by means of a directly referential expres-
sion. These can be descriptively indiscernible, but ostensively or introspectively discernible.
Non-holists, it seems, have a more robust conception of objecthood. For Quine’s objects-
qua-F, it is a given that any one of them is dispensable whenever the theory demands
it. Other intersections of observations could be chosen as focal points for reification. But
objects to which my mind reaches out directly are not so easily dispensed with. Perhaps
I cannot coherently explain away my own existence as an observer, or the existence of my
current mental state.
Ramsey’s objection reminds us that as far as philosophy of logic is concerned, there is
no reason to promulgate the identification of indiscernibles. So Quine’s attempt to build
facsimile identity into the very grammar of logic grants too much power to syntax. Distinct
indiscernible objects are certainly not a logical impossibility. Nevertheless, in a theory like
Quine’s which admits only objects-qua-F as elements of the ontology, the identification
of indiscernibles is perfectly defensible: where we encounter an object-qua-F, followed by
an object-qua-all-and-only-the-same-F s, we only have reason to posit one thing. Facsimile
identity is a good fit for objects-qua-F, since they are subject to some sort of criterion
of identity. An epistemology-neutral language of regimentation should make room for
the kind of direct commitment Quine cannot shoehorn into his grammar, but without
making Quine’s grammar appear incoherent in turn. Our language must find some way of
encompassing Quine’s facsimile, and his thin objects, as well as the more robust kind of
objecthood that comes with primitive identity.
6.2.1 The ‘Common Objectual Bearing’ Argument
Why should we think of logic as having something to say about the identity or distinctness
of objects? In 5.2.1 above we saw that Frege, with the help of his new, improved polyadic
logic, challenged Kant’s contention that logic is completely separate from being and reality,
and can be true in the absence of any existents whatsoever. Frege defends a strong thesis
of logical objecthood. He not only thinks that being comprises part of the subject matter
of logic, but also that there are special logical beings, the posits of logic: extensions. As
we all know, his theory of extensions is unfortunately inconsistent. Still, the absence of
special logical beings does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that logic is not about
beings at all. Singling out some among the objects for special treatment is different from
making the existential assumption that there are objects in a general way. A more modest
argument for a theoretical connection between logic and being can be made, one that does
not posit special logical beings, but on which logic does speak of objects qua objects. The
argument is based on the increased expressive power that polyadic logic has compared to
Kant’s monadic Aristotelian logic. Sullivan notes that Frege’s logic incorporates the notion
of a ‘common objectual bearing’ [Sul04, p. 718], unlike monadic logic. Although Sullivan
does not elaborate much on the meaning of ‘common objectual bearing’, I proposed in
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5.2.1 that it is related to polyadic logic’s capacity to express relations, specifically equiv-
alence relations. Monadic logic, having no relational vocabulary, can speak of objects by
means of names or variables, but has no way of putting things equal to each other, or, in
Sullivan’s words, of saying that two representations have an objectual bearing in common.
Without a way of settling whether purported objects are held to be identical or distinct,
the cardinality of a theory is indeterminate. So it is difficult to state the ontology of a
theory formulated exclusively in a monadic language. Some headway might be made by
adopting the Tractarian convention [Wit74] that the use of a different expression implies
that a new referent is introduced. But this does not help make sense of the possibility
that two things posited for different purposes might turn out to be the same thing. Nor
does it allow for the possibility of reduction and paraphrase. This problem is reminiscent
of the issues we identified with Carnapian deflationism in 2.3, where variables of different
kinds cannot be put equal to each other [vI02]. In a monadic language nothing can be put
equal to anything, even itself, so the possibility of theoretical identification of two posits
previously held to be distinct is blocked off completely.
Frege’s tendency to think of common objectual bearing as belonging logic suggests a thicker
conception of objecthood, to which identity is integral: two representations share a common
objectual bearing by both centring on a common identical object. But in fact Frege wavers
between taking identity as primitive [Fre67] and defined, sometimes arguing that identity
between objects is ‘complete coincidence’, or having all their properties and relations in
common [Fre97, p. 177]. This indicates that although Frege believes that identity cannot
be construed as merely language-relative and extra-logical, he also takes identity to be
definable for some systems or some ontological categories within a system. Frege, always
careful to distinguish object from concept, does not put forward a criterion of identity
properly so-called for functions, but a second-order analogue of identity, which holds for
functions with all and only the same objects in their extensions [Fre97, p. 177].
6.2.2 Kinds and Criteria of Identity
Even in a first-order language like our improved language of regimentation, criteria of
identity might be appropriate for some of the metaphysical categories of a given theory. If
an object is introduced specifically as ‘whatever satisfies the condition “F”’, treating it as
an object-qua-F is reasonable. Two objects-qua-F, for example, encountered in different
theoretical contexts, both of which satisfy the condition of being natural numbers without
predecessors, have a good claim to be identified. Numbers and other mathematical posits
are a paradigm case of objects which we access, if at all, wholly by descriptive methods—
criteria of identity seem appropriate for metaphysical categories accessed by descriptive
methods only. This implies that although ‘0’ looks syntactically like a name, it is natural
to think of it as a disguised description, short for ‘the natural number which is not a
successor’. The word ‘0’ thus understood is not a Millian name, since it has sense as well
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as reference. It should go into the regimented version of this theory as a descriptive phrase,
not a constant.
The task of the logical part of the theory is not, like Quine says, to present objects only
as idealised nodes, mere points of confluence of observable characteristics; that view would
entail his thin conception of objects and his facsimile of identity, amounting to mere indis-
cernibility within the theory. His treatment of identity runs up against Ramsey’s objection:
being indistinguishable by predicates, no matter how sophisticated, never entails being the
same thing. Still, when Quine says that ‘to try to decide whether the penny now in my
pocket is the one that was there last week, or just another one like it, I would have to
explore quite varied aspects of my overall scheme of things’ [Qui92, p. 24] he appears to
be making a sensible point about identifying two purported middle-sized physical objects.
We need significant descriptive resources to identify something as a penny, which must
be invoked to identify something as last week’s penny. But criteria of identity that are
purely third-personally descriptive do not help Sally the scientist from chapter 4, who was
confronted with two descriptively indiscernible data points which are distinguishable only
ostensively. That is not an issue we are likely to face with numbers, since our methods
for getting in contact with numbers were presumed to be description-only, never ostensive
or introspective. In the case of Sally’s data points, she has, according to Quine, good
theoretical reasons to identify the two: they are objects-qua-F for all and only the same
descriptive F s. Still her sense perceptions tell against it: there are clearly two objects. In
this case, although there are some descriptive methods involved in identifying a data point,
purely descriptive criteria of identity are likely to lead us astray.
When are criteria of identity appropriate? And what is the difference between such enti-
ties as numbers, middle-sized dry goods, and presently occurring mental states? To answer
these questions we take a page out of Barcan Marcus’ book, and turn to her characteri-
sation of intensionality and extensionality. We saw in 3.4.3 that Barcan Marcus believes
that extensionality comes in degrees, with languages being more extensional the weaker the
strongest equivalence relation they substitute for identity. I noted then that her character-
isation is accurate for Quine, who in general holds indiscernibility-according-to-the-theory
to be the strongest equivalence relation expressible in any language which meets his stan-
dards. Within those languages certain metaphysical categories can be given even weaker
criteria of identity, which Barcan Marcus spells out in terms of extensionality principles.
The solution I want to give to the present problem is that the different kinds of access which
epistemic agents can have to different kinds of objects dictate what kind of extensionalising
principles are appropriate, if any.
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6.3 Access to Objects and Explicit Extensionality
6.3.1 Barcan Marcus on Extensionality
According to Barcan Marcus [Mar60, Mar61] the contrast between intensionality and ex-
tensionality is not all or nothing; rather, languages can be extensional to a higher or lower
degree. The more extensional the language, the weaker its strongest equivalence relation.
An implicit extensionalising principle holds for a language when it forms part of its govern-
ing logic or grammar, which entails that the language cannot express fully-fledged identity,
but only some weaker equivalence, like indiscernibility. Quine’s insistence that logic proper
does not contain a fully-fledged identity predicate, but only his defined facsimile, can be
seen in Barcanian parlance as an implicit extensionalising principle. Instead of primitive
identity, the defined predicate of facsimile identity abbreviates exhaustive lists of same-
ness with respect to all the predicates [Qui70, p. 64]. From within the object language,
facsimile-identical objects are impossible to tell apart, since they are objects-qua-all-and-
only-the-same-F s. Speaking about such a language, though, it is easy to demonstrate that
such objects are only indiscernible-according-to-that-language, which does not entail that
they are identical tout court.
Explicit extensionality principles will be helpful for regimenting criteria of identity. As we
noted in 3.4.3, they have a logical form along the lines of
(EEP) x eq y → xIy,
where ‘eq’ stands for some equivalence relation weaker than identity, ‘I’ stands for identity,
‘→’ is a conditional that is part of the language or a metalinguistic conditional, and ‘x’
and ‘y’ go proxy for purely objectual expressions [Mar61]. There are two kinds of explicit
extensionality principles: those that hold for a language or system as a whole, and those
that govern only some particular category within it. We saw in 3.4.3 that Barcan Marcus
would classify Quine’s ‘reading identity in place of river kinship’ [Qui50, p. 66] as an
explicit extensionality principle for rivers.
Our aim is to achieve a language of regimentation that can regiment the theories of both
Barcan Marcus, who thinks that all objectual expressions are directly referential, and
that encounterable objects cannot be paraphrased away, and Quine, who denies both
those claims. One step towards an epistemology-neutral theory of ontological commitment
with regimentation is to make Quine’s global implicit extensionalising principles explicit.
Quine’s views on theory formation—moving from feature-placing observations to reification
on the loci of significant overlap—lead him to speak as though all languages, all of which
share a logical structure, have an extensionality principle built into them: that whenever
two objects are objects-qua-all-and-only-the-same-F s, they count as the same object. That
principle of extensionality, which remains implicit in Quine, merely part of the background
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logic, should be brought to the foreground in a neutral language of regimentation, and
translated as an explicit extensionality principle for his theory.
My reservations about Quine’s insistence on global criteria of identity stemmed from his
thin conception of objecthood. For him, the only handle we have on objecthood is via the
use of variables, which are used to mark significant intersections in observations. Although
this makes objecthood a logical notion in that all objectual expressions are part of the
logical vocabulary, it entails that identity is not a logical notion, but explained away as
indiscernibility within the language. In chapters 4 and 5 we covered the question of object-
hood as a logical notion in our language of regimentation; it was found not to depend on
logical committing expressions or rejection of primitive identity. The point of this section
is that a language of regimentation like the one I propose, with constants and primitive
identity, does not amount to making thin objecthood or criteria of identification impossi-
ble to understand. Quine’s language is implicitly extensionalised; it incorporates facsimile
identity into the very syntax of logic, which is to build an epistemological perspective into
its grammar. But our language, which is not implicitly extensionalised, does not thereby
make extensionalising principles—even global ones—incoherent: it just demands that they
be made explicit, so that a holist language is forced to wear its epistemic presuppositions
on its sleeve. Besides global extensionalising principles for specific regimented theories,
many theories will also contain extensionalising principles for specific metaphysical cate-
gories.
6.3.2 Metaphysical Categories and Extensionality
Besides being a matter of degree rather than all-or-nothing, Barcan Marcus’ extensionality
also provides the option of category-restricted extensionality principles. Some categories
are more strongly extensional than others. Sets are a good example of a metaphysical
category that is subject to an explicit extensionality principle. Two sets are normally
thought to be identical if all their members are identical, which is encapsulated by the
Axiom of Extensionality: ∀x(x ∈ a ↔ x ∈ b) → a = b. Sets have a clear criterion of
identity, namely having all and only the same members. A rather weak equivalence rela-
tion is held to be sufficient for identity. Properties, by contrast, are usually described as
being more strongly intensional than sets. Their criterion of identity will be formulated
in terms of a stronger equivalence relation than that of sets, because two properties can
be intuitively distinct even though they have exactly the same instances. Every creature
with a heart is a creature with a kidney. Yet the property of being a cordate and the
property of being a renate seem like two different things. So the extensionalising principle
in question equates identity for properties with a stronger equivalence relation than the one
that works for sets. The criterion of identity for properties is controversial, but certainly
involves sameness in more respects than having all the same instances. Those who believe
in both properties and particulars take particulars to be more strongly extensional than
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properties. Identifying two particulars on the grounds that they satisfy all the same de-
scriptions runs up against Ramsey’s objection that such indiscernibility does not formally
entail identity, and against the possibility of first-personal or ostensive individuation. To
institute purely descriptive criteria of identity for particulars would be contentious to say
the least. But most realists about properties do accept some form of purely descriptive
criteria of identity for properties; properties and other universals are not usually thought
of as being first-personally or ostensively encounterable. So it is not especially contentious
to reject indiscernible properties.
6.3.3 Barcan Marcus, Russell’s Thesis and Encounterable Objects: Foun-
dationalism and the Rejection of Criteria of Identity
These reflections suggest that criteria of identity are suitable for objects which we access by
descriptive methods. Such objects are usually introduced into the theory as posits: objects
hypostatised by the theory to function as best explanations of observed phenomena. As
they are specifically introduced qua satisfier of some description, there is no objection
to treating them as objects-qua-F. Adherence to a strictly holist epistemology is not a
requirement for this use of posits, which is open to object-foundherentists too. Objects
of direct commitment resist such treatment. Let us call such entities ‘encounterables’.
Encounterables, denoted by constants, are not thin objects, tentatively marked on the foci
of theoretically interesting patterns of observations. They are, according to the theories
in question, out there in the world for us to bump into unthinkingly, possibly without any
help from the ideology. Since the mind reaches out to them directly, it is harder to think
of them as potentially dispensable.
In a theory like Barcan Marcus’, where all objects in the ontology are encounterables, only
primitive identity is admitted and there are no criteria of identity. Recall Russell’s Thesis
from section 3.3.4, also endorsed by Barcan Marcus: ‘the identity sign is ... never flanked
by descriptive phrases’ [Mar85, p. 191], but only by constants and variables. Names that
are to be translated as constants cannot be disguised descriptions or in any way retain
descriptive features. Since identity only obtains between a thing and itself, only purely
objectual expressions —including Millian names and variables—can be used in identity
statements. Indirectly referential expressions, like descriptions, will not do because instead
of picking out the thing directly, they determine their referent through satisfaction of
some descriptive phrase. This very technique disqualifies them from flanking the identity
predicate because they single out objects qua satisfier of some description, turning the
object in question into an object-qua-F, for which the identity of indiscernibles should hold.
Criteria of identity specify some condition the object must satisfy, which does nothing to
prevent the possibility of Ramsey’s objection arising: that two things may well both satisfy
that condition and still be distinct.
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6.3.4 Direct Commitment: No Criteria of Identity
All theories grounded in strict object-foundationalism only admit direct commitment us-
ing constants, captured by the criterion ‘to be is to be the referent of a constant’. A
fully regimented theory of this sort will not contain any criteria of identity for elements of
the ontology, all of which are encounterables. Encounterables are not objects-qua-F, but
capable of being objects of acquaintance or other direct methods without descriptive in-
termediary. Extensionalising principles stipulate that, for the purposes of some particular
theory, there is some cluster of descriptive conditions which provides sufficient reason to
consider any two objects-qua-F which satisfy them to be identical. But Barcan Marcus
does not conceive of any of the elements of her ontology as objects-qua-F : all commitment
is to encounterables.
Although Barcan Marcus’ own characterisation of her canonical language does contain ex-
tensionalising principles, when we translate her theory into first-order logic with constants
and identity they disappear. This is because our preferred quantification is objectual, not
substitutional. When Barcan Marcus introduces terms and substitutional quantification
to talk of mathematical entities, possibilia, propositions and universals, none of this talk
is committing since no such entities are assigned purely objectual tags, and their variables
never take tag-substituends. So for our purposes, this is simulated quantification, since it
cannot be characterised in terms of committing expressions. She contends that extensional-
ising principles hold for such simulated entities, but not for the referents of tags. But in my
preferred language of regimentation, we would represent Barcan Marcus’ tags as constants,
and her substitutional quantification without tag-substituends as logical constructions: in-
complete symbols which disappear upon analysis, along the lines of [Qui70, pp. 68-74].
The theory could contain contextual definitions for the purposes of ontological reduction,
paraphrasing away such entities, or entail negative existentials featuring descriptions of
them, but cannot contain reference to them.
It should be noted, though, that whether or not an object is encounterable is theory-relative,
not a feature of the object’s nature. It depends on the kind of access that particular
theory takes epistemic agents to have to objects in general, or to objects of that kind.
Barcan Marcus adheres to a kind of classic nominalism where everyday objects are directly
encounterable, and the purported posits of mathematics, modal logic, propositional objects,
etcetera are barred from the ontology because they fail to fit her nominalist model of
encounterability [Mar78]. I also mentioned earlier on that it might be natural to think of
mental entities characterised by privileged access as a likely example of encounterables, and
of mathematical entities as the opposite end of the spectrum: objects to which our access
is purely descriptive. Object-foundationalists like Barcan Marcus firmly reject the latter;
holists like Quine debar the former from their ontologies. But I do not mean to suggest
that it is mandatory to think of the former as encounterables, or that mathematical entities
can only be thought of as objects-qua-F. Mental entities might be the subject of indirect
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commitment in an epiphenomenalist theory. They would then be translated into canonical
notation as descriptions.
6.3.5 Indirect Commitment and Extensionalising: Criteria of Identity
Some theories are governed by an epistemology which only allows for indirect contact with
objects. Quine’s view is the familiar example.1 They should be translated into the language
of regimentation without constants, using only variables as committing expressions. All
objects in such theories are objects-qua-F. They contain a global extensionalising principle,
a criterion of identity for all objects: objects which are indiscernible with respect to all open
formulae of the theory are to count as identical. All equivalence relations are extensionalised
to some degree in these theories: identity is always equated with some slightly weaker
equivalence relation, such as descriptive indiscernibility. In addition to that, these theories
sometimes contain specialised criteria of identity for particular categories. Such criteria
might impose weaker equivalence relations than intra-theoretical indiscernibility, making
some categories within the theory more strongly extensional than others. In Quine’s case,
for instance, two spatiotemporal zones are identical iff they have the same co-ordinates.
The identity of rivers requires additional criteria: sameness of co-ordinates as well as the
presence of flowing water in sufficient quantities [Qui50]. For someone like Armstrong
(temporarily setting aside the difficulties first-order regimentation presents for him), sets
are identical iff they have all their members in common, but properties are less strongly
extensional: they have to share all their instances as well as sharing their explanatory role
in natural laws [Arm80].
6.3.6 Metaphysical Categories and Extensionality for Hybrid Commit-
ment
A theory in which a hybrid criterion of commitment holds may contain some objects which
are presented by the theory as things with which our minds can have direct, unmediated
contact. Those objects are encounterables, represented in the regimented theory by con-
stants, and are not subject to criteria of identity. Identity for encounterables is primitive:
simply old-fashioned sameness of thing. So hybrid theories do not contain a global exten-
sionalising principle equating identity with indiscernibility-according-to-the-theory. But
they reserve the right to introduce extensionalising principles for some of their metaphys-
ical categories. Whether an object counts as an encounterable vs. an object-qua-F for a
1As we saw above, this might also apply to the later Frege—the Frege of [Fre97] where he equates
identity between objects with ‘complete coincidence’, falling under all and only the same concepts, and its
second-order analogue for functions with having identical extensions [Fre97, p. 177].
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particular theory depends on how the theory views the kind of cognitive access that epis-
temic agents have to the objects in that category. It may seem more natural to think of a
mental state as directly encounterable than to think of a set that way. But philosophers
can coherently put forward theories of noëtic rays or mathematical intuition, and believe
they assign names directly to sets or numbers; such names would then be rendered in the
language of regimentation as constants.
A more conventional treatment of numbers suggests that our only access to them is via de-
scriptions. Mathematical ‘names’, on such a view, are actually disguised descriptions, such
as ‘0’ for ‘the natural number which is not a successor’. Such singular terms should always
be regimented into descriptive form. By contrast purely objectual constants, if they are
not to fall afoul of Russell’s thesis, cannot have any descriptive content. If they were, their
singling out their referent would be conditional upon the referent’s satisfying that descrip-
tion. But true names, which are to be translated as constants, are Dartmouth-invariant:
once assigned, they never fail to apply, or cease to apply, depending on ideological changes
in their referents. Singular terms which retain descriptive meaning are not Dartmouth-
invariant. We could coherently continue to call a city ‘Dartmouth’ after the river Dart
changed its course [Mil84, p. 20], but to wonder whether 0 is a successor is either to be
confused about the meaning of ‘0’, or perhaps to ponder a change or refinement in math-
ematical definitions. Extensionalising principles which function as criteria of identity are
appropriate for descriptive expressions, including descriptions in disguise: they rely on the
object’s satisfying some descriptive condition F .
Some categories of objects in hybrid theories are accessed by mixed methods: a combi-
nation of direct and indirect contact. Plausible examples include middle-sized physical
objects, the boundaries of which are settled by descriptive methods, but with which we
also have some perceptive contact, and sentient organisms, which are known from the out-
side by observers, and from the inside by the sentient creature itself. Another interesting
example is Maddy’s sets, the boundaries of which are delineated by conditions set out
in mathematics, but of which, she claims, we also have perceptual experience [Mad80].
Names for such entities can in some cases be translated into the language of regimentation
as purely referential constants. The mixed mode of access makes it possible to assign names
by description without thereby turning them into disguised descriptions. Apparent names
which retain some descriptive sense must be regimented in descriptive terms. But mixed
methods make it possible to deploy descriptive methods to determine the boundaries of
some object in descriptive terms, and subsequently to assign a non-connotative directly
referential expression to it. Kripke might be cited as an example here: although in general
he favours a causal theory of naming, sometimes names are assigned with the help of a
description. The examples he gives, though, are not purely descriptive, but include some
ostensive or first-personal element, as for instance when someone ‘points to a star and says,
“That is to be Alpha Centauri” . . . “By “Alpha Centauri” I shall mean the star right over
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there with such and such coordinates”’ [Kri80, p. 95].2 Names assigned by description need
not be reducible to descriptions. If they are, they must be regimented as descriptions; if
they are not, as constants. Recall the difference between theories of naming and theories of
reference: direct reference, denotation without connotation, is possible even though names
are assigned with the help of descriptive methods. We know this because names assigned
by description can be Dartmouth-invariant. Take the example given in 3.5.2 of the person
who said ‘my first baby will be called “Chris”’. Once assigned, ‘Chris’ refers to Chris inde-
pendently of Chris’s satisfying the original description. Even if it were to turn out that the
descriptive information is wholly false, because Chris turns out to have been switched at
birth, ‘Chris’ will still refer to Chris. Although the hybrid criterion would be congenial to
Russell, too, he leaves no room for this kind of assignment of names. He regards ordinary
proper names as disguised descriptions, and that is how we should translate them into
canonical notation. Constants would only be used where he believes himself to be engaged
in direct commitment, for instance, to the self and sense data in [Rus12].
6.4 A Language of Regimentation Compatible with a Broad
Range of Epistemological Views
The findings of this chapter bode well for expansions of the language of regimentation. I
have shown how adding constants to a first-order language of regimentation and allowing
for primitive identity to be used permits the translation into regimented form of a wide
variety of theories which would otherwise have run up against Quine’s prohibition on di-
rect commitment. Although Quine had his reasons for insisting that any object is just
a potentially dispensable posit, an x marking the spot of some confluence of observable
characteristics, such thin objects and the attendant facsimile identity are less useful for
non-holists. Quine builds some of his own epistemology into the syntax of logic, making
it impossible to ascribe direct commitment via introspection or acquaintance to his op-
ponents. To achieve our irenic goal of being able to let each party to the dispute state
what their commitments are in a shared language, it is vital not to build in a different
kind of epistemology that would invalidate Quinean theories. Simply substituting thick
objecthood and primitive identity will not do. Instead we used Barcan Marcus’ conception
of extensionality to bring Quine’s implicit weakening of the identity relation out into the
open, translating it as a global criterion of identity for objects-qua-F, and allowing for
2Kripke’s suggestions seem tentative, and he does not claim to be giving a theory of naming. Burgess
[Bur97] appears to indicate that Kripke takes social-historical chains to be part of the reference of names, a
theory of reference far removed from Barcanian tags. I would distinguish theories of naming from theories
of reference: historical chains are involved in naming, but it does not follow that they have to be involved
in reference. Barcan’s tags are assigned directly because she does not believe in indirect contact with
objects, not because direct reference entails causal assignment. Kripke may well believe in direct reference
in precisely the sense Barcan Marcus does.
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custom-made extensionalising principles to fit particular metaphysical categories within
non-foundationalist theories. Primitive identity can be expressed by means of directly ref-
erential expressions, but weaker forms of equivalence can go proxy for identity for objects
to which our minds reach out using descriptive methods. Some form of identification of
indiscernibles is still defensible for elements of the ontology which function in the theory
as objects-qua-F. So both the thinner, potentially dispensable, qua-F objecthood of posits
and the more robust, theory-independently encounterable objecthood of foundationalism
are accounted for. Direct, indirect and hybrid criteria of commitment are all expressible,
and no longer forced to talk past each other. It combines the good parts of Quinean
commitment—a univocal treatment of ‘being’ and all ontological vocabulary, clear expla-
nations of interdependence, ontological reduction and implicit commitment—with a realist
view of logic and quantification, while also making room for first-personal and acquaintance
commitment, and managing to be neutral on epistemology.
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Conclusion
Quine’s quantificational criterion of ontological commitment is so deeply interwoven with
Quine’s epistemology and philosophy of logic that it thereby becomes incapable of ac-
commodating commitment to individuals. His philosophy of logic has the advantages of
promoting the unity of being and the univocacy of all ontological vocabulary, and seam-
lessly explaining ontological reduction and implicit commitment, unlike natural language or
alternative logical systems. But any expressions which refer directly to individuals, though
intuitively committing, are paraphrased away in terms of descriptions under the Quinean
criterion, which allows only commitment to objects-qua-F. It leaves no room for Millian
names, first-personal vocabulary, or any way of encoding in the language of regimentation
such methods as acquaintance, ostension, or introspection, even where they further the
aims of science. The underlying reasons are to do with Quine’s adherence to behaviourism
and holism, demanding a wholly third-personal scientific language in which any object
whatsoever is potentially dispensable when the theoretical weight of the entire theory is
brought to bear. Although there is good reason to agree with Quine that a logical language
is the best medium in which to conduct ontological enquiries, his particular choice of logical
language, first-order logic without constants, was found to be too narrow.
Alternative criteria of ontological commitment with their own canonical languages can be
formulated to suit non-holist epistemologies. Where contact with an object is allowed to
be direct, thought reaching out directly to an object without the medium of a theory,
directly referential expressions can be used to capture such cognitive acts in language. The
wider sense of ontological commitment with regimentation I proposed, on which a theory’s
ontology comprises all and only the values of the objectual expressions of its translation
into canonical notation, allows a choice of objectual expressions and canonical notation. An
object-foundationalist, who countenances only direct contact with objects, will choose only
directly referential committing expressions, resulting in a first-order logic with constants, à
la Barcan Marcus. Advocates of intermediate epistemologies, such as Russell and perhaps
Kripke, adhere to a hybrid criterion: they allow commitment by acquaintance as well as
by description. They will need at least a first-order language with objectual variables as
well as constants. I therefore propose to expand the language of regimentation, at least
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to include constants. The translation process should take into account whether the theory
being translated into canonical notation allows for direct or indirect access to objects, or
both. Barcan Marcus’ extensionalising principles can be put to good use to explain why
some theories, or certain categories of objects but not others within some theories, have to
make use of criteria of identity.
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